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FROM THE EDITORS
That the People’s Republic of China has long toyed with the idea of building aircraft carriers is widely known. It is also clear that a consensus within the Chinese
military and political leadership on such a course has proven elusive. There are
increasing signs, however, that the long-standing debate on this issue has been
resolved in favor of a decision to embrace the aircraft carrier. The questions that
remain concern the scope and purpose of a Chinese carrier program (or programs), what it might reveal about current Chinese naval or grand strategy, and
what implications it will have for the U.S. Navy over the coming decades. These
questions are addressed by Nan Li and Christopher Weuve in this issue’s lead article, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update.” Professors Li and Weuve,
both of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, conclude
that for reasons of affordability and technological complexity as well as strategic
calculation, the Chinese effort will concentrate initially on a medium-sized carrier dedicated primarily to an air-defense mission on China’s southern maritime
frontier. Nevertheless, they do not rule out the possibility of China’s eventually
developing large, nuclear-powered carriers on the American model for projecting offensive power in the “far seas.”
The U.S. Navy’s recently articulated maritime strategy places special emphasis on the need for enhanced cooperation with foreign navies in the interests of
global maritime security. Such a strategy presupposes that we know our maritime partners and friends at least as well as we know our potential adversaries. It
is, to say the least, not obvious that this is currently the case. Two articles in this
issue have been specially commissioned to help address this situation. In “Great
Britain Gambles with the Royal Navy,” Geoffrey Till, director of the Corbett
Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at the University of London and the United
Kingdom’s foremost commentator on naval and maritime affairs, provides a
comprehensive survey of the current condition and future direction of the RN.
Many will be surprised to discover that the closest ally of the United States has
embarked on an ambitious program of fleet recapitalization in spite of the severe and continuing fiscal challenges it faces. Next, Jack McCaffrie and Chris
Rahman, of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security,
University of Wollongong, New South Wales, provide an informed analysis of
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the Australian defense white paper of 2009, a document that marks a watershed
in Australia’s strategic outlook and signals a significant commitment to upgrading that nation’s naval capabilities and reach. It is our intention to feature additional articles on allied navies in future issues of the Review.
Any discussion of the state of American alliances must pay particular attention to Japan, especially given recent political developments there. The resounding victory of the Democratic Party of Japan in the 2009 general election and the
formation of a new government under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama with a
broad mandate for policy and administrative reform has potentially large implications for the American presence and for American interests in East Asia, as underlined by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s visit to Tokyo in October. This
important evolution in Japanese politics and its likely impact on Japan’s foreign
and national security policies are examined by Tobias Harris in “How Will the
DPJ Change Japan?” Though it is too early to tell what reality there is behind the
DPJ’s stated commitment to working toward the creation of a new security
“community” in East Asia, the DPJ is plainly prepared to challenge aspects of
American leadership in the region—in particular, previously negotiated arrangements with respect to the U.S. military presence on Okinawa. As his title
suggests, Harris is persuaded that significant departures in Japanese security
policy should indeed be expected.
In “Engaging Oceania,” Captain Sea Sovereign Thomas, USMC, provides a
useful reminder of the continuing importance of the small island states of the
Pacific for the security of the United States and its allies in the region. Particularly in the light of the active economic and diplomatic presence in Oceania of
the People’s Republic of China, Thomas argues, it is essential that the United
States visibly engage with these states more than it is now doing, and he suggests
ways in which the U.S. Pacific Command could be the vehicle of that
engagement.
Finally, Milan Vego, professor in the Joint Military Operations Department at
the Naval War College, offers a detailed analysis of operational-level joint warfare in the Mediterranean during World War II in defense of the strategically situated island of Malta from Axis attack. Vego argues that military planners today
can learn important lessons from this history, especially in calculating acceptable levels of loss against the importance of the strategic objective.
NEW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Policy Studies Series, Number 4
Our first publication in a language other than English has recently appeared:
Paul D. Taylor, editor, Perspectivas sobre estrategia marítima: Ensayos de las
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FROM THE EDITORS

5

Américas, la nueva estrategia marítima de EE UU y comentario sobre Una
Estrategia Cooperativa para el Poder Naval en el Siglo XXI (Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, the New U.S. Maritime Strategy, and
Commentary on A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower). The book
collects essays written by representatives of Western Hemisphere navies during
the preparation of the U.S. 2007 maritime strategy (published in English as our
Newport Paper 31) and commentaries written after its appearance (published in
various issues of this journal), as well as the text of the strategy itself. U.S. Southern Command has supported the project throughout, and the book is being distributed throughout its area of responsibility; Admiral James G. Stavridis, then
Commander, U.S. Southern Command, contributed an introduction. The book
is also available for sale online by the U.S. Government Printing Office, at
http://bookstore.gpo.gov.
Historical Monograph 16
Dr. Evelyn Cherpak’s Three Splendid Little Wars: The Diary of Joseph K. Taussig,
1898–1901, is now for sale by the U.S. Government online bookstore. This diary,
Professor John B. Hattendorf writes in his foreword, is “a valuable glimpse of the
initial stage of a naval officer’s professional military education just a little over a
century ago.”
Newport Paper 34
Somalia . . . From the Sea, by Gary J. Ohls, also in press, is available in print and
on our website. Dr. Ohls, of the Naval Postgraduate School, has written an account of the repeated U.S. attempts in the 1990s, in the framework of newly developed expeditionary doctrine, to rescue Somalia from the chaos and
starvation that had engulfed it.
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Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the
fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
6 November 2008. He most recently served as Commander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in international relations from the University of Southern California, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Commanding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquarters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Director, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Newport: Where the Navy Connects to the World

THE EPIGRAPH ABOVE is what the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

Gary Roughead, told me within a month or so of my arrival as President of the Naval War College. Frankly, I had very little idea of how true this statement is until I witnessed the Nineteenth International Sea Power Symposium
(ISS), which took place in Newport from 6 to 9 October. This conference was the
brainchild of Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, who was President of the Naval
War College at the time the first one occurred, in 1969. Admiral Arleigh Burke was
in attendance and spoke at this inaugural event, now forty years ago. After World
War II, Admiral Burke had been convinced that many tough issues could be
worked out among serving naval officers if they had developed personal relationships. It was this idea that led him to create the international course, known as the
Naval Command College, back in 1956, with Colbert as its first director. In 1969,
Burke said, “When an old sailor looks back, he finds that the majority of his
friends are other naval officers, from his own country and from other countries.
People he relies on, people he trusts absolutely, people he likes, and has fun
with—whom he knows, respects, and admires—and above all, people he trusts.”
The ISS occurs every two years. It has no mandate, it has no authority to propose action as a body, and it derives no authorities from international law or the
UN Charter. It is simply a gathering of naval professionals who get together every
two years to discuss issues of common interest and, above all, to get to know each
other. Normally, about sixty or so navies show up at these events; however, the
publication of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21) changed
all that dramatically. In 2007, knowing that the strategy would be rolled out at the
ISS, almost a hundred navies attended to hear Admiral Roughead, General James
Conway, and Admiral Thad Allen announce it. The subsequent response to the
strategy has been dramatic. This year, with 104 nations represented (Vietnam and
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the Russian Federation attended for the first time), including ninety-four heads of
service, the ISS constituted the largest single gathering of senior international naval leadership in history, and what these leaders had to say was equally dramatic.
There was a common theme for this gathering—“Connecting Navies, Building
Partnerships”—and much of the discussion of speakers, panels, and “breakouts”
centered on the participation of maritime forces in voluntary networks to increase
security in the maritime domain. Such networks increase maritime domain
awareness (MDA) and maritime security, and often these regional networks are a
shared responsibility, including interagency and often intergovernmental cooperation. Chiefs of navies from every continent and others were on stage in the newly
refurbished Spruance Auditorium describing how actively their services were involved in MDA. Not so many years ago, MDA was a term viewed with skepticism
by many of them. At this ISS, not only was there a common use of the term but
many were pointing with pride to the strides they and their regional partners had
made in trying to achieve it, while working to overcome national “sea-blindness.”
You might even say that at ISS XIX we were witnesses to the beginning of a global
maritime security partnership. The CNO suggested to the chiefs that the Naval
War College gaming center be used to work through scenarios and solutions in the
year between ISSs—a suggestion that was well received.
For the first time, addresses to the assembled group by the Secretary of the
Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus, and the CNO, Admiral Roughead, were
streamed live on the Internet (see www.usnwc.edu/ISS2009). Since the conference
was conducted using interpreters in about ten languages, it will take some time for
the transcript of the proceedings to be produced, but conference participants
should have their copies in the next several months. Beyond the conference panels
and keynote speakers, there was much substantive business conducted at ISS in
the “white space” in the corridors and during one-on-one meetings between
chiefs. More than one told me, “I just took over recently, and imagine, this is where
I met all the chiefs of my region for the first time—in Newport.” A senior U.S. naval leader indicated that he was able to meet with all the navy chiefs in his region
with one single trip—“It would cost the taxpayers much more for me to fly to each
individual nation to conduct this type of business.” Normally the Naval War College in Newport has between 80 and 120 officers from over 50 countries in attendance, and many of these officers were able to meet with their chiefs of navy
during the recent symposium. ISS and its connection with CS21 is a huge
good-news story for everyone in the world. From where I sit, maritime security is
improving, with a view to obstructing terrorists and criminals, and perhaps even
making war less likely. The faculty here at the Naval War College is pleased and
proud to have played a part in all this, and we enjoy a very close working relationship with the Navy Staff; it’s an exceptional team effort. I think Arleigh Burke is
smiling today.
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Of course, ISS, while of global importance, is not the only event that occurs
here in Newport. It’s another example of the rich and varied activities that go on at
the Naval War College, as we enter the 125th anniversary of the founding of this
professional graduate institution. Recently we co-sponsored a conference on the
Arctic with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, sponsored a conference on
irregular warfare, hosted the editor of Fortune magazine (who spoke to our students and supporters), and co-sponsored a conference with the Atlantic Council
centering on maritime domain awareness. As I write this, our international students are heading out to visit the western part of the United States, and we have a
delegation of Mexican Navy officers observing our Joint Military Operations
planning exercise to learn how we use joint war gaming to support our teaching
curriculum.
As we did with our participants in the International Sea Power Symposium, I
would like to encourage our readers as well as our students to speak up, to speak
their minds, to talk about some of these issues that are central to the future of our
navy and our nation. It is not enough to be interested; I would go farther, to say
you must engage. I say this especially to naval professionals—especially our students, in residence and in our distance education programs, American and international, any service or agency. For you naval officers, it will soon be your navy,
and the U.S. Navy does not have all the answers. We must absolutely learn from the
experiences of others, and we must learn to collaborate with other navies at national and regional levels, to reach out to others working on things of interest to
us. Contribute a paper, write an article together—I have told the students they
should show me their published articles or rejection slips by the end of the school
year.
By the time you read this, we should have up and running our new website
“look” and a moderated blog (discussion group) sponsored by the Naval War College, as well as the “President’s Book Club.” (As I pointed out in my “President’s
Journal” blog, the first book we’ll discuss is World War Z, by Max Brooks; it’s science fiction, but those whom I’ve talked to who have read it, get it.) Let’s get the
discussion going about things that matter to us as naval professionals and to the
nation. Read, Think, Discover, and Engage. The stakes are too high not to.

JAMES P. WISECUP

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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CHINA’S AIRCR AF T C ARRIER AMBITIONS
An Update

Nan Li and Christopher Weuve

T

his article will address two major analytical questions. First, what are the
necessary and sufficient conditions for China to acquire aircraft carriers?
Second, what are the major implications if China does acquire aircraft carriers?
Existing analyses on China’s aircraft carrier ambitions are quite insightful but
also somewhat inadequate and must therefore be updated. Some, for instance,
argue that with the advent of the Taiwan issue as China’s top threat priority by
late 1996 and the retirement of Liu Huaqing as vice chair of China’s Central
Military Commission (CMC) in 1997, aircraft carriers are no longer considered
vital.1 In that view, China does not require aircraft carriers to capture sea and air
superiority in a war over Taiwan, and China’s most powerful carrier proponent
(Liu) can no longer influence relevant decision making. Other scholars suggest
that China may well acquire small-deck aviation platforms, such as helicopter
carriers, to fulfi ll secondary security missions. These missions include naval diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antisubmarine warfare.2
The present authors conclude, however, that China’s aircraft carrier ambitions
may be larger than the current literature has predicted. Moreover, the major
implications of China’s acquiring aircraft carriers may need to be explored more
carefully in order to inform appropriate reactions on the part of the United
States and other Asia-Pacific naval powers.
This article updates major changes in the four major conditions that are
necessary and would be largely sufficient for China to acquire aircraft carriers:
leadership endorsement, financial affordability, a relatively concise naval strategy that defines the missions of carrier operations, and availability of requisite
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technologies. We argue that in spite of some unresolved issues, these changes
suggest that China is likely to acquire medium-sized aircraft carriers in the medium term for “near seas” missions and for gaining operational experience, so
that it can acquire large carriers for “far seas” operations in the long term.
These four major conditions, or variables, can be either dependent or independent, depending on circumstances. Generally speaking, central leadership
endorsement of the idea of acquiring aircraft carriers may depend on whether
the required money and technologies are available and whether an appropriate
naval strategy is formulated. There are some circumstances, however, in which
central leadership endorsement may in fact make money and technologies more
readily available and appropriate strategy more forthcoming.3 Because of such
variation in the relationship among these four major conditions (variables),
each will be discussed separately.
The article has five sections. The first four examine changes in the four major
conditions of leadership endorsement, financial affordability, appropriate naval
strategy, and requisite technologies. The concluding section discusses the major
implications if China actually acquires aircraft carriers.
LEADERSHIP ENDORSEMENT
Liu Huaqing, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commander 1982–88
and a CMC member (and its vice chair 1992–97) from 1988 to 1997, strongly
advocated carrier operations; 4 however, this idea was not endorsed by members
of the central civilian leadership, like Jiang Zemin. Lack of funding and requisite technologies may have played a role, as well as a relatively low dependence
of China’s economy on external sources of energy and raw materials. More important, however, the proposal contradicted the “new security concept” Jiang
endorsed in 1997, which highlighted “soft” approaches to China’s maritime as
well as land neighbors. This concept contributed significantly to China’s signing
of a declaration of code of conduct over the South China Sea in 2002 and the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 with Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) members, as well as to the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001.5 Because of these political and diplomatic initiatives,
the primary missions Jiang assigned to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during his reign were rather narrow and limited, confined primarily to the defense
of national sovereignty; the integrity of China’s territorial land, air, and waters;
and deterrence of Taiwan from declaring formal independence.
Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as the Chinese Communist Party general secretary in 2002 and became the CMC chair in 2004. He has required the PLA to
fulfi ll more expansive and externally oriented missions that were absent in
Jiang’s era: to secure China’s newly emerging interests in outer, maritime, and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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electromagnetic space, and to contribute to world peace through international
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. Hu has also endorsed a “far-seas operations” (远海作战) concept for the PLAN, one that implies some new level of
power-projection capability.6
Such a change is understandable for two reasons, both due to recent years of
rapid economic growth. First, China has begun to develop a stronger sense of
vulnerability stemming from its growing dependence on external energy and
raw materials, and it has become more interested in the sea-lanes that bring in
these resources. Second, investments overseas and the number of its citizens
working there are both growing. These factors should have made the idea of
acquiring aircraft carriers more acceptable to the central civilian leadership following Jiang’s retirement.
There are several indicators that this idea has been endorsed by the central
civilian leadership. On 6 March 2007, a PLA lieutenant general revealed to the
media at the annual National People’s Congress that a project to develop aircraft
carriers was proceeding smoothly. Ten days later, the minister of China’s Commission of Science and Technology in National Defense, Zhang Yuchuan, stated
that China would build its own aircraft carriers and that preparation was well
under way.7 More recently, a spokesperson of China’s Ministry of National Defense, Major General Qian Lihua, claimed that China has every right to acquire
an aircraft carrier.8 But more important, China’s defense minister, General Liang Guanglie, recently told the visiting Japanese defense minister, Yasukazu
Hamada, that China will not remain forever the only major power without an
aircraft carrier.9 All of these statements suggest that China has the intention to
acquire aircraft carriers. These forthright comments on such a politically sensitive issue would have been impossible had they not been endorsed by the central
party leadership.10
FINANCIAL AFFORDABILITY
One major reason for China’s past hesitation to acquire aircraft carriers was
a lack of funding. When Mao proposed at a CMC meeting on 21 June 1958 to
build “railways on the high seas”—oceangoing fleets of merchant ships escorted
by aircraft carriers—China’s defense budget was a mere five billion yuan/renminbi (RMB). Of that, only RMB 1.5 billion could be allocated to weapons acquisition, and out of this share the PLAN received less than RMB 200 million.
A 1,600-ton Soviet-built Gordy-class destroyer cost RMB 30 million, and the
PLAN could afford only four of them.11
The carrier project was again placed on the policy agenda in the early 1970s,
but financial constraints still prevented the initiation of a serious program.
From 1971 to 1982, China’s annual defense budget averaged about seventeen
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010

Li&Weuve.indd 15

21

11/24/2009 11:47:28 AM

16

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R EV I EW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 1, Art. 24

billion RMB. Out of less than six billion allocated for weapons acquisition each
year, the PLAN could expect to receive only several hundred million, whereas
one Type 051 destroyer cost RMB 100 million. With the endorsement of party
leader Hua Guofeng in the late 1970s, China planned to acquire an eighteenthousand-ton light aircraft carrier, either through import or coproduction, and
it was to carry the British vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (V/STOL) Harrier
aircraft. The project had to be scrapped, because the price asked by British suppliers was too high. Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping, succeeding Hua as the paramount leader, decided to cut defense spending in order to free up resources for
the civilian economy.12
From the middle to late 1980s, Liu Huaqing lobbied feverishly for carrier
operations. He proposed feasibility studies in the seventh five-year plan (FYP),
for 1991–95; research and development on key aspects of platform and aircraft
in the eighth FYP; and production
It appears that in the short run China is likely in the early 2000s. His plan was
to acquire a mediuim-sized carrier for limited, shelved, partly because of insufficient funding.13 While the defense
air defense–dominant missions.
budget had been increasing since
the early 1990s, its growth could not catch up with the rising cost of aircraft carriers, as modern designs integrated more advanced aircraft, air-defense systems,
and electronics. Funding priority was instead given to developing submarines.
By 2007, however, China’s finances had improved remarkably, with government revenue reaching $750 billion—lower than the $2.6 trillion for the United
States but higher than Japan’s $500 billion. China’s foreign exchange reserve
now ranked first in the world, reaching $1.4 trillion. As a result, China’s annual
formal defense budget had grown to $46 billion (RMB 350.9 billion). According to official estimate, about a third of China’s formal defense budget, or $15.3
billion that year, was used for weapons acquisition. Given that naval modernization is currently a high priority, the PLAN is probably now receiving several billion dollars a year just for weapons acquisition, and this figure is likely to grow
in coming years.14
Aircraft carriers come in a wide variety of sizes, costs, and capabilities. Taking into consideration the lower labor and material costs in China, the cost of
building a medium-sized, conventionally powered, sixty-thousand-ton carrier
similar to the Russian Kuznetsov class is likely to be above two billion dollars.15
But that cost is just the start, as a carrier needs aircraft and escorts. A Russian Su33 carrier-based combat aircraft costs fifty million dollars, so a notional carrier
air wing of about fifty Su-33s, several airborne early-warning (AEW) planes, and
a number of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and search-and-rescue helicopters
may cost more than three billion. A Russian Sovremenny-class guided-missile
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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destroyer costs about $600 million, so an escort force consisting of a number of
guided-missile destroyers, frigates, and supply ships may cost more than four
billion dollars. That makes the likely total cost of one carrier battle group about
ten billion dollars; the price of two carrier battle groups, which is the number
that China is likely to acquire, would be around twenty billion. That cost, spread
over a period of ten years of development, would constitute only a moderate proportion of the projected naval weapons acquisition budget during that time. The
annual cost for regular training, maintenance, repairs, and fuel for two carrier
battle groups can be estimated at about 10 percent of the construction cost of
the carrier, or $200 million for each of the two battle groups. This is based on a
useful rule of thumb derived from U.S. experience. Such a figure can be readily
covered by another third of the annual naval budget, which is specifically allocated for such a purpose. This proportion, like the weapons acquisition proportion, is also likely to grow over the years as the defense budget grows because of
rapid economic growth.16
NAVAL STRATEGY
Leadership endorsement and fi nancial affordability are necessary for China to
acquire aircraft carriers, but they are not sufficient. A fairly concise naval strategy that defines the missions of the carrier battle groups is also needed. It is,
however, more problematic than the two previous conditions.
“Near-coast defense” (近岸防御) defined China’s naval strategy from the
1950s until the early 1980s. It highlighted counter–amphibious landing operations earlier against the Taiwan Guomindang government’s attempt to recapture the mainland and later against a possible Soviet invasion from the seas, and
as a result it did not require aircraft carriers. In the late 1980s, a “near-seas active defense” (近海积极防御) strategy, largely operationalized by Liu Huaqing,
was endorsed to replace near-coast defense. This strategy requires the PLAN to
develop credible operational capabilities against potential opponents in China’s
three “near seas”—the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea—or the
space within and slightly beyond the “first island chain,” which extends from
Kurile Islands through the main islands of Japan, the Ryukyu Archipelago, Taiwan, and the Philippines to Borneo.
According to Liu, at least two major issues within this expanded operational
space require aircraft carriers: “to solve the need for struggle against Taiwan
[independence] [解决对台斗争需要] and to resolve the dispute over the Nansha
[Spratlys] Archipelago [解决南沙群岛争端].” In operational terms, Liu believed
that “whether the attack type or the V/STOL type, they [aircraft carriers] are for
the purpose of resolving issues of [fleet] air defense and sea attack” (防空和对海
攻击问题). Liu particularly stressed that “the objective for us to acquire aircraft
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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carriers is not to compete against the U.S. and the Soviet Union.”17 This implied
that what Liu wished to acquire was a medium-sized, conventionally powered
platform for limited, air defense–dominant missions, not a large, nuclearpowered one for expansive, sea/land-attack-dominant missions.18
Of the two major issues, Liu clearly privileged the Spratlys dispute. For instance, he highlighted the need to compare the cost-effectiveness of employing
carriers and carrier-based combat aircraft as opposed to land-based aviation
divisions, combat aircraft, and airLeadership endorsement and financial afford- refueling tankers. This shows that
ability are necessary for China to acquire air- he was particularly concerned
craft carriers, but they are not sufficient. A fair- about lack of air cover for distant
naval operations over the Spratlys.
ly concise naval strategy is also needed.
However, naval operations over
Taiwan can be covered by land-based combat aircraft, even though, as Liu mentioned, without carriers, air operations over Taiwan could be more costly because
more airfields and land-based combat aircraft are needed due to the reduced loitering time in the air.19 The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1997 retirement of
Liu Huaqing, which helped to consolidate further Jiang Zemin’s position as the
CMC chair, clearly contributed to the shelving of the PLAN’s carrier project.20
While articulating the near-seas active defense strategy in the 1980s, Liu
Huaqing stated that the PLAN would operate within and around the first island
chain, or in China’s near seas, for a long time to come. But he also suggested
that the growth of the economy and strengthening of science and technology
would translate into expansion of Chinese naval power in the long run. This
in turn would allow the PLAN to extend its operational range from the near
seas to the “middle and far seas” (中远海), or the space between the first and
second island chains, the latter stretching from northern Japan to the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam and farther southward, and beyond. This would also
allow the PLAN to “strike the enemy’s rear” through exterior-line operations
if China’s coast, or interior line, were attacked by an opponent. Liu, however,
placed emphasis on the primacy of “near-seas operations” (近海作战为主) and
regarded “middle- and far-seas operations as [only] supportive and auxiliary”
(中远海作战为辅).21
By 2004, however, such an emphasis seems to have shifted somewhat. China’s
naval analysts, for instance, now argue that China’s naval strategy should shift
from near seas to far-seas operations.22 They hold that such operations are necessary because of China’s increasing vulnerability relating to distant sea-lanes
and choke points. China’s ever-expanding oceangoing fleet of merchant ships,
especially tankers, also needs to be protected, as does China’s growing overseas investment, and as do the increasing number of Chinese citizens living and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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working overseas. Moreover, China’s prosperous coastline and resource-rich
exclusive economic zones and territories need to be secured where in dispute.
These areas, however, are difficult to secure, because they are so long and wide
and their flanks are so exposed. This problem extends into such close forward
positions as China’s near seas, which are partially blocked by the first island
chain, and the few exits through straits and channels are mostly narrow and
controlled by others, making it difficult to gain initiative by maneuvering out
through them. Many of the navies operating in these near seas are quite formidable, including the U.S., Japanese, Russian, Taiwanese, ASEAN-state, and
Indian navies. They render the PLAN more vulnerable, and they limit, and even
reduce the effectiveness of, the near-seas active-defense strategy for both deterrence and war fighting.23
According to China’s naval analysts, to alleviate vulnerability and enhance
effectiveness the PLAN needs to break out of interior-line constraints associated with the narrow and near seas within and around the first island chain.
Acquiring capabilities to operate in the far seas, the vast space beyond the first
island chain, would allow the PLAN to regain initiative and momentum. While
“interior-line operations require near-seas capabilities, exterior-line operations
are based on far-seas capabilities. . . . Far-seas capabilities make it possible to
carry out offensive operations and ambush and sabotage operations in the far
and vast naval battle-space beyond the first island chain, and would have the
effect of shock and awe on the enemy.” Forward operations and offense are central to naval combat, because oceans have few invulnerable physical objects on
which to base the defense, whereas naval platforms, once crippled, are hard to
restore. An emphasis on offense also helps to optimize naval force structure. It
is also more cost-effective, because as strikes become more long-range, precise,
and powerful, and therefore more lethal, defense becomes more expensive to
maintain. History also shows that a strategy of close and static defense led to the
decisive defeat of the Qing navy in the first Sino-Japanese War, in 1894.24
Far-seas strategy suggests that the PLAN needs to develop power-projection
capabilities that can operate effectively in the more distant western Pacific and
the eastern Indian Ocean. It also implies that the PLAN may come in direct confrontation with the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific—in, for instance, a competition for sea access and denial in a crisis over Taiwan. Moreover, in the worst
case, the PLAN may come into direct contact with the U.S. and Indian navies
in competition for vital sea-lanes in the South China Sea and eastern Indian
Ocean and for such choke points as the Malacca Strait. These scenarios may
require the PLAN to acquire large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, very different from the medium, conventionally powered carriers for limited missions
envisioned by Liu Huaqing. A key variable that may determine whether China
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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would acquire medium, conventionally powered carriers or the large, nuclearpowered ones is whether requisite technologies are available.
AVAILABILITY OF REQUISITE TECHNOLOGIES
Before discussing the specific carrier development route that the PLAN might
follow, it is useful to spend a moment talking about aircraft carriers in general.
Thinking about Aircraft Carriers
There are four main types of aircraft carriers operating worldwide today, as defined by their method of launching and recovering aircraft. The first—the most
capable but also the most expensive—is the “catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery” (CATOBAR) design. Originally created by the United Kingdom but
perfected by the United States, this design philosophy is currently employed by
the United States and France. Because catapults (currently using steam, though
electromagnetic catapults have been proposed) are necessary for heavy aircraft
capable of long range or heavy payloads (which in turn can perform a wider variety of missions at greater range), the CATOBAR carrier is generally considered
a prerequisite for a significant carrier-borne power-projection capability.
The second carrier design is the “short takeoff but arrested recovery” (STOBAR)
type. This design uses a rolling takeoff—often assisted by a ski-jump ramp—but
aircraft return on board via arrested recovery. Most current non-U.S. aircraft carriers
are of this type, including the Russian Kuznetsov class, a unit of which, Varyag, has
been acquired by China. A STOBAR carrier is generally much simpler to build and
maintain than a CATOBAR design but less capable, though it may still be a large, fast
ship. STOBAR is less appropriate for the strike role, so a decision to forgo catapults
may indicate intent to not perform the strike mission.
The third design, “short takeoff vertical landing” (STOVL), combines a rolling takeoff—often assisted by a ski-jump ramp—with vertical recovery. This is
the system Spain and the United Kingdom have used on their most recent units.
Britain is currently evaluating a variant called “shipborne rolling vertical landing,” or SRVL, for its new Queen Elizabeth class.25 As a general rule, aircraft capable of vertical landing can also take off vertically, but the performance penalty
is high; a rolling, ski jump–assisted takeoff maximizes load or range. A STOVL
design is likely be smaller than other types, but it still requires high speed to
generate wind over the deck. The STOVL design severely limits strike and longrange missions, but it is easier to build and maintain than types better suited
to those tasks. STOVL generally represents the minimum capability needed for
fighter-based air defense.
The fourth and final type is the “vertical takeoff and landing” (VTOL) carrier. Compared to STOVL, a VTOL design forgoes even more aircraft operational
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capability and allows for a slower (and thus less expensive) ship. Selecting VTOL
over STOVL generally means either that the ship is intended to operate only
helicopters, is designed for a function (e.g., amphibious assault) that constrains
performance, or is really envisioned only for noncombat or general support
missions. For fi xed-wing aircraft, the difference between STOVL and VTOL is
generally the presence in the former of a ski-jump ramp at the front of the flight
deck and the ability to make enough speed to generate wind over the deck.
Several general rules of thumb are useful when thinking about aircraft carrier size and capabilities:
• The more missions a carrier is to perform, the more aircraft it needs and the
bigger the ship must be.
• The longer the range or heavier the payload of the aircraft, the more likely
the carrier will need catapults and arrested recovery.
• The bigger the flight deck, the bigger the aircraft that can be operated.
Also, the faster the carrier, the bigger the aircraft that can be operated.
(Faster carriers require bigger propulsion spaces, so these factors are
complementary.) Some missions are best performed by bigger aircraft.
• Strike is a long-range, heavy-load mission, as is aerial refueling.
• One pays a penalty for VTOL capability. Even if the design of the aircraft
does not involve performance compromises, which is a big assumption, it still
takes extra fuel to take off vertically, because “there’s no such thing as a free
launch,” and there will be much more restrictive weight limits on what one
can “bring back” on landing—unused ordnance may have to be jettisoned.
VTOL is at best inefficient, and at worst affects overall combat capability.
• A large carrier is more efficient—that is, it carries more aircraft per ton of
displacement and can handle planes on board better than a small carrier.
Taken together, these considerations are powerful tools in analyzing what
a PLAN carrier might look like, based on discussions of design features on the
one hand—that is, “What can they do with what they intend to buy?”—and
missions on the other—that is, “What do they need to buy to do what they say
they want to do?” For example, the Russian-built Varyag is a ski jump–equipped
STOBAR design, displacing sixty to sixty-five thousand tons and with a long,
thousand-foot flight deck. This makes it a relatively large carrier, smaller than
an American Nimitz but larger than the French Charles de Gaulle, roughly comparable to both the American Kitty Hawk class and the British Queen Elizabeth.
Note that one must be careful comparing displacements: with large, capacious
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ships like carriers, the difference between empty, full, and standard loads can be
tens of thousands of tons.
Due to the lack of catapults, fixed-wing aircraft on Varyag are essentially constrained to air superiority—fleet air defense or offensive air—or relatively shortrange strike.26 Varyag was intended to operate with a steam propulsion plant capable of thirty-two knots, but when sold to China it reportedly had no engines.27
Russia officially categorizes this type as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser”;
the limited abilities of its embarked aircraft and its Russian-style heavy missile
load are consistent with this description.28 Its usual suggested role is to support
and defend strategic missile–carrying submarines, surface ships, and maritime
missile-carrying aircraft. In other words, while it may have some antiship capability, both in its aircraft and its missiles, it is not really designed to support
long-range strike missions.
Medium-Carrier Options
Major General Qian Lihua stated, in his November 2008 comment already cited,
that if China acquires an aircraft carrier, it will serve mainly the purpose of
near-seas active defense. Thus it appears that in the short run China is likely
to acquire a medium-sized carrier for limited, air defense–dominant missions.
For a medium, conventionally powered carrier intended for these purposes, the
requisite technologies are generally available. China has been analyzing Varyag
since 2002.29 The Chinese design and construction of super containerships,
tankers, and liquefied-natural-gas carriers should also be useful experience for
building the hulls of aircraft carriers, although carriers are much more complex
ships. China also has the simulation and testing facilities necessary for research
and development, such as large-scale ship-model basins and wind tunnels, and it
has been gaining engineering and technical assistance from Russia and Ukraine,
countries that have experience in designing and building medium-sized aircraft
carriers. Furthermore, specialized construction materials, such as high-grade
steel, can either be indigenously developed or acquired through import. Moreover, China has made substantial progress in information, automation, new materials, and maritime and space technologies, many of which can be integrated
into carrier construction. Finally, while major technical bottlenecks exist and
need to be resolved, China has experience in producing heavy steam and gas
turbines, of which several units can be grouped together to provide sufficient
speed and range.
For takeoff and landing, China is likely to choose a STOBAR design. China’s
naval analysts have identified several benefits of a STOBAR design over a
CATOBAR design. A STOBAR design, for instance, minimizes the space needed
for water and fuel storage, maximizes the energy available for ship’s propulsion,
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offers simpler production and maintenance, and reduces vulnerability to mechanical breakdowns, because of the absence of the steam catapult.30
Because the missions for medium carriers are more those of air cover for
naval operations than those of more distant sea and land attack, air superiority fighters with some sea/land-attack capabilities would be sufficient. In this
case, purchasing the Russian STOBAR-capable Su-33 combat aircraft, which can
carry eight air-to-air missiles and one or two antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs),
seems to be a realistic option, and indeed China has been negotiating with
Russia for such a purchase.31 In
China’s aircraft carrier ambitions may be larger the meantime, China may also
attempt to upgrade a land-based
than the current literature has predicted.
combat aircraft of its own, such as
the indigenous J-10 or the J-11B (a Chinese variant of the Russian Su-27), into a
carrier-based aircraft. At a minimum, such an attempt would probably involve
reinforcing the landing gears, wings, and fuselage of the aircraft for arrested
recovery, which puts heavier stress on these components than standard runway
landings.32
Similarly, China may purchase carrier-based Ka-31 AEW helicopters from
Russia. The Ka-31 can patrol for two to three hours on end, with a detection
range of 150 kilometers for sea targets and 100–150 kilometers for low-altitude
aircraft and ASCMs, and it can direct engagement against fifteen targets at one
time. Assisted by shipborne phased-array radars, these ranges and capacity are
sufficient for limited missions in the near seas. It is also likely that China may
upgrade its shipborne Z-8 (a variant of the French Super Frelon) to a carrierbased AEW platform and develop carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) with electro-optical, infrared, and radar sensors for intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance at sea. UAVs can patrol for a long time at
high altitude and are difficult to detect.33
The Chinese approach to carrier development is likely to be incremental.
Therefore, China may attempt to gain engineering and operational experience
by moving from smaller and simpler platforms to larger and more complex ones.
This means that the option of building small V/STOL carriers should not be
completely excluded.34 On the other hand, many Chinese naval analysts argue
that the missions that small carriers can accomplish are too limited, because the
number and types of aircraft they carry and their operational radii are too limited. To secure China’s eighteen-thousand-kilometer coastline, the “three million square km of maritime territories,” and the nation’s expanding maritime
interests, as well as to further learning and adaptation, these analysts believe,
building medium-sized carriers is more appropriate as the first step in realizing
China’s aircraft carrier ambitions.35
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Large-Carrier Options
For far-seas operations, a medium-sized carrier may not be adequate. A
STOBAR design, for instance, limits aircraft takeoff weight and shifts the full
burden of takeoff propulsion onto the aircraft, thus increasing the amount of
fuel consumed at that stage. This restricts the fuel and weapons payload that an
aircraft can carry, thereby reducing its range, loitering time, and strike capabilities. STOBAR is also more affected by wind, tide, rolling, and pitching. Furthermore, it needs more flight-deck space for takeoff and landing, thus limiting the
parking space and having an adverse effect on takeoff frequency–based crisis
reaction. In comparison, the CATOBAR design, which is mostly associated with
large carriers, minimizes aircraft fuel consumption on takeoff, thus enabling
better payload, range, loitering time, and strike capability. Its runway requirement, while greater than in a V/STOL design, is also minimal, thus allowing
more flight-deck parking and faster launches, even simultaneous launch and
recovery, resulting in quicker crisis response.
CATOBAR designs can also launch heavier fi xed-wing AEW and ASW aircraft.36 For far-seas operations, AEW platforms are particularly indispensable.
China’s military analysts, for instance, are impressed by the American E-2C,
which can patrol up to six hours, monitor a sea area of 12.50 million square
kilometers, and track two thousand targets, directing engagements against forty
of them simultaneously. They believe that with its detection range of 741 kilometers for surface targets, 556 kilometers for aircraft, and 270 kilometers for
missiles and its ability to patrol 180–200 kilometers away from the carrier battle
group, the E-2C, together with the combat patrol aircraft, establishes a threehundred-kilometer outer air-defense perimeter, deeper than the range of most
ASCMs.37 Without a similar air-defense perimeter, Chinese analysts believe, a
Chinese carrier battle group would be a “sitting duck,” particularly if it engages
highly stealthy U.S. combat aircraft.
Similarly, far-seas operations require far-more-capable carrier-based combat
aircraft than does near-seas active defense. Such an aircraft should be capable of
high speed, large combat radius, long-range sea/land attack, and stealth.38 Finally, the tremendous thermal energy that a large carrier consumes, particularly for
propulsion and catapult-steam generation, suggests that a nuclear power plant is
preferable to a conventional one.
Because China has had no experience in building and operating an aircraft
carrier, acquiring a working, medium-sized carrier may be a necessary stage to
gain such experience in the near future. Nonetheless, China’s naval analysts are
particularly impressed by the large U.S. carriers, including their most advanced
iteration, the Gerald R. Ford class, and its related technologies.39 Further, there
are indicators that research has been done on tackling some major technical
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issues for constructing large carriers.40 The process of acquiring such carriers,
however, is likely to be costly and protracted.
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?
In spite of unresolved issues, China is getting closer to realizing its aircraft carrier ambitions in terms of leadership endorsement, fi nancial affordability, naval
strategy, and requisite technologies. China is likely to develop medium-sized
aircraft carriers in the medium term for near-seas missions and to gain operational experience so that it can develop larger carriers for far-seas operations in
the long term. In this section we offer some thoughts on the potential missions
of such ships, the factors that go into defining those missions, and the regional
implications.
An aircraft carrier is not a solo-deploying ship. To be survivable in an intense
combat environment, it needs escorts to protect it. While China has acquired
new surface combatants with sophisticated antisurface and antiair capabilities,
it continues to lag behind in the area of ASW. Unless one is willing to assume
that the PLAN does not believe in the antisurface utility of submarines—a conclusion at odds with its own submarine acquisition efforts—the lack of antisubmarine escort capability implies at least one (and perhaps all) of the following:
• China intends to address its lack of ASW capability in the future and is
willing to accept increased risk in the short term, or
• China thinks that it has a solution to the ASW problem, or
• China does not envision its aircraft carriers as becoming the targets of
submarines.
All three are likely true to some degree, and indeed they may be interrelated.
Aircraft carriers are long–lead time projects, and it may be that China’s decision
makers have decided to start that program first, accepting that they may end up
fielding a carrier before its ASW support is ready. Or they may have decided that
they have a solution to the ASW problem in the form of mines—implying in turn
that they believe they can control the location of the battle—or through speed and
maneuver, which itself may be an argument for a big, fast nuclear carrier.
Or perhaps China does not expect to use its aircraft carriers against a firstclass opponent with submarine capability. For that matter, perhaps China does
not expect to use its carriers in combat at all. Many missions (such as those
detailed below) would either involve smaller regional powers, unable to mount
a significant submarine threat, or be strictly for peacetime. The United States
has traditionally viewed aircraft carriers as instruments of high-intensity combat, but their utility in other areas is significant. Imagine, for instance, a carrier
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providing surface-search capability via a small number of airborne assets. While
high-intensity carrier operations require frequent replenishments of jet fuel,
low-intensity ops could continue for weeks with minimal support, while maintaining a surge capacity if needed.41 Since China lacks overseas bases, it may be
willing to make do with a relatively small increase in capability in a given situation and hence be willing to operate carriers in ways the U.S. Navy is unlikely
to consider. For this reason, it will be very interesting to see how many and what
types of aircraft the PLAN decides is appropriate for its carriers.
It is important to note that while China understands the potential vulnerability of aircraft carriers to concerted attack, the problems facing China and those
facing the United States are not similar.42 U.S. Navy aircraft carriers operating in
the western Pacific face a sophisticated reconnaissance-strike complex of overthe-horizon radars, supersonic cruise missiles, and antiship homing ballistic
missiles. A PLAN aircraft carrier operating in the same geographic area has none
of these concerns; rather, a PLAN carrier has these systems backing it up.
With the above points as a backdrop, one can readily envision five PLAN carrier missions:
1. SLOC protection. In recent years China has become concerned regarding
its sea lines of communication through the Strait of Malacca and other
areas outside the range of its land-based airpower. Even more recently,
Chinese warships have undertaken antipiracy missions in the Gulf of
Aden. Whether the mission is constabulary or combative in nature,
an aircraft carrier provides useful capabilities, including facilitation of
extended surface-search capabilities via fixed-wing and helicopter assets,
and “visit, board, search, and seizure” via helicopter. Moreover, such a
mission would likely be welcomed by the international community—
including the United States.
2. Deployment to overseas crisis locations. Because Chinese overseas interests
have grown extensively, such deployment serves to deter threats to Chinese
overseas interests and reassure security of these interests.
3. Exclusive economic zone/territorial enforcement. China has extensive
territorial claims in the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands.
Small amounts of airpower in these areas—even just to maintain a surface
picture—could confer a tremendous advantage.
4. Humanitarian aid and disaster relief. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
demonstrated the utility of aircraft carriers in disaster relief operations,
both as helicopter-staging platforms and for the use of the powergeneration, water-purification, and medical capabilities aboard. Using a
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Chinese carrier in such a contingency would potentially produce a great
deal of prestige and goodwill for China, perhaps even more than would a
ship specifically designed for disaster relief, reassuring regional neighbors
as to Chinese intentions. Again, such a humanitarian deployment by the
PLAN would likely be welcomed by the international community.
5. Taiwan contingency. The prospect of the use of an aircraft carrier in
support of an invasion or coercion campaign is often cited. Given the
PLAN’s lack of proficiency in ASW, a PLAN carrier participating in such a
scenario would make a tempting target for opposing forces. Nonetheless,
it would have the potential to complicate the problem by increasing the
axes of attack, especially if U.S. entry into the conflict could be forestalled.
Even if a feint (after all, China’s close mainland air bases could generate
far more sorties than could one or two carriers), a carrier’s presence
would likely prompt the United States or Taiwan to “honor the threat” and
allocate forces accordingly, which could be significant in a short conflict.
For the first four missions listed above, a carrier seems like overkill, or
at best a suboptimal use of resources. In strict terms that is true, but China attaches great symbolic value to a Chinese aircraft carrier as physical evidence of
the nation’s coming of age as a great naval power. China may feel it gains more
through incidental use of an aircraft carrier in humanitarian aid/disaster relief
or other noncombat missions than it would with purpose-built (but less prestigious) platforms.
FINAL THOUGHTS
For regional conflicts short of full-scale warfare, a Chinese aircraft carrier has
the potential to complicate seriously the calculations of competitors in the region. The only nations in the region likely to be able to stand up against even
a modest Chinese air wing are Japan, South Korea, and, going a little farther
afield, India. A PLAN carrier would have the effect of extending Chinese air capabilities without requiring overseas air bases. Nonetheless, while a nuclear carrier may be homeported in China, supplying it with jet fuel, food, ammunition,
and other consumables becomes harder with distance. The U.S. Navy solves this
problem with an extensive series of overseas logistics bases and large, fast replenishment ships that support the operations of carriers, themselves operating
largely from the continental United States. Lacking such support mechanisms, a
Chinese carrier is likely to stay closer to home, but it may still require a Chinese
support presence overseas.
For the United States, a PLAN aircraft carrier is probably of little day-to-day
concern, at least until the PLA develops an ASW capability. In peacetime, the
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U.S. Navy is unlikely to consider a Chinese carrier a threat, and it may perhaps
even welcome Chinese assumption of great-power naval responsibilities in such
maritime constabulary operations as counterpiracy. In wartime, for the foreseeable future, a Chinese air wing is unlikely to threaten U.S. naval forces seriously,
and China’s limited ASW capability provides persuasive options to an American commander. This is not to say that a Chinese carrier would not complicate
American planning, however, as even threats that can be neutralized require
allocation of resources to do so.
In the short to medium terms, therefore, China’s acquisition of aircraft carriers offers more opportunities than challenges. Medium-sized carriers would be
for limited, air defense–dominant missions in local conflicts within the first island chain. They could be easily contained, being exposed and made vulnerable
by their large profi les in so limited an operational space. Developing such carriers would also divert funding from building advanced submarines or advanced
missiles that arguably pose greater threats. Also, carriers could perform nontraditional security missions that are compatible with the goals of other navies in
the Asia-Pacific region, thus contributing to maritime security cooperation.
In the long term, however, if China can overcome the technological obstacles
and gain the operational experience needed to build large, nuclear-powered carriers in substantial numbers and correct the deficiencies in its antisubmarine capabilities, the PLA Navy may pose more challenges than opportunities. Several
such carrier-based strike groups could project Chinese power beyond the “far
seas” to the still more distant and vast “near oceans” (近洋) and “far oceans” (远
洋). The much improved sensors, sustainability, stealth, networking, range, and
strike capabilities and self-protection of such highly integrated battle groups
could drive the cost of containing and fighting them much higher.
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GREAT BRITAIN GAMBLES WITH THE ROYAL NAVY
Geoffrey Till

T

he news late last year that the Type 23 frigate HMS Northumberland was to
be replaced on the Falklands patrol by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Largs Bay in
order to join the international counterpiracy effort in the Gulf of Aden raised
quite a few eyebrows. This was not because anyone seriously thought that Argentina would seek to profit from the absence of a British warship in these contested waters for the first time since 1982 but more as it seemed to show just how
bad things were getting for the once-mighty Royal Navy that its first-line fleet
1
could not apparently cover both commitments at once. Worse still had been the
sad story of the ambush by the Iranian Revolutionary
Geoffrey Till is professor of maritime studies in the DeGuard Corps of a boarding party from HMS Cornwall
fence Studies Department, King’s College London, and
director of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studin 2007, described by the then First Sea Lord, Admiral
ies. Previously the dean of academic studies at the Joint
Sir Jonathon Band, as “one bad day in our proud
Services Command and Staff College, he has taught at
400-year history.” Subsequent investigations showed
the Royal Naval College Greenwich, Britannia Royal
Naval College Dartmouth, City University, and the
that there had simply not been time or resources for
Open University; he earned his PhD at King’s College
the boarding party to be sufficiently trained in the reLondon. Professor Till was a visiting scholar at the U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California;
quirements of operating in that particularly difficult
later he held the Foundation Chair in Military Affairs
situation. Such events led to a spate of articles that the
at Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. He
Royal Navy was in serious trouble, “on the brink,”
held the Kippenberger Chair at the Victoria University
of Wellington, New Zealand, and is currently Visiting
heading into stormy waters, or had even “strangely
Professor at the Rajaratnam School of International
2
died.”
Studies in Singapore. His recent books include
To many observers, these incidents seemed to illusSeapower: A Guide for the 21st Century (second edition 2009) and The Development of British Naval
trate a chronic and worsening problem—the drastic
Thinking (2006).
decline in the numbers of warships available to the
Royal Navy, compared to its inexorably rising number
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3

of commitments. The Royal Navy now comprises just 101 units, including sixteen inshore patrol boats used only to train university cadets. Every year the
Royal Navy seems to have had one hull less on the water. In 1980 there were
sixty-seven frigates and destroyers; by 2020 the figure could be as low as eighteen. Even in the past ten years, destroyer and frigate numbers have shrunk from
thirty-five to twenty-three, despite the recommendations of the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review. Six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have been decommissioned in the same period. But at the same time, among the effective
ships remaining in “extended or reduced readiness” (or more cynically, “in
mothballs”) in Portsmouth were the carrier Invincible, three air-defense destroyers (Exeter, Nottingham, and Southampton, nearly two years before their
time), two offshore patrol ships, and four Royal Fleet Auxiliary logistic ships. At
least two Type 42 guided-missile destroyers have gone on operations with their
Sea Dart air-defense missiles disabled. In recent times other modern vessels have
been disposed of prematurely: the Upholder SSKs (conventionally powered
hunter-killer submarines) to Canada (which meant the abandonment of the
Royal Navy’s conventional submarine capability), three of the first generation of
Type 23 frigates to Chile, and others. And so it seems to go on. . . .
Questions naturally arise, not least for Americans concerned at the possible
fate of one of their leading naval allies, especially given their own budgetary
problems at a time of considerable commitment around the world and the relative rise of the maritime powers of the Asia-Pacific. Is this just a part of a dramatic shift of naval power from West to East? If so, to what extent? How bad are
things generally—and how much worse are they likely to get? What will it mean
for the U.S. Navy?
Trying to answer these questions requires us to look at what the British seem
to think their Royal Navy is for and then to gauge the gap between its commitments and its current and future resources. We will find that the gap is wide and
probably unsustainable. We will review and reassess all aspects of British defense, the Royal Navy’s commitments, and its most important programs (Trident replacement, the Astute SSNs, Type 45 destroyers, carriers, afloat
sustainability, and plans for future surface combatants). Given the bleak state of
Britain’s public finances, the point that emerges is that the Royal Navy is currently engaged in the hardest part of one of the longest and most challenging
campaigns in its illustrious history, the outcome of which is at the moment too
close to call. The Royal Navy may emerge from this, one of its greatest battles, as a
totally transformed and still globally significant navy, ready to “fight and win” in
the conditions of the twenty-first century. Certainly, if it doesn’t, the world will
be a different place, not least for the United States.
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SO, WHAT IS THE ROYAL NAVY FOR?
The apparent decline of the Royal Navy seems strange, since the British have always been regarded as a particularly maritime nation, with a long-standing interest in the defense of the maritime trading system upon which the prosperity
and security of the country has always been seen to depend. “The UK is,” admits
the country’s new National Security Strategy, “and ever has been, a distinctively
4
maritime nation.” According to the A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization
Index, the United Kingdom is the twelfth-most-engaged country in the world
economy. If one excludes the factors that disproportionately skew the calculations toward countries with very small populations, the United Kingdom rises to
third position, behind only the United States and Canada.5
Defending trade and market access has accordingly long been a major role for
the Royal Navy. In the language of its own traditional prayer, the Royal Navy itself
has acted as “a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions.”
For all his fame in winning decisive battles, even Admiral Horatio Nelson accepted
that the fundamental justification for the Royal Navy was to defend trade. “I consider,” he told one of his captains, “the protection of our trade the most essential
6
service that can be performed.” And yet, despite all these centuries of tradition,
the ancient emphasis on the direct defense of trade at sea has over the years been
7
quietly airbrushed out of the list of the country’s main military tasks. This is
largely the product of a risk-management decision-making system at the Ministry
of Defence (MOD) in which maritime affairs in general and the Royal Navy in
particular seem to command much less attention than they did.
There is a curious disconnect here between objective reality and the decision
maker’s perception of it. The apparent relegation of maritime affairs is not due
to any actual decline in Britain’s sea-dependence—far from it, in fact. The
United Kingdom remains a preeminent trading nation. By volume, 92 percent of
British trade is conducted by sea. So used are the British to laments about their
declining financial and maritime status that the rapid growth of their shipping
industry is hardly noticed. After a twenty-year decline in British shipping, a
government-inspired major reformulation of regulations and taxation arrangements have led to a merchant fleet now 170 percent larger than it was in 2000.
The shipping industry employs forty thousand people in the United Kingdom
directly, as well as another 212,000 indirectly, and brings £4.7 billion to the
8
country every year. This sea dependence is, moreover, beginning to percolate
into public consciousness more than it used to. When the MV Napoli grounded
off the Devon coast in January 2007, thousands of tons of valuable imported
goods washed up onto the beaches—and with them came a sudden, belated, and
unexpected recognition of just how dependent every aspect of British life is on
the safe and timely arrival and departure of merchant shipping.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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Nowhere is this more true than in the field of energy security. The United
Kingdom is already a net importer of natural gas and will soon become a net importer of oil. Lamentably low stocks ashore mean that were there to be any significant interruption of this trade, it would not be long before Britain’s lights
would go out. The National Security Strategy recognizes the fact that the United
Kingdom’s energy security needs to be seen against a global background in
which, before the recession hit, world energy consumption was increasing at a
rate of 2.6 percent per year, twice as fast as in the previous decade. “Supplies,” it
says, “may not be able to keep up, intensifying competition for energy and leading to instability and conflict.”9 From every angle, then, the worldwide market
shapes Britain’s energy interests. Whether it likes it or not, in this as in so many
other ways, the United Kingdom is enmeshed in the consequences of globalization. It sees itself as a constituent in a supranational economic system that operates above and beyond the traditional purview of the nation-state. Because this
can become a source of vulnerability, the United Kingdom has a “particularly
10
large stake in the success of the international rules-based system.”
Globalization, of course, is the product of a system that depends absolutely
on seaborne trade, and as Albert Thayer Mahan reminded us over a century ago,
it is vulnerable and faces a range of threats: “This, with the vast increase in rapidity of communication, has multiplied and strengthened the bonds knitting the
interests of nations to one another, till the whole now forms an articulated system not only of prodigious size and activity, but of excessive sensitiveness, un11
equaled in former ages.”
The threats and challenges that the system faces are wide and varied. They include the prospect of conflict between various types of sea users (disputed jurisdictions, fishermen against the oil industry, etc.), all forms of maritime crime,
the depletion of sea-based resources, and environmental deterioration. Sometimes trade can suffer, as it did in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, from inadvertent involvement in the quarrels of others. The global trading system indeed
could be destroyed by large-scale interstate warfare, as it nearly was before and
12
after the First World War. These days the system can be the subject of exploitation or even direct and premeditated attack from groups or states hostile to its
intentions or its effects. Finally, the system can be at risk to a global pandemic or
a financial meltdown in response to what Karl Marx called capitalism’s “internal
contradictions.”
Any of these threats can disrupt trade and, importantly, the conditions for trade.
Because the United Kingdom is part of the sea-based trading system, its economic
security will be affected too, directly or indirectly. This is not a matter of choice for
the United Kingdom, but whether it chooses to play its part in the defense of the system and how it chooses to do so most certainly are. Accordingly, there is a general
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consensus that “preserving the trading environment should be recognised and pri13
oritised as a fully justifiable military task for the new millennium.”
The British choice has been to be a full participant, not merely a bystander, in
the world’s events. The latter approach is explicitly rejected: “Our approach to
the global era is an internationalist one, and we are committed to working with
partners to develop and adapt the rules based international system to meet the
14
demands of the twenty first century.”
. . . AND FROM THIS DEVELOPS THE ROYAL NAVY’S TASKS
The recognized role of the United Kingdom’s armed forces in general, and of the
Royal Navy in particular, flows from all this. “Preserving the trading environment” calls for the Navy to defend trade and, less obviously, the conditions for
trade, both directly by what it does at sea and indirectly by what it does from it.
This is generally seen to require the development of four different sets of
capability:

• Fighting and winning wars
• Staging distant expeditions
• Defending good order at sea
• Preventing and deterring conflict.
Fighting and Winning Wars
Fighting and winning wars remain a high priority even in the age of globalization. Globalization might fail—it has before. Today’s variant has systemic weaknesses, as is all too obvious, and faces potentially well-equipped adversaries. It
will be under a particular strain in the 2030s, when some predict a “perfect
storm” resulting from a coincidence of global warming, possible pandemics, and
gross shortages in oil, food, and water. National competitiveness, already evident
15
in the consequences of recession, is likely to increase. While according to the
National Security Strategy there is no such serious threat today, it is not possible
to rule out the reemergence of a major state-led threat to the United Kingdom,
16
its dependencies, or its allies over the longer term.
But even if globalization doesn’t fail so catastrophically, the capacity to fight
and win wars remains vital, because, after all, serious interstate conflict not involving the United Kingdom directly still poses a critical level of threat to the
system as a whole. The Royal Navy continues to make the case that maintaining
the capacity to fight and win is still the most effective deterrent to war in an un17
certain future. Moreover, the Navy’s argument runs, the standards associated
with the capacity to engage in high-intensity conflict usually offer high levels
of precision, effect, and (very important from the political point of view)
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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protection for the British forces engaged with lower-intensity, asymmetric
opponents.
For all these reasons, the Royal Navy takes the retention of its world-class capabilities in such high-end disciplines as antisubmarine and antiair warfare
(ASW and AAW) as critical to its present and future strategic effectiveness.
Hence the appearance of the Daring Type 45 destroyer, the Astute class of submarine, and the Navy’s long insistence on a recapitalization of its existing aircraft carrier fleet. For all that, there is a concern that the Royal Navy has not been
able to pay as much attention as it would wish to some of these disciplines, because of the passing distractions of Afghanistan.
Although much of the popular debate still tends to focus on traditional platforms, the British recognize that future effectiveness, precision, and maneuverability may depend in large measure on a network-centric approach, unmanned
vehicles, robotics, loitering systems, precision systems, engineering, signature
reduction, the consequence of increasing ranges of weapons and sensors, and so
forth. Part of its case for the hugely sophisticated and so far highly successful
Daring-class destroyers is the aspiration to stay up with the hunt in technological innovation, even to lead it in some areas, expensive though this might be. If
the Royal Navy is to continue as a significant naval player, the argument goes, it
really has little choice about this, given the rising capacity of adversaries to challenge even complex networks, sensors, and weapons.
Staging Distant Expeditions
Here is the obvious response to the impulse to “go to a distant crisis before it
18
comes to you” in order to defend the system by liberal intervention ashore. This
capability focuses more on the protection of the conditions for trade ashore than
on the trade at sea itself. This traditional focus in British strategy is unlikely to
change. “We remain committed,” says the National Security Strategy, “to retain19
ing robust, expeditionary and flexible armed forces for the foreseeable future.”
The 1998 Strategic Defence Review pointed out that “maritime forces are inherently well suited to most force projection operations. Their reach, ability to
sustain themselves without reliance on host nation support and flexibility are
invaluable attributes. A joint maritime force often provides the opportunity for
20
early and timely intervention in potential crises.” The Royal Navy, indeed,
demonstrated the advantages of maritime power projection of this sort in the
first and second Iraq wars, the opening Afghanistan campaign, and the now al21
most forgotten but highly successful Sierra Leone operation of 2000.
British maritime power projection, usually but not always in consort with
others, has taken a variety of forms, from the capacity to conduct, or threaten,
amphibious assaults to the delivery of ordnance from the sea, at one end of the
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spectrum, to the conduct of humanitarian relief operations, at the other. It all
depends, however, on the kind of assured access to be expected from the capacity
to fight and win wars discussed earlier.
Depending very much on the scenario and particularly the level of opposition to be expected, mounting “expeditions” of this wide-ranging sort may call
for the capacity to sustain, transport, and support civilian populations or landed
forces or both; to engage in amphibious operations; to develop specialist forces
for riverine and lacustrine pre- and postconflict stabilization operations; and, if
necessary, to strike adversaries ashore with sea-launched missiles and naval gunnery. Hence the British focus on Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre task
groups to secure sea control and project power ashore.
In recent years, and in conformity with the 1997 Strategic Defence Review,
the Royal Navy’s amphibious capabilities have been completely transformed and
revitalized with two new 14,600-ton assault ships (HM Ships Albion and Bulwark), the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean (twenty-one thousand tons), and four
new sixteen-thousand-ton Bay-class landing ships, supported by six Ro-Ro ferries for strategic sealift. But even with recent enhancements a Littoral Manoeuvre Group cannot provide the personnel, vehicles, and stores required for a
full maneuver brigade. At the same time, the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike Task
Group depends on the invaluable Invincible-class carriers, now only with
ground-attack Harriers—these are clearly at the end of their operational careers.
With the contentious early retirement of Sea Harrier FA.2 fleet in March 2006
and having no deployed air-defense fighter at sea, the Royal Navy is in the midst
of an embarrassing “capability holiday” until the Joint Strike Fighter (or JSF, the
22
F-35) arrives. Nonetheless, the Royal Navy’s recent development of capabilities
for what it calls “littoral manoeuvre” and its ambitious carrier replacement program are predicated on the assumption that an uncertain future demands the
development of a much enhanced capability for sea-based force projection.
The perceived cost and debatable effects of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations have sparked a certain wariness in some quarters about a continuation of
23
the United Kingdom’s expeditionary impulse. Despite this, it seems highly unlikely that Britain will turn away from its long-term policy of supporting military interventions in support of a rules-based international system—even in
some circumstances without the specific approval of the Security Council, but
24
only once all other options have been exhausted. The Iraq and Afghanistan experiences are, however, likely to reduce greatly a future British government’s appetite for large-scale and open-ended interventions of this sort while increasing
its longer-term interest in the more limited liabilities (and, admittedly, aspirations) of distinctively maritime conceptions of expeditionary operations.25
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Here, sea-based expeditionary forces obviously come into their own, with
their capacity to project power in their own right—to insert, support, and extract landed forces into and from areas of concern, which are mostly near
26
water. Hence the increased political salience of the Royal Navy’s interest in all
types of expeditionary activity, including sea basing, the capacity to operate
sustainably at sea with a much reduced physical and political footprint ashore.
The Royal Navy is not slow in making such points.
As part of its determination to foster the mentality of deployability, the Royal
Navy has for decades staged regular group deployments around the world, even
when its equipment and maintenance state and the government’s political will
to engage “out of area” were low—as was the case in the 1970s after the decision
to withdraw “from East of Suez.” Despite that injunction the Royal Navy continued to foster its global presence, and with all its difficulties, commitments, and
27
operational stretch, it continues to do so. The previous First Sea Lord made the
point that “only by genuinely deploying ships on operational tasks will they play
to their inherent strengths of poise, presence and inbuilt sustainability. Navies
28
are for using—they are not just insurance policies.”
The Royal Navy has, for example, just completed Operation TAURUS, an ambitious group deployment of one of its amphibious task groups. At its peak it
was led by Bulwark and Ocean and was accompanied by two Type 23 frigates,
HM Ships Argyll and Somerset; a French frigate, FS Dupleix; an Arleigh
Burke–class destroyer, the USS Mitscher; a Trafalgar-class SSN, HMS Talent; two
Bay-class landing ships; three Royal Fleet Auxiliaries; and the survey ship HMS
Echo. The force conducted amphibious operations in Turkey and the Gulf and
riverine operations in Bangladesh and Brunei, and it interacted with seventeen
other navies around the world. The force included both Royal Marines and
Royal Air Force (RAF) units, nicely illustrating what the Royal Navy considers to
be the strategic versatility of a properly constituted and all-round joint and
combined maritime force.
Defending Good Order at Sea
The defense of good order at sea—or to give it its more contemporary label,
maritime security, as against terrorists, criminals, and the careless—is an immediate precondition for the effective operation of the global trading system.
Moreover, as an island nation heavily dependent on seaborne trade, Britain is
more economically dependent on good maritime order than are many other
29
states. But good order at sea is also critical for wider concepts of national security. About thirty tons of heroin, for example, enter Britain every year (mainly
from Afghanistan), together with vast quantities of cocaine from South America; this clearly represents a threat to the peace and prosperity of every British
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citizen. Intercepting the passage of illegal drugs at sea—and of illegal immigrants too, for that matter—therefore constitutes a significant contribution to
individual human security in the United Kingdom. The Royal Navy has been active for years in the rarely publicized campaign to intercept and disrupt the drug
30
trade in the Caribbean and across the Atlantic to Europe. The current emphasis on the threat to the homeland posed by al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates has further
reinforced the importance of maritime security operations.
Some argue that if handled sensitively, this growth of interest could be good
for the Navy—at least, if the fortunes of the navy next door in Ireland are anything to go by. The Irish navy has risen from two to eleven platforms in fifteen
years, solely on the basis of its task of maintaining good order in the country’s
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. Perhaps the Royal Navy might benefit in like manner? The difficulty is that forces designed for the preservation of
good order in home waters are unlikely to have the sailing and fighting characteristics required for the first two tasks just discussed and so, given the Royal
Navy’s overall proclivities, are bound to take a second place in that service, if one
of increasing importance.
This inclination is further reinforced by the United Kingdom’s general acceptance of the fact that the globalization of such maritime threats means that the
first line of defense of Britain’s home waters has to be much farther forward.
“The distinctive characteristics of the UK as a nation mean that it is impossible,
when thinking about our own national security interests, to separate the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international.’” For this reason, the National Security Strategy
concludes, there is an important “away game” aspect to the enforcement of good
31
order at sea. “This implies a strong case for investing in certain kinds of naval
forces, such as frigates, capable of playing a role in both interdiction at sea and
32
maintenance of maritime law and order.”
The task calls for collective and cooperative maritime domain awareness
across the world ocean, not just at home. This mandates close habits of cooperation with other navies, coast guards, and maritime security agencies. It demands
sophisticated, flexible, and adaptable legal regimes to deal with pirates, drug
smugglers, and human traffickers operating across possibly ambiguous national
jurisdictions. Through ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition,
and Reconnaissance), it requires an emphasis on thoroughly integrated surveillance to track down mobile and covert adversaries, as well as a structured and
balanced sufficiency of cheaper frigates, corvettes, ocean and offshore patrol
vessels, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and even submarines on
occasion, to intercept wrongdoers and enforce jurisdiction. Given the vastness
of the oceans and the ranges of tasks and of possible adversaries, numbers have a
quality all of their own in the preservation of good order at sea.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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Preventing and Deterring Conflict
Prevention and deterrence may well head off incipient problems before they become crises for the system. Here the main naval contribution to national and
global security could well lie in what does not happen. Maritime power is as
much about preventing conflict as about winning it. The Royal Navy’s role in
helping guard Iraq’s two critical oil platforms against attacks by insurgents and
its successful training program to prepare the Iraqi navy and marines to assume
that responsibility themselves illustrate deterrence and prevention, respectively.
Together they reduce the future need for external countries to concern themselves with Iraqi and Gulf security.
The prevention of conflict is seen to depend in large measure on the benign
presence of naval forces able to develop sustainable relationships with local
states; to help states build up their capacity to defend themselves against such
major problems as climate change, humanitarian disaster, poor governance, and
the like; and, if necessary, to reassure them against prospective adversaries. Prevention may also call for constructive capacity-building engagement, especially
in the good-order tasks discussed earlier, since, as the piracy problem in the Gulf
of Aden shows, a lack of good governance in one area may result in security
threats that challenge the system.
The piracy situation off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden illustrates the consequence of a failure of governance at sea. The Royal Navy is taking a leading role
in this long campaign to address the consequences of this; it established and led
the European Union (EU) Operation ATALANTA and until recently provided the
33
flagship for the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 in the Gulf of Aden. The
United Kingdom was also instrumental behind the scenes in setting up the legal
arrangements with Kenya that allowed the authorities there to prosecute captured pirates on behalf of the international community. Better by far, however,
would it have been for naval forces to have contributed proactively to Somalia’s
capacity to defend and exploit sustainably its own marine resources, thereby
preventing the situation from arising in the first place. “Stabilization,” the argument goes, should be about preventing conflict rather than restoring the situation afterward.
Ensuring good order at sea calls for the development of jurisdictional and enforcement capabilities in the countries of relevant regions, since disorder at sea
often follows deficiencies of this sort. Although sometimes constrained rather
than encouraged by the Ministry of Defence, the Royal Navy therefore takes capacity building very seriously and has demonstrated an impressive ability to get
things done. The successful cruise and capacity-building port calls of HMS Endurance (far removed from its normal role in the South Atlantic) around the
coast of Africa last year was, like the U.S. African Partnership Station, which it
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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partly inspired, intended to reduce the prospects of the Somalia situation recur34
ring elsewhere in the continent.
And where there is an adversary to be deterred, early demonstrations of force
can nip the problem in the bud. Potential wrongdoers ashore and afloat are
identified and deterred by the presence of naval forces clearly able to limit their
chances of success. What constitutes a successful deterrent will depend in large
measure on the nature of the prospective adversary, but in most cases short of
interstate war it resides in a regular naval presence in areas of concern of vessels
appropriate for the tasks in hand. Frigates and ocean-capable patrol vessels for
visible presence and submarines for covert surveillance are most commonly
used for this purpose, and they are most effective when acting closely in consort
with the vessels of other like-minded nations.
Finally, of course, there is deterrence at the top, nuclear end of the spectrum.
For all its interest in limiting or even reversing nuclear proliferation, the current
British government remains set on the country’s maintaining the independent
nuclear deterrent now exclusively provided by the Royal Navy’s four Vanguard
35
submarines. With this continuous aspiration, of course, comes a requirement
for the sustainment of certain specialist types of defense industrial expertise and
operational skills, such as deepwater ASW.
SO, GIVEN THE NEED FOR THESE TASKS, WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
Even in today’s contentious and difficult times, relatively few people involved in
or merely observing the British defense debate would seriously dispute very
much of this, but for all that there remain the serious problems of paying for it
all and deciding priorities—that is, the problem is a resources-commitments
gap.
For much of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the biggest problem confronting Britain’s naval planners has been a sometimes acute shortage of
resources and a seemingly ever-widening gap between these and a level of commitment significantly higher than originally envisaged in the Strategic Defence
Review. British defense spending, at £38 billion in 2008, is now estimated to represent a mere 2.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), its lowest rate since
the early 1930s and less than half of what it was in the late 1980s. Nevertheless,
the consensus view is that especially in the current recession, no significant uplift of this level seems in prospect. Although absolute cuts are unlikely in the near
term, defense inflation on its own could inflict real cuts of some 10 percent over
the next five years. For the medium to longer term, the government has inaugurated a strategic-review process that could well add further real cuts to this. Either way, the challenge will be to do more with less, very possibly much less.
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As a result, the Royal Navy faces two distinct challenges. The first is how to get
through the next couple of almost certainly bleak years of severe constraint, and
the second will be how to respond to the resource implications of the expected
new strategic defense review of 2010–11, whatever they are.
The existence of a resources-commitments gap is not, of course, new, and in
the past a number of ways of bridging the divide have been tried, and these will
certainly be relevant for the next few years.
“Can Do.” “Working extra hard” is traditionally seen as the Royal Navy’s way of
getting through a difficult situation—in other words, a policy of expecting a
temporary level of performance from people and equipment well above what
was originally considered sustainable and then spinning that program out still
farther. The Royal Navy has always been most reluctant to refuse a commitment
even in circumstances that would make that seem reasonable, even sensible. The
most famous recent example of this occurred in 1982, when the First Sea Lord,
Sir Henry Leach, donned his uniform and demanded to see the prime minister,
the uncharacteristically uncertain Mrs. Thatcher, in order to assure her and the
country that the Royal Navy was able and willing to lead the campaign to retake
the Falkland Islands, despite every prospect of significant loss. As befits this “can
do” tradition the Royal Navy’s current operational tempo is extremely high,
some 40 percent of its force being committed to current operations.
But there are problems with this. Even when such operations are successful, as
they generally have been, the tempo inflicts personnel stresses, a higher rate of
equipment wear-out, reduced operational life for ships, weapons, and aircraft,
and, finally, skill fade in unexercised disciplines. For example, ships deployed as
singletons in order to maintain as much global coverage as possible may lose
some of the “edge” they need as constituents of a task force. More insidiously,
when the service so often delivers the apparently impossible (or at least the very
difficult), politicians, the public, and the Treasury come unreasonably to expect
that. Sympathetic critics argue that a few refusals might have a salutary effect,
leading to more resources or fewer commitments—the latter possibility, of
course, being the worry.
Combining with Partners. Responding to financially induced shortages
mandates working in coalitions of the willing. The Royal Navy argues that
high-intensity capabilities at sea confer status in alliances and greater influence
over events. The fact that, like the French, the British “do” nuclear deterrence,
carrier strike operations, and amphibiosity puts their influence and their general contribution to alliances in a different category from those of the rest of the
Europeans (many of whom face similar problems). The British aspiration is not
just to participate in coalition operations but to lead them. Hence the EU’s
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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counterpiracy campaign off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, ATALANTA, is effectively run by the Royal Navy from NATO’s Allied Maritime Component
Command Headquarters at Northwood.
For the past century or so, the British have been well aware that “strategy” is as
much about influencing the behavior of allies as it is that of adversaries. For this
reason the Royal Navy puts considerable stress on the importance of maintaining a credible global presence and of retaining a fleet sufficient in quality and
quantity to continue to command the levels of respect it has been used to in decades past. The numerical decline in the fleet, however, makes that more difficult, because inevitably it reduces the Navy’s level of operational presence.
Joining with the Other Services. For years the British armed forces in general,
and the Royal Navy in particular, have consistently advocated the joint approach, for its now-obvious synergies of effort, resource, and effect.36 By offering
the opportunity to make the most of what each service can offer, close
interservice cooperation clearly means that more can be done with less. But as a
solution to the resources-commitments gap, British jointness is also revealing its
limits. First, the ferocious assaults apparently launched by both the Army and
the Royal Air Force on the carrier replacement program show that reducing resources actually decreases the prospects for real jointness, certainly at the strategic level, and so the latter is unlikely to be necessarily the solution to the former.
It may be, but often it won’t be. Second, there are areas in the spectrum of conflict that continue to require dedicated single-service specializations that cannot
safely be traded away in the name of jointness or economy. Third, the shortage of
resources leads to unsatisfactory risk-management compromises that in fact
satisfy the aspirations of none of the services, the Royal Navy included.
Seeking Other, Cheaper Ways of Doing Things. In return for a promise of a “core
work load” of naval production every year to help planning, the MOD expects
from industry significant improvements in efficiency, productivity, and profitability. Much of this transformation in Britain’s shipbuilding capacity has been
driven by the requirement to tool up for the Queen Elizabeth–class aircraft carrier (CVF) and Future Surface Combatant (FSC) projects. As Lord Drayson, the
Defence Procurement Minister, stated in 2005, “The level of warship building
over the next 10 years is the largest the UK has seen for many years. . . . [W]e need
to find new ways to get the yards to work together, to pool resources and provide
investment so we have an industry which is more efficient and effective than it is
37
now. We have an opportunity to change ship-building in this country.”
“Quite simply,” Archie Bethel, chief executive of Babcock Marine, has remarked, “we must continue to attack support costs, otherwise we will end up
38
with a smaller navy.” This followed Babcock’s acceptance of responsibility for
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operating a number of naval dockyards, bases, and depots, and it is an important
part of a determined campaign to transform, reduce, and simplify both the
Royal Navy’s support costs and its equipment-acquisition processes. Some of
these innovations have seemed radical. The Royal Navy’s hiring of the four
River-class ocean patrol vessels (HM Ships Tyne, Severn, and Mersey) for fishery
protection and HMS Clyde for the Falkland Islands Patrol from BVT Surface Fleet
(which still “owns” these ships) has proved a great success in cost-efficiency terms,
providing through a multiple-watch system completely predictable platform
availability for the MOD. Conversely, Vosper Thornycroft operates but does not
own the two survey vessels, HM Ships Echo and Enterprise, but is still contracted to deliver 334 sea days a year. By these and a host of other reforms, the
Royal Navy now gets far more out of its ships than it used to. These days the
number of “operational” units generated by a given pool of ships is higher, and
modern technology often reduces operating costs too. A Type 45 destroyer, for
example, with its all-electric drive is expected to use half the fuel required for a
Type 23 frigate.
For the past fifty years a succession of major institutional reforms to the manner in which ships, weapons, and sensors are designed and built—to correct for
past inefficiencies and partially compensate for ruthless defense inflation—have
been put in place, with varying success. A procurement system that delivers good
ships on budget and on time has long appeared to elude the Royal Navy. Partly
this has been a consequence of unsustainably optimistic projections of anticipated cost (no doubt in part intended to help secure political approval) and
partly because of the inherent problems of a maritime defense industry not suf39
ficiently tailored to suit modern conditions. The result in the 2004–2006 period was something of a procurement crisis, resulting in cost and time overruns
40
that seriously threatened important shipbuilding projects.
An official Defence Industrial Strategy that was finally issued in 2005 and a
Defence Technology Strategy in the following year have indicated a real determination to get to grips with this problem. It has led to a constructive rationalization and consolidation of British defense industries, with, for example, a great
emphasis on teamwork among various providers, as demonstrated by the formation of BVT and the Aircraft Carrier Alliance. This in turn promises to facilitate more cost-effective procedures, such as performance-based agreements,
and to help stabilize the maritime supply chain in the future. Progress in the reorganization of the British defense industry and the development of the notion
of partnering between customer and supplier allowed the placing of major orders in 2007.41
How effective these reforms will prove in the long run remains to be seen, although initial prospects seem favorable.42 But a basic problem remains. The
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United Kingdom’s maritime defense industry is now, after a long period of famine, grappling with something like a feast in orders but suspects that in the longer term these orders could well drop off substantially. The industry is thus still
far from securing the steady and predictable flow of future orders that it would
like to have. For such reasons the instituted reforms have, for all their promise, so
far ameliorated rather than solved the real problem of a gap between commitments and resources.
More Networking. An alternate way of making the most of fewer platforms is to
ensure that those few act together more coherently. Some have gone on to argue
that with network-enabling technologies there could be a shift in the composition of the fleet away from fewer large platforms to larger numbers of smaller
combatants gridded to operate together. The Royal Navy has not gone so far as to
accept the more radical of these views but nonetheless has put a good deal of effort into this non-platform-centric approach to the future fleet.43 In July 2004,
the “promise of a Co-operative Engagement capability (CEC) was used to justify
44
reducing destroyer and frigate numbers from 31 to 25.” Nonetheless, and despite the service’s long experience in this field, the introduction and support of
these potentially transformational technologies are more likely to increase raw
costs for the Royal Navy than to reduce them. The full-blown CEC scheme
sketched out in July 2004 was in fact postponed for five years, in early 2005.
THE NEED FOR A MAJOR REVIEW
Given the failure of these palliatives to solve the United Kingdom’s long-standing
resources-commitments problem, there is a general recognition, across the political spectrum and among all the services, that in the current financial and strategic environment the country needs the kind of major rebalancing of
commitments and resources that only a rigorous strategic defense review can
provide. The last one of these was in 1997–98, with a “new chapter” added in
2002 in light of the focus on counterterrorism created by 9/11. The history of
British defense since 1945 shows something of a pattern of a review every decade
or so. Indeed, some believe Britain should adopt the more regular course corrections provided by the American Quadrennial Defense Review process.
It was no surprise, then, that the government announced on 7 July 2009 a
wide-ranging consultative “green paper” (i.e., a preliminary government report
without commitment to action) on defense to be completed by the spring of
2010, when a new general election is widely expected. This will act as the foundation for a full-blown strategic defense review through 2010–11 that will set the
agenda for the succeeding decade or so. The Conservative opposition has likewise announced its intention to follow much the same course, and a number of
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private organizations have already published significant contributions to the
debate.
Of these, perhaps the most comprehensive has been the Institute for Public
Policy Research’s very wide-ranging report Shared Responsibilities: A National
Security Strategy for the UK. Its emphasis is on defining security in the widest
way and on considering the defense dimension within that much broader context. It also puts a good deal of stress on developing closer security relationships
45
with the rest of Europe in a much more unstable, multipolar world. Finding
what it calls “a black hole in the defence budget,” the IPPR report recommends a
close review of Britain’s projected defense-equipment requirements with a view
to “capability downgrading and quantity reductions, as well as for complete can46
cellation of some equipment programmes.” Significantly, the candidates offered up for illustrative purposes were all naval: the Future Carrier program, the
Joint Strike Fighter, the Type 45 Daring-class destroyer, and the Astute-class submarine. If it serves no other purpose, the report at least identifies some of the ar47
eas that the Royal Navy will need to defend in the coming round.
The Strategic Deterrent
The Royal Navy has successfully operated Britain’s continuous-at-sea deterrent
for the past forty years and believes that none of its patrols have been detected,
even when one of its SSBNs (ballistic-missile submarines) was involved in a minor but extraordinary collision with a French SSBN in the Atlantic in February
48
2009! Each boat sails in “relaxed” mode, carrying forty-eight detargeted warheads that are on several days’ notice to fire. The Trident missile will not reach
the end of its operational life until around 2042, and the Vanguard submarines,
on current estimates, will require replacement in 2024.
The long lead time needed to build a new generation of ballistic missile–
firing submarines led the British government to outline plans in a December
2006 white paper and then in May 2007 to authorize design and concept work
for a new class of submarines. The new submarines are expected to have twelve
rather than the current sixteen missile tubes, and a British-led contract has been
awarded to General Dynamics Electric Boat to design a “Common Missile
Compartment” for both the United Kingdom’s successor submarines and the
49
U.S. Navy’s projected Ohio-replacement SSBNs. This followed a year of intensive review by the Ministry of Defence of over a hundred alternative ways of
maintaining a deterrent. The conclusion of the review was that only a Trident-like system would produce the necessary capabilities at bearable cost. The
highly classified nature of much of the evidence considered in this review greatly
limited its visibility and contributed to quite a widespread perception that the
decision was more of an instinctive reflex than the result of a rigorous analysis of

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24

NWCR_Winter2010_john.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5294_NWC_Review_Winter2010\NWCR_Winter2010_john.vp
Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:28:36 AM

54

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

War College: Winter 2010 Review

TILL

49

50

all the issues. Also, although spread over many years, the program, at an estimated £24 billion, seems to many extremely expensive at a time of major constraint. Accordingly, many have argued that the decision ought to be put back on
the table for a second look, given that contracts for the build of the new subma51
rines may not need to be placed until perhaps 2014.
So far, though, the government has, uniquely, excluded the possibility of a reconsideration of this program from the green-paper process. The National Security Strategy was quite clear that “a minimum strategic deterrent capability is
likely to remain a necessary element of our national security for the foreseeable
52
future.” Even the rather more skeptical IPPR report has concluded that development work should continue and that consideration be given to “a further
run-on, beyond 2024 of the existing Vanguard hulls,” since “a minimum UK de53
terrent is still needed.” The Conservative opposition has in theory acknowl54
edged the necessity of a degree of reconsideration; nonetheless, it is still likely
to accept the need for a submarine-based system of some sort, although there is
an appetite within the party for much cheaper solutions. There remains, furthermore, the wider skepticism about whether the United Kingdom needs an independent nuclear deterrent at all. The prime minster’s recent decision to delay
Trident design work and his apparent readiness to consider such various “Trident Lite” alternatives as three rather than four SSBNs and a reduced number of
55
warheads may prove significant.
The Astute-Class Submarines
The 7,400-ton Astute SSN, the first of which is expected to be delivered by the
end of 2009 (at the time of writing), is closely related to this issue. Three others
have been laid down and long-lead orders given for two more; an order for the
seventh boat, to be delivered around 2020, should be issued next year. An eighth
56
boat seems problematic. This constitutes a significant drop in SSN numbers
since 1998 from fourteen to perhaps eight. Originally scheduled to produce the
first Astute in June 2005, the program has been subject to delays, cost increases,
and constructional problems that are partly attributable to a certain fading in
skills as a result of the long gap since the early 1990s, the construction of the last
Vanguard. The delays and difficulties are also due to the determination to give
this submarine some extraordinary, world-class capabilities. Finally, the Astute
program exemplifies one of the most difficult problems facing the British maritime defense industry—the fact that the SSN building industry is highly specialist, with only one supplier (once Babcocks, now BAE Systems at Barrow), one
customer, and no prospect for export. As a result, the program has also to support the costs of retaining the industry.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the program was in real trouble in the 2002–2005 period, but it has now, with the negotiation of new agreements and procedures between the MOD and BAE Systems, been successfully turned around. As Murray
Easton, managing director of the project at Barrow, remarked, “We were in a
marginal situation with Astute and just survived. If we were to go through any57
thing like that again, then we almost definitely wouldn’t recover.”
For this reason, going instead for a regular, plannable, and predictable drumbeat of nuclear submarine construction would have many advantages for industry. The Defence Industrial Strategy agreement of 2005 sought to solve this
problem for BAE Systems at Barrow with a long-term agreement to deliver one
submarine every twenty-two months. After the Future Attack Submarine project, which was intended to be a follow-on to the Astute class, was quietly terminated in 2001, the future of the SSN building industry seems linked to the
Trident replacement project. Were it decided not to build successors to the Vanguard SSBN, the likely atrophying of submarine design and construction skills
58
would make a longer-term replacement for the Astutes highly problematic.
The Type 45 Daring-Class Destroyer Program
The Daring Type 45 destroyer was another extremely complex and ambitious
program, one that pulled together the productive efforts of over seven thousand
defense firms. Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces, stated in 2003 that
the principal role of the Type 45 Destroyers will be antiair warfare. However, these
ships are being built with significant space and weight margins to enable incremental
acquisition should an emerging requirement necessitate a different equipment fit.
Our requirements are being kept under review, and the design could be modified to
incorporate improved land attack capabilities, including a cruise missile system such
as Tomahawk.59

Perhaps inevitably, its costs increased over budget, and six ships rather than
the twelve originally envisaged were decided upon—contributing, of course, to
each ship’s being significantly more expensive than originally planned for.
About three years late, this program is now nearing completion, and the Royal
Navy claims with some justification that the result has indeed been what is, in
many respects, a world-beating AAW destroyer. With its Samson radar, a single
Daring will be able to monitor all takeoffs and landings from every major airport
within two hundred miles of Portsmouth, including London Heathrow and
Gatwick. Able to engage twelve air targets simultaneously, a Type 45 could single60
handedly protect London from air attack. The design, moreover, is spacious,
with all the growth potential anticipated by Adam Ingram in 2003.
Nonetheless, criticisms of the project have been made. Its Sea Viper principal
antiair missile system has not yet been fired from the ship, although extensive
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trials (including a first sea-firing on 4 February 2009) have taken place. A
cross-party committee of members of Parliament has been critical of the MOD’s
61
project management for its alleged deficiencies. Another criticism has fastened
onto the fact that the Daring has not been fitted with land-attack missiles, as a
result, some say, of a blocking operation carried out by a Royal Air Force con62
cerned about the survival of its deep-strike role. The vessel’s highly sophisticated Samson radar system would allow it to grow into a highly effective ballistic
missile–defense role; given the proliferation of missiles around the world, this
seems a likely requirement.
The Carrier Program
The program for two sixty-five-thousand-ton CVFs originally announced in the
1998 Strategic Defence Review has now been confirmed, much subcontracted
work has already been completed, and the first steel was cut ceremonially on 7
July 2009, but these ships remain controversial. The British press has reported
widespread opposition to them within Army and Royal Air Force circles and itself has exhibited skepticism about whether they really constitute good value for
money. The IPPR report also identified the carrier and the associated JSF programs (138 aircraft for the Royal Navy and for the RAF, at an estimated five and
ten billion pounds, respectively) as major sources of significant future savings
on the defense budget.
The in-service dates of the two carriers were originally 2012 for Queen Elizabeth and 2015 for Prince of Wales. The decision in December 2008 to delay the
completion of the two carriers by approximately two years, in order to
“reprioritise investment to meet current operational priorities and to better
align the programme with the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft,” added at least £600
63
million to the £3.9 billion already envisaged. Now HMS Queen Elizabeth is due
for completion in 2016 and Prince of Wales two years later in 2018. Each will be
able to take from thirty-five to forty fighter aircraft and a large number of helicopters and UAVs.
64
The arguments against the completion of the project are fairly familiar.
Given their high-seeming cost and the likely presence of allied carriers and
friendly land bases, some believe that the need for such an ambitious capability
is overstated. The IPPR report makes the point that since Britain is likely to engage in major combat operations only in coalitions led, most likely, by the
United States, investment in capabilities already held “in abundance, relative to
65
any adversary,” seems unwise.
The worst aspect of this controversy has been the reappearance of destructive
interservice tribalism. The British Army’s position is that current expenditure
for the forces actively engaged in Afghanistan should take priority for the next
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ten years or so, rather than weapons systems, “relics of the Cold War,” which it
claims are primarily intended for high-intensity interstate warfare. The RAF has
attacked the carriers more insidiously, first arguing that the Harrier force on the
Royal Navy’s existing carriers should be scrapped, thereby opening up a serious
gap until the putative arrival of the JSFs. Beaten off in this attack, the RAF then
argued that it should take over entire responsibility for naval aviation, promising to make nonspecialist aircrew available as and when necessary. This threat to
return to the dreadful days of “Dual Control” in the interwar period has likewise
66
been defeated, at least for the time being.
The carrier program’s heavy reliance on the prompt arrival of the vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (V/STOL) version of the JSF F-35B as the answer
to the RAF/Royal Navy requirement for perhaps 138 Joint Combat Aircraft remains a source of danger, and any significant delay could hugely complicate the
67
carrier project. The V/STOL ramp could be removed and replaced by conventional catapults, but this would cost considerable money and time. The fact that
the United Kingdom has invested enough in this project to become a Level 1
partner (that is, to have a significant role in the project’s direction) with the
United States indicates in itself, however, the priority currently attached to it.
The CVF’s defenders point to the manifest utility of the carrier in most
war-fighting, expeditionary, and conflict-prevention situations. Britain’s capacity “to deliver airpower from the sea wherever and whenever it is required” until
about 2070 will facilitate “strategic effect, influence and, where necessary, direct
action [that] will give us an unprecedented range of options to deal with the
68
challenges of an uncertain world at a time and place of our choosing.” The
Navy has argued that the experience of the past fifty years amply demonstrates
the advantages of sea-based aviation in a manner likely to be confirmed in the
69
next fifty. The CVF and its air group could be flexibly tailored to cope with activities in all of the four main task areas identified earlier.
Moreover, given the inability to run the elderly Invincible carriers and Harrier
fleet still further and the absence of a “Plan B,” the loss of this program would
put the Royal Navy at a major disadvantage relative to all the world’s other carrier navies (including several European ones)—a position from which it would
be very difficult indeed to recover. Given the increasing domestic and international challenges facing the U.S. Navy’s carrier program in the next few decades
and the rising naval powers of the Asia-Pacific, the loss of these two “medium”
carriers would materially change the global naval balance for “the West.”
With Quentin Davies, the Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, announcing at the steel cutting that aircraft carriers “are a corner-stone of British
Defence,” the naval view seems to have prevailed for the moment, but few doubt
that the way ahead will be rocky. The industrial side of the argument, often
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overlooked, may prove decisive. The carrier project employs ten thousand shipyard workers directly (mainly in Glasgow and Rosyth, in politically sensitive
Scotland) and an estimated forty to fifty thousand more workers among the
many subcontractors spread around the rest of Britain and, indeed, abroad. The
Aircraft Carrier Alliance, largely comprising a functional merger of BAE Systems and Vosper Thornycroft, the two largest shipbuilding concerns in the
country, is, as we have seen, represented as an imaginative rationalization in support of the government’s Defence Industrial Strategy of keeping world-class de70
fense technologies in Britain.
Although the completion date of the carriers has been put back two years, the
project has advanced since the contract was signed on 3 July 2008 more than is
generally recognized. Work has gone ahead on the generators in France and Italy,
on the shaft lines in the Czech Republic, on the rudders and propeller blades, on
the aircraft lifts, the automatic weapons-handling system, bridge and antennae
design, and so on, alongside heavy investment in infrastructure, especially in the
No. 1 Dock at Rosyth. Numerous suballiance contracts have been signed—for
example, to de-risk interface problems between the carriers and its aircraft and
to deliver the propulsion systems needed to drive what will be the world’s biggest
71
all-electric ships. Given such sunk costs, cancelling the project at this stage
would be very expensive in financial terms. For the time being, at any rate, the
National Security Strategy emphasizes “continued commitment to renewing the
Royal Navy, through Type 45 destroyers, Astute submarines and the Future Air72
craft Carriers.”
All the same, the new First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, has admitted that the carrier program could be overturned. In the meantime, industry is
forging ahead, and with the return of the British Harrier force from its diversion
to Afghanistan, the necessary work on regenerating carrier-strike capability on
HMS Invincible and then Ark Royal has now resumed. Exercise AURIGA, the
73
group deployment for 2010, will be important from this point of view.
The MARS Program
The Military Afloat Reach Sustainability (MARS) program attracts much less attention than the Royal Navy’s other, higher-profile projects, but it is critical to
the support of the service’s sustained global presence, to the development of
British concepts of sea basing, and to the logistic support of British joint forces
74
ashore. The Royal Navy’s current tankers and solid-support ships are ageing
fast, find it difficult to keep up with modern task groups, and include singlehulled tankers of dubious legality. Originally the program was intended to produce a total of eleven new ships between 2011 and 2021 at a cost of some £2.5
billion, but delays have been experienced, partly because of the program’s
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concurrency with the CVF, Type 45, and Astute projects. Two Wave-class auxiliary oil tankers have been delivered, but the overall series is worryingly late.
The Future Surface Combatant
The “hi/lo mix” issue (that is, the idea of combining sophisticated but expensive
units with forces less capable but affordable in greater numbers) is exactly illustrated by the current debate over the Future Surface Combatant. This program,
intended to replace the Type 22s, 23s, and lesser types as well, started in the
75
mid-1990s but failed in 1999 and had to be resurrected in 2003. The cancellation of the last two Type 45s (numbers 7 and 8, known colloquially as HM Ships
Dubious and Doubtful) in the original plan provided headroom for the resuscitation and indeed partial acceleration of this project, but the accumulated delay
makes an eventual shortfall in destroyer and frigate numbers almost inevitable.
The precise mix of ships to be adopted has always been a very complex matter,
but since these ships are to be the mainstay of the Royal Navy for decades, it was,
and indeed remains, clearly important to get the project right.
Some argue that this family of ships should include a sizable investment in
new, less capable, and cheaper—if not “cheap as chips”—warships, more modular and fitted for, but not with, specialist equipment. This thinking reflects a concern that the reduction in numbers brought about by an insistence on high
quality in warship design dangerously reduces the geographic coverage that the
fleet provides. However good it is, a warship can only be in one place at one time.
Having secured just six of the Daring class, these people think, there is now a
need for a bigger focus on simple numbers.
A second school of thought is somewhat less concerned about the drop in
numbers, having greater faith in the compensating effect of high quality. With
technical advances and the astonishing speed at which first-line warships can
move, the coverage afforded by a modern warship amply compensates for a drop
in numbers, its adherents say. Pointing to the deeply impressive capabilities of
the Type 45, they conclude, “Measuring the capability of our Armed Forces by
the number of units or platforms in their possession will no longer be signifi76
cant.” For such reasons, this school continues to uphold the traditional Royal
Navy policy of placing its major investments in capable, high-end war-fighting
platforms. They also maintain that governments would be less willing to use the
second-rate ships of a two-tier navy in any but the most benign of environments, when, in fact, support ships might offer greater capability.
At the moment, there is a broad balancing consensus that the FSC family
should comprise three classes of ship:

• C1: large, capable warships intended for ASW and land attack, with organic
mine countermeasures (MCM) and a limited capacity to carry a military
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force. The C1 should be big, with a large flight deck and growth potential.
It would be able to join a deployed task group. The aspiration is for the first
of these to be commissioned in 2017, an ambitious target indeed.

• C2: smaller, less sophisticated, and so cheaper general-purpose vessels, possibly with the same hull as the C1, intended for lower-scale stabilization
and maritime security operations.

• C3: a diverse family of significantly smaller ships capable of operating on
the open ocean and of being configured for a variety of roles, including offshore patrol, MCM, hydrography, and oceanography. These ships, in effect,
are now regarded as a distinctive group in their own right, but alongside
the C2s they could provide presence and often be entrusted with conflict77
prevention and maritime security operations around the world.
The notion that we will see a blurring of the differences between simpler frigates and minor war vessels and a trend toward more multipurpose vessels making use of modular and unmanned technologies is part of this debate. The
thinking behind the C2 variant is particularly revolutionary, since it approaches
the controversial notion of building a major warship that from the war-fighting
point of view would be second-class by design. Admiral Sir Jonathon Band was
“much more interested in something which is designed first and foremost to
perform maritime patrol and presence tasks, with the ability to contribute to
78
‘classic’ warfare tasks if required.”
By such innovative thinking the planners hope to be able to help solve the
numbers problem; to reduce the current diversity in platforms, weapons, and
sensors; and to do both at sustainable cost. Early progress in this project is also
seen as essential as a means of providing the British warship-building industry
with a sustained basis for sensible planning. For the same reason it is important
that some of the variants have export potential. Thinking about all of this, especially the C3 variant, is quite tentative at the moment, however, and no quick or
easy solution to the Royal Navy’s numbers problem is expected. In the meantime, plans exist to upgrade and run on some of the Type 22 and Type 23 frigates
79
as a way to keep frigate numbers up until the 2030s. Some of these hulls are
likely to remain in service for between thirty-two and thirty-six years—nearly
twice as long as originally envisaged. The FSC program attracts nothing like the
public attention given to the carriers and Trident, but it is hard to exaggerate its
importance for the Royal Navy as an oceangoing force in the longer term.
AIMING FOR THE VERY BEST
The conclusion that emerges is that for all its apparent reductions in size, the reported death of the Royal Navy has as yet been considerably exaggerated. Instead
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what the world may be watching is a major process of transformation, and in some
ways rebirth, of what is still and will remain one of the world’s significant navies.
A succession of British defense policy makers over the past ten or fifteen years
have collectively taken, under extreme financial and operational pressure, a real
and potentially risky gamble for their navy’s future. They have decided that the
Royal Navy must stay in the front line—the premier division, in soccer
terms—and to that end they have set going the most ambitious program of fleet
recapitalization for perhaps forty years, at a time when naval defense spending is
less than half of what it was in the Cold War era. The price deliberately and consciously paid for this ambitious renewal has already been severe in numbers of
ships, submarines, aircraft, and people. But insofar as the tonnage of frontline
ships is concerned, today’s built and building fleet is appreciably larger than it
was in 1997, even without the Future Surface Combatant. The final rewards of
this Nelsonian policy of aiming for the very best will be apparent only when the
major programs described above complete or start to come through.
The problem for the Royal Navy is that the general situation has greatly worsened since this long campaign began. The so-called War on Terror has produced
two conflicts in which the United Kingdom has found itself in savage and expensive land-based wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, whose needs command the attention of governments, politicians, and the media. The facts that over half the air
strikes in Afghanistan are from carriers and that 40 percent of the British personnel engaged in that unrelenting campaign have at various times been naval
(counting the Royal Marines as such) make no difference. At a time when journalism, the defense variant included, can be likened to the “industrialization of gossip,” the facts are less important than the narrative—it is the impression that
counts. And the impression is that the Army is doing all the fighting and so deserves the resources. Given the very short political horizon of most politicians and
80
media folk, this is potentially a very dangerous development for the Royal Navy.
However, a growing public distaste for engagement in large-scale, open-ended
conflicts on, and garrisoning of, parts of the Asian mainland (or anywhere else,
for that matter) will probably militate against the assumption that the strategic
future should be merely the strategic present extrapolated forward. Accordingly,
one of the most contentious and critical issues in the Strategic Defence Review
will therefore be the extent to which current experience should act as a template
for defense preparation in the medium and longer terms. It may well be that the
review will herald a marked shift away from fighting future Afghanistans and
back toward the traditional, more modest, maritime conceptions of strategy that
have served Britain rather well over the past three hundred years.
The new review will certainly need to address the extraordinary disconnect
that has developed over the years between a growing awareness of Britain’s
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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dependence on the sea for its safety and security, on the one hand (as exemplified by the government’s rejuvenation of the British shipping industry, the attention paid to maritime security in the National Security Strategy, and today’s
very high levels of directed naval engagement), and, on the other, a continued
shortfall in the allocation of resources needed to sustain it.
On top of all that come the effects of the worst economic recession for the
United Kingdom in three-quarters of a century. The United Kingdom’s national
debt is now some 12 percent of GDP, and government revenues are some £175
billion overdrawn. Accordingly, significant reductions in medium-term government spending can be anticipated, not least in defense. Although both major political parties have suggested that they will seek to protect the defense budget,
estimates of the size of prospective defense cuts vary widely; the newspapers talk
of 10, 15, even 30 percent reductions. At the moment no one knows, nor will
they until the new Strategic Defence Review is completed. Nor do we know
which government will make the next round of decisions in 2010. The political
certainties are few. If past history and current political attitudes to national
spending and borrowing are anything to go by, we can expect a Conservative
government under David Cameron to be significantly less sympathetic to the
Royal Navy than the current administration. All in all, it would be wildly optimistic to imagine the Royal Navy’s emerging completely unscathed from this
deadly barrage of unexpected and unpredictable fire.
All this may make the chances that this, Great Britain’s greatest gamble with
its navy, will actually come off seem quite remote, but the successfully completed
transformation of the United Kingdom’s amphibious capability (once long despaired of) and the appearance of the Darings and the Astutes may suggest, for
all the contention, that as so often before the Royal Navy will prevail against the
odds. Certainly, for the long-term prosperity and security of the country and for
the rules-based maritime order of which it is a part, one must hope so.
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AUSTRALIA’S 2009 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
A Maritime Focus for Uncertain Times
Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman

A

s a significant medium power in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia inescapably is a participant in the most politically, economically, and strategically
dynamic part of the world. The region is a vast and politically complex area, one
that is increasingly prosperous, confident, volatile, and potentially dangerous in
almost equal parts. Situated at the nexus of the Pacific and Indian oceans, Australia must share in both the opportunities and challenges thrown up by these
two great maritime stages for geopolitical interaction.
As a maritime trading state highly dependent upon secure sea lines of communication stretching from the Middle East to North America, Australia is tied
comprehensively and profitably to Asia’s economic success. Yet Australia must
also suffer the less positive implications of such dynamism, including growing
strategic competition among the region’s major powJack McCaffrie is a visiting principal fellow at the Ausers, an increasing competition for resources, active
tralian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, NSW. A
Islamist terrorist threats, unpredictable and unsatisretired naval officer, he is a 1986 graduate of the U.S.
fied states in combination with the related danger of
Naval War College’s Naval Command College. He has
weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferapublished several papers and edited monographs on naval history and maritime security and is currently worktion, and the consequences of failing or troubled
ing on Southeast Asian and South Pacific security
states unable to cope with political, economic, envimatters. Dr. Chris Rahman is an ANCORS research felronmental, or demographic stresses.
low specializing in maritime strategy and security. His
most recent publication is The Global Maritime PartThe impact of such factors has been especially evinership Initiative: Implications for the Royal Austradent
for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), which
lian Navy, published by the Royal Australian Navy’s
Sea Power Centre–Australia.
over the past decade has been operating at a constantly
high tempo in response to strategic crises, disintegrat© 2009 by Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman
ing societies, or grave natural disasters—from East
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Timor to the Persian Gulf and the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sumatra,
and Pakistan. Indeed, there have been many other, lesser ADF deployments over
that time as well, along with the added importance of border security in the
post-9/11 world.
THE 2009 WHITE PAPER IN BRIEF
Yet Australia’s official defense policy and long-term planning to shape the ADF
for the looming challenges in the decades ahead had, until this year, not changed
for nine years. This situation was rectified in May 2009 with the release of a new
defense white paper, after a prolonged gestation period. It is a significant document, with important implications for Australia’s status as a regional medium
power, its ability to respond to future threats and project influence in a fundamentally maritime region, and its future utility as a leading ally to the ultimate
arbiter of regional order, the United States.
National Security and Defense Policy
Elected in November 2007 the Labor government, under Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd, issued its defense white paper Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, to take account of the evolution in strategic circumstances and
to differentiate its defense policy from that of the previous Liberal-National Coalition government. The paper was drafted by a team led by Mike Pezzullo, seconded from his position as Deputy Secretary Strategy in the Department of
Defence. The writing process appears to have been more robust and inclusive
than in previous such documents, with a notable use of war gaming, involve1
ment of the individual services, and regular government oversight.
At the outset the white paper acknowledges the complexity of global affairs
today and the consequent need to balance the demands on the ADF. These are
generated by the need to be able to respond to interstate and intrastate conflict
and the need to contribute to support operations against nonstate global forces.
Essentially, the relatively small Australian Defence Force needs to be able to contribute significantly, even decisively, in operations ranging from humanitarian
2
assistance to major interstate conflict.
Thus the 2009 white paper aims for a balance between resources available
3
for defense and desired strategic weight and reach. It highlights Australia’s reliance on a continued U.S. willingness and capacity to provide stability in the
Asia-Pacific and categorizes strategic risk as needing either a nondiscretionary
4
response from Australia or allowing a more selective approach. Furthermore,
the white paper establishes a strategic risk–based approach to defense planning, founded on the five-yearly production of white papers—each preceded
5
by formal risk assessments and force structure reviews.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24

NWCR_Winter2010_john.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5294_NWC_Review_Winter2010\NWCR_Winter2010_john.vp
Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:28:37 AM

68

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

War College: Winter 2010 Review

MCCAFFRIE & RAHMAN

63

The white paper’s strategic outlook reflects Australia’s continuing interest in
seeing the United States retain global primacy but also notes the rise of both
China and India as potential great powers, with particular emphasis on China’s
6
potential to challenge the United States economically. It further identifies the
potential for violence or political instability in a range of countries from the
Middle East to Northeast Asia and the probability that the United States will
need greater support from allies and potential partners like Australia. Finally,
there is recognition of “new security risks,” including climate change (with its
potential for major problems in the South Pacific) and the supply of energy,
food, and water.
Notwithstanding the broad geographical reach of the outlook, the white paper geographically bounds Australia’s main strategic interests: the defense of
Australia and security in the immediate neighborhood—that is, Indonesia, East
Timor, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and the South Pacific. This is based on
the premise that Australia’s capacity to influence events is greatest closer to
7
home. The white paper does, however, confirm that Australia will deploy farther afield and continue to support U.S. efforts—but not unconditionally—in
8
maintaining a rules-based global order. It reiterates the long-standing principle
of defense self-reliance: Australia expects to meet most direct military threats
without combat support from America but notes the significant advantage that
9
accrues from access to U.S. intelligence and technology.
Future Force Structure
Development of the white paper incorporated a force structure review, from
which has emerged “Force 2030”—a future ADF optimized to deter and defeat
attacks against Australia but capable of contributing to domestic security and
10
emergency response as well as to regional stability and security. Force 2030 is
expected to be more potent than the existing ADF, especially in all aspects of
maritime warfare, air superiority, strike, and information operations. The
planned improvements in maritime warfare capabilities are particularly significant. The intent is for the ADF to maintain a strategic capability edge in the re11
gion, by continuing to exploit and apply advanced technologies.
The ADF is expected to maintain a level of preparedness that will allow the
government to respond to a broad range of contingencies. Among the specific
government demands are the ability to establish and maintain sea control and
air superiority in key places in the primary operational environment near region
12
and the ability to project maritime and airpower beyond that if necessary. Significantly, there is a stated need to be able to deploy and sustain a brigade group
and, possibly simultaneously, an additional battalion group in a different loca13
tion—both potentially for prolonged periods.
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Complicating Issues
Concluding the white paper is a brief exposition of the financial plan underpinning the force structure and other initiatives. There is no cost assessment for any
individual initiative, simply commitments to funding levels to the year 2030: 3
percent real growth in the defense budget to 2017/18, 2.2 percent real growth
from 2018/19 to 2030, and 2.5 percent fixed indexation to the defense budget
14
from 2009/10 to 2030. The government has also stated that the planned force
structure depends on the success of the A$20 billion Defence Strategic Reform
Program, which is intended to generate internal savings for reinvestment in capability over the next ten years. Emphasizing the importance of the Strategic Reform Program, the funding statement also points out that any funding shortfalls
in the white paper plan will be found from within Defence.15
While the white paper promises much for the planned force, recent history is
sobering. For example, the 1987 white paper indicated that the surface combat16
ant force would be expanded to sixteen or seventeen ships. It remains at twelve.
The 1987 white paper also acknowledged the need to allocate 2.6 to 2.9 percent
17
of gross domestic product (GDP) to support the proposed program. From that
point, defense spending as a proportion of GDP began a gradual decline until it
reached a low of 1.9 percent just a few years ago. In all likelihood, a different government will enact or otherwise amend this program, in economic and strategic
circumstances that no one can predict today.
Attention will also focus on the personnel demands of the future force structure. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is still critically short of some categories
of officers and sailors, with particular problems in the submarine arm and with
technical personnel overall. The Navy can crew at best only three of the current
six Collins-class submarines. There is a plan to recover the submarine arm per18
sonnel situation; general recruiting and retention figures are showing some
promise. The RAN should be able to generate the necessary personnel numbers
over the next fifteen years or more. Nevertheless, a nationwide skills shortage
that was experienced before the onset of the global economic crisis may again
put pressure on personnel numbers when the anticipated economic recovery
appears.
STRATEGIC DRIVERS
The strategic thinking informing the 2009 white paper is perhaps the most controversial element of the document. In particular, the role of China has dominated not only the public debates leading to the white paper’s formulation and
release but also reportedly the internal debate within Australia’s national security establishment.19 Indeed the influence of China upon Australia’s threat perceptions has been a difficult issue for Canberra’s policy makers for over a decade,
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as the potentially destabilizing growth of Chinese material strength and its political assertiveness throughout Australia’s wider region have been balanced by an
increasingly entangling economic embrace, one that matches Australian resources to China’s insatiable demand and deep pockets. Chinese resource hunger, especially for Australian iron ore, played a major role in feeding Australia’s
economic boom until the onset of the global economic crisis, and continuing
Chinese demand may yet prove sufficient to cushion the Australian economy
from the worst of the global recession. These economic ties have driven a strong
pro-China business lobby and bolstered bipartisan political support for deepening ties at all levels of engagement, including the political and strategic.
In the realm of public defense policy, the potential threat to Australia and
Australian interests from an authoritarian, strategically ambitious, and
geopolitically unsatisfied China has largely been downplayed, even rejected, as a
matter of underlying principle for the last decade. A perception that Australia
might attempt to balance its international relationships by drawing closer to
China was exacerbated by the election in November 2007 of a new government
led by the Mandarin-speaking, self-professed Sinophile former diplomat Kevin
Rudd. However, Rudd has increasingly demonstrated himself to be rather more
realistic and circumspect about China and a stronger supporter of the global
role of American power and of the centrality of the U.S. alliance for Australian
20
security than initially appeared to be the case.
Indeed, in statements made in the months leading up to the final drafting of the
white paper he seemed to be establishing the case for a revision of Australia’s
stated defense policy. At the heart of his concerns were the risks to regional stability caused by the economic and strategic dynamism of the region’s major powers.
In particular, he noted in a landmark speech in September 2008 to the Returned
Services League National Congress in Townsville, northern Queensland, that the
21
rise of China is “driving much of the change in our region.”
Prime Minister Rudd further declared that the ADF will need to develop in response to changes in the regional security environment that include the rapid modernization of military capabilities, especially “significant improvements in air
combat capability, and naval forces—including greater numbers and more ad22
vanced submarines.” The modernization of regional maritime capabilities in turn
presents “challenges in terms of Australia’s ability long term to defend its own sea
23
lines of communication.” Although several states in the Asia-Pacific are developing such capabilities, including India, South Korea, and Singapore, it seems clear
that in the context of the speech, both in the singling out of China and its reiteration
of Australia’s commitment to the Australia/New Zealand/United States alliance as
the first-named of “three pillars” of Australia’s strategic policy, China represented
the prime strategic concern.24
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The general China theme in driving the risk assessments for the white paper
was continued by Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, Chief of the Defence Force,
who publicly raised concerns over China’s January 2008 antisatellite missile test
and Beijing’s alleged reticence to explain the rationale underpinning aspects of
25
its strategic modernization. This concern with China’s military transparency,
commonly raised by many states, should be viewed in euphemistic rather than
literal terms: it is the capabilities being developed and the strategic objectives
driving their development—many of which are in fact quite evident—that
worry China’s neighbors and its strategic rivals.
Further, two other factors contribute to the elevation of China’s position in
Australia’s threat perceptions. The first comprises China’s increased espionage
activities and cyber-warfare attacks against the Australian government, allegedly including electronic spying against Prime Minister Rudd himself, in addition to targeting over the past several years expatriate Chinese within
Australia, Australian businesses, and sources of both commercial and strategic
technologies. This has led to heightened counterespionage activities by both
the Australian Security Intelligence Organization and the Defence Signals Di26
rectorate. Cyber attacks are acknowledged in the white paper to be more substantive and serious than previously assumed, with significant resources now
allocated to cyber-warfare needs, including the establishment of a Cyber Secu27
rity Operations Centre. Although there are multiple sources of cyber attacks,
it is well understood that the primary threat currently is posed by China.
Second, the white paper reiterates a long-standing policy that no major
power “that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Australia” should be able to access bases in the immediate neighborhood “from which
28
to project force against us.” Realistically, there is only one major power that potentially could pose such a problem. China already has military outposts deep in
the South China Sea and allegedly maintains listening posts and has designs on
basing privileges elsewhere in Southeast Asia and throughout the Indian Ocean
region. Nevertheless, the prospect of China establishing actual bases anywhere
in Southeast Asia, let alone in the immediate neighborhood, must remain only
the slimmest of possibilities. However, Chinese political and economic influence itself is increasingly problematic, particularly in the South Pacific and Papua New Guinea, where Chinese money, directed toward gaining access to
resources and countering Taiwan’s diplomatic presence, has fostered corruption, instability, and wider challenges to good governance.
In nominal terms at least, the white paper is understandably diplomatic when
it comes to the China factor. However, China is the only regional power to receive extended treatment in the document. The white paper continues the
theme set by Rudd’s Townsville speech, noting China’s rapidly growing power
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and its central role in the future stability of the region. It projects that China will
become the “strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin,” but
notes that the “pace, scope and structure” of Chinese strategic developments, including expanding power projection capabilities, may “give its neighbors cause
29
for concern.”
In some parts of the Australian defense establishment, the attitude toward
China is believed to be even more hawkish, with a draft internal Australian
Army document reportedly identifying Chinese, and potentially also Indian,
military ambitions as destabilizing and a challenge to the dominant U.S. role
throughout the Asia-Pacific: “Of particular concern is an increased likelihood
for dispute escalation as a result of changes to the perceived balance of power
with the real potential for a return to major combat operations involving
30
states.”
This prospect is consistent with the white paper’s acknowledgment that
“shows of force by rising powers” over both political disputes and resources are
increasingly likely and that interstate war, including between the major powers,
cannot be ruled out in the future. As a direct result of such pessimistic, yet understandable, judgments, the white paper’s assessment of the contribution of
Defence to Australia’s national security concludes that “the main role of the ADF
should continue to be an ability to engage in conventional combat against other
31
armed forces.”
In fact, taken in context, other leading regional states are treated in stark contrast to China. For example, Japan’s continued role as the leading regional alliance partner to the United States is viewed as a fundamental aspect of regional
stability. The white paper further describes Japan as a “critical strategic partner”
and notes the deepening practical defense relationship between the ADF and the
Japan Self-Defense Forces, underpinned by the 2008 Memorandum on Defence
32
Cooperation. The white paper likewise acknowledges Australia’s shared democratic values with India and the two nations’ common security interests and
33
growing practical defense cooperation, especially in maritime security. This
latter point also reflects the emphasis given by the prime minister in 2008 to the
importance of Australia’s sea-lanes and the need for enhanced naval power to
protect those maritime interests.
Indeed, the white paper rather belatedly elevates the importance of the Indian Ocean in Australia’s strategic thinking, noting its growing importance as
a trade route, especially for energy supplies. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century recognizes the consequent growth in strategic competition
among major naval powers and states clearly that “the Indian Ocean will join
the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and defence planning”;34 strategy and planning, in turn, will have to “contemplate
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operational concepts for operating in the Indian Ocean region, including with
35
regional partners with whom we share similar strategic interests.”
Canberra’s usual statement on the continued importance of Indonesia’s internal stability to Australian security is repeated, but unlike in the 2000 white paper, which was promulgated in the diplomatically fractious wake of the
Australian-led intervention in East Timor, the new document is able to strike a
36
more positive note on Indonesia’s internal political development. Consequently, the document reflects the strengthening of bilateral political and security ties exemplified by the Lombok Treaty on Security Cooperation and the
37
January 2009 Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation.
If Indonesia’s democratic development has been a positive factor in Australia’s security environment, instability elsewhere in the near neighborhood continues to create headaches for Canberra policy makers. In particular, ongoing
problems in East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea will
38
require continuing attention. The white paper also reiterates Australia’s com39
mitment to assist in stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan.
Islamist terrorism, including possible terrorist attacks involving weapons of
mass destruction, is still viewed as a significant threat, although the white paper
is more sanguine regarding the threat within Southeast Asia than in earlier security policy documents—post-9/11 and soon after the October 2002 terrorist
bombing on Bali—suggesting that while the threat will remain extant, the
spread of regional extremist networks will be constrained by ongoing
40
counterterrorism efforts. Lastly, the white paper notes—rather too briefly,
given the issue’s domestic prominence in recent years—the ADF’s role in border
protection and support for domestic security and its unique capabilities for responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions throughout
41
the region.
A BALANCED MARITIME FORCE
Taking into account the strategic drivers, regional geography, and Prime Minister Rudd’s stated emphasis in 2008 on naval power, it should come as no surprise
that by far the most significant force-structure initiatives in the white paper relate to maritime capability. Nevertheless, land and air forces do receive due attention. No major size or structural changes will be made to the Army, but it will
receive new troop-lift helicopters, artillery, and deployable protected vehicles;42
it will receive as well “enhanced communications, networking and battle man43
agement systems.” Combined with the previously announced Abrams main
battle tanks, C-17 airlifters, and big-deck amphibious ships (LHDs), these
force-structure improvements will enable the ADF to deploy and sustain a substantial combat force in the future.
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Air combat capability will be updated with the announced purchase of up to a
hundred F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft in the next decade. While the Air
Force’s long-range strike capacity will be reduced with the 2010 withdrawal
from service of the F-111, the capability gap will be filled to an extent by the previously approved purchase of twenty-four F/A-18F aircraft, twelve of which will
be wired for conversion to EA-18G electronic attack configuration, should that
44
be required at a later date. Airlift capacity is to be further increased with an additional two C-130J and up to ten light tactical transport aircraft.
Almost certainly the most far-reaching force-structure decision is the commitment to long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), all of which will
be sea based: on the already approved, Aegis-equipped air warfare destroyers,
the new (Anzac-class replacement) frigates, and the next generation of submarines.45 This represents a dramatic shift and will give the naval surface force,
and the ADF jointly, an offensive role and capacity beyond anything previously
imagined. It will also add more flexibility to the submarine’s existing roles and
will provide a range of strike options to any operational commander.
Although the introduction of LACMs may draw some criticism for introducing a new capability into the region (assuming that the missiles will be of up to
2,500-kilometer range, and thus presumably the Tomahawk), it is merely a different way of achieving the capability that will be lost with the retirement of the
46
F-111 strike aircraft. It is also consistent with the strategy enunciated in the
2000 white paper that “we would . . . seek to attack hostile forces as far from our
shores as possible, including in their home bases, forward operating bases and in
47
transit.” Unlike that document and its intellectual predecessor of 1987, however, the 2009 document actually provides for the force structure to accomplish
those missions.
The decision to double the submarine force to at least twelve boats is almost
48
as significant. The new submarines will be conventionally powered and locally
built, and they will have greater range and capability than the Collins class. They
will, therefore, almost certainly be the largest conventionally powered submarines in service and will be a fresh design. The technical and personnel problems
that have dogged the Collins class from introduction into service will ensure that
the new submarine project receives unprecedented scrutiny during development. The close U.S.-Australian collaboration in undersea warfare is expected to
be central to the development and sustainability of the new capability.
The new submarine force, which will begin to enter service late in the 2020s,
will be capable of land attack, antisubmarine and antishipping warfare, support
49
of special forces, and operations with unmanned underwater vehicles. The
white paper notes that for the new submarine, “long transits and potentially
short-notice contingencies in our primary operational environment demand
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high levels of mobility and endurance.” Those are demands ideally suited to a
50
nuclear-powered submarine, which the government expressly rules out. The
limited submerged speed of conventionally powered submarines does restrict
their mobility and capacity to respond to short-notice demands. Nevertheless,
the force of new submarines will be a substantial deterrent and sea-denial asset
for Australia.
One of the white paper’s real surprises is the prominence given to naval surface combatants. Many defense commentators in Australia, especially those who
favor a continental strategy of sea and air denial, have long criticized surface
combatants for their supposed limited utility and vulnerability in high-threat
environments, albeit without providing realistic alternative capabilities or evi51
dence to support their claims. The three Aegis destroyers, based on a Spanishdesigned hull, will be joined by eight frigates (which will be larger than the
Anzac class that they will replace) and by about twenty offshore combatant vessels, which in time will replace the current mix of patrol boats and hydrographic
52
and mine warfare vessels.
In addition to their land-attack role, the air warfare destroyers will be armed
with the SM-6 long-range surface-to-air missile and with the U.S. Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC), which, if fitted to the soon-to-be-fielded
Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, will provide an over-land
defensive capability against cruise missiles, as well as a very long-range (two
53
hundred nautical miles or more) air defense capacity. This combination will
also produce the kind of sensor grid necessary to maximize the range of the
54
SM-6.
The force of eight large frigates will be optimized for antisubmarine warfare.
The first Anzac frigate entered service in 1996; the first of these new ships could
appear as early as 2021. Although the white paper is not specific as to their size,
they could share a common hull with the destroyers. This would make sense in
several respects, not least the flexibility that that hull volume would provide for
sensor and weapon fits.
The next-generation frigate’s antisubmarine warfare fit is to comprise an integrated sonar suite, incorporating a long-range active towed array, and a com55
bination of helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Provision has
been made in the white paper, “as a matter of urgency,” for twenty-four new helicopters that will be antisubmarine and antisurface capable. Their design will almost certainly be based on either the U.S. MH-60R or the European NH-90.
The Air Force operates Australia’s maritime patrol aircraft, currently two
squadrons of AP-3C aircraft. These are to be replaced by a mixed force of eight
new maritime patrol aircraft and up to seven high-altitude and long-endurance
UAVs. Given that the UAVs will be able to contribute little to antisubmarine
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warfare, the number of dedicated maritime patrol aircraft may not be consistent
with the white paper’s emphasis on undersea warfare.
A force of about twenty offshore combatant vessels—corvettes of up to two
56
thousand tonnes—will complete the major maritime force initiatives. The intent is to develop a single multirole hull that will incorporate modular
(containerized and portable) combat suites suitable for constabulary, mine57
warfare, and hydrographic roles. Most of these corvettes will be employed in
the peacetime constabulary role, but unlike any of their recent predecessors,
they will be large enough and well enough equipped to undertake war-fighting
tasks.
The maritime force structure will be rounded out with the acquisition of a replacement replenishment ship, a medium-size sealift ship, and six new and more
capable heavy landing craft. Together with the already contracted LHDs and the
other initiatives listed in the white paper, they point toward the RAN’s being a
well-balanced but vastly more capable and flexible regional naval force in the
future.
Implications for Australia’s Strategic Doctrine
The implications of defense policy, as articulated in the white paper, upon what
may best be described as Australia’s strategic doctrine—a subject of considerable
debate over the past quarter century—are less avoided than politically fudged in
Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century. That debate, although seemingly
interminable, has been central to the shape, capabilities, and strategic posture of
the ADF since the Dibb Report of 1986 and subsequent 1987 white paper, which
58
emphasized the “Defence of Australia” focus for ADF force structure.
Briefly, the “Defence of Australia” doctrine adopted a minimalist approach to
defense strategy, with an emphasis on denial capabilities in the so-called sea-air
gap to the immediate north to prevent any physical attack against the continent
itself. This continentalist doctrine led to the development of a highly unbalanced and inflexible force structure. In fact, the inadequacies of the force of that
era were quite debilitating to the strategic options available to the Australian
government. It was dominated by the limited denial capabilities of the F-111
strike aircraft and submarine forces, supported by F/A-18 fighters; by a surface
fleet that lacked area-defense capabilities and combat power; and by an army
that was too small, too light, and almost undeployable in strength outside of
Australia. The limitations of this force were demonstrated by the difficulties experienced in deploying even a relatively small peacekeeping force to neighboring East Timor in 1999.
Despite the reiteration of the continentalist doctrine in the 2000 white paper,
the actual direction of defense policy, strategy, and eventually also force
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structure changed quite significantly in practical terms, perhaps as the result of
post-9/11 and IRAQI FREEDOM contingencies rather than genuine strategic in59
sight. The result, however, was a commitment to a more powerful and deployable force, including a larger army with greater protection and firepower, three
new destroyers to assert sea control and provide air defense for deployed sea and
land forces, enhanced combat capabilities for both classes of frigates, and four
C-17 airlifters, and two large LHDs with new MRH-90 helicopters for mobility.
The 2009 white paper, perhaps in homage to the lore of the previous Labor
government and its “Defence of Australia” doctrine, treats the continentalversus-expeditionary approaches as “a false distinction,” in part by misrepre60
senting the latter strategy. “Defence of Australia” always was something of a
conceit, in that the alternative model of a balanced, mobile, more “maritime”
joint force in fact would have been both more capable generally and better able
to defend Australia and its interests than the denial model. Nevertheless, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the new government in the 2009 white paper
very much takes an evolutionary approach to force-structure development, accepting all the more “expeditionary” force additions made by its predecessor
and further enhancing the overall combat power, reach, and deployability of
the ADF.
Regional Reactions
Officials in several countries were briefed on the contents of the white paper
prior to its release, and the reaction seems to have been muted, except in China.
61
There the official response has been limited and “subdued”; however, media
reports suggest that initial Chinese reactions were “incandescent,” implying an
62
inability to see the need for the proposed ADF plans. Other reports suggest
63
confusion at the apparent Australian hawkishness in relation to China. Some
Chinese academics were strident in their criticism of the white paper, but one,
Rear Admiral Yang Yi of China’s National Defense University, may well have encapsulated the Chinese position best in claiming that China was less concerned
by the scale of the “force build-up” than by the China-threat argument that un64
derpinned it.
By contrast, the initial official Indonesian reaction was very positive. An Indonesian Defence Ministry spokesman, Brigadier General Slamet Heriyanto,
saw the force-structure plans as perfectly normal for an economically successful
65
nation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ALLIANCE
While the plans detailed in the white paper may have been influenced by rising
powers in the Asia-Pacific, they have significant implications for the United
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States, on whose strategic primacy Australia’s strategic outlook and defense
66
planning have depended since the Second World War. Increasingly since the
end of the Cold War, Washington has sought to deepen its relationships and
share its international security burdens with partners like Australia. Over the
last decade especially, Australian maritime forces have operated within U.S.-led
coalitions during operations in and around the Persian Gulf, contributing primarily surface combatants, amphibious ships, and maritime patrol aircraft. Numerically, the contributions have been small, and the combatants in particular
have had limited capability—both the Anzac and Adelaide classes, the latter of
the U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG 7) design. Substantial ground force deployments have also contributed to these coalitions, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
A possible challenge for the alliance lies in the discrepancy between the areas
identified as the ADF’s primary operational environment and those volatile
parts of the world—such as Northeast or Southwest Asia—where the outbreak
of conflict might require an American intervention, thus potentially also generating requests for Australian assistance as a close alliance partner. However,
while the geographical areas for future potential ADF operations may be focused upon Australia’s near neighborhood, this is likely to be a discrepancy on
paper rather than in practice.
Recent, ongoing, and future (Force 2030) ADF capability developments
will dramatically enhance the potential for Australian maritime forces to
contribute to U.S.-led coalitions in future contingencies. The air warfare destroyers and, especially, the new frigates—with their LACMs, SM-6 missiles,
CEC, possibly theater-ballistic-missile defense, and advanced antisubmarine
warfare systems—would add measurably to any U.S. Navy–led maritime
67
force. The addition of new submarines (with the Collins class already arguably Australia’s most valued maritime capability) would undoubtedly make
Australian contributions to any maritime coalition even more attractive.
Australia’s 2009 defense white paper is a wide-ranging document that reaffirms
certain long-standing elements of Australian defense thinking and also breaks
much new ground. In setting the scene for defense planning over the next twenty
years, the white paper confirms reliance on the U.S. alliance while emphasizing
the need for Australia to deal with most local security challenges without external combat assistance.
The white paper affirms that Australia will continue to contribute to U.S.-led
coalitions but asserts that it may have to focus many of its defense efforts closer
to home than has been the case in the recent past. Nevertheless, the white paper
proposes a robust future defense force with a very strong maritime emphasis, including a sea-based strike capacity and the ability to deploy, protect, and sustain
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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a substantial land force. The increasingly potent and deployable ADF Force 2030
will thus likely be in high demand by future Australian governments, to enhance
Australia’s own regional influence, respond to crises, and when deemed appropriate, support the role of its alliance partner in maintaining international
order.
Whether the proposed Force 2030 is affordable remains uncertain, and
whether the government’s assessment is valid that interstate conflict will continue to be the primary concern of the nation’s military preparations also remains to be determined. Certainly, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific
Century is Canberra’s first concerted attempt in defense policy and strategy
terms to address the security challenges posed by a rising China and regional
great-power dynamics. The Australian government has presented a sober view
of the future and an indication of its determination to prepare for whatever that
future may bring.
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HOW WILL THE DPJ CHANGE JAPAN?
Tobias Harris

B

y any measure, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the 2009 general
election in a historic landslide. The Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) seat totals fell from 219 single-member districts to sixty-four, and seventy-seven proportional-representation seats to fifty-five. Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner, lost
1
ten seats, including all eight of the single-member districts it had won in 2005.
The DPJ’s likely coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party of Japan and People’s New Party, basically stayed put: the former returned with the same number
of seats, while the latter fell one seat, to three.
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(summa cum laude) in politics and history from
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THE 2009 GENERAL ELECTION
The DPJ’s victory was not necessarily a surprise—surveys of the three hundred single-member
districts by major daily newspapers conducted prior
to the general election had predicted that the DPJ
would likely receive over three hundred seats—but it
is impressive nonetheless. But what explains it? How
was the DPJ able to go from a party crisis after the
2005 general election to winning the largest majority
won by a party in the postwar era? After all, not only
did the DPJ suffer a blow in 2005 when it managed to
win only 113 seats, but within months of the election
Seiji Maehara, the young party leader who took over
for Katsuya Okada after the party’s defeat, was forced
to resign after he tried to use a fraudulent e-mail connected to the 2005 candidacy of Takefumi Horie, the
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now-disgraced executive of the company Livedoor, to attack the Koizumi government. The e-mail scandal raised serious questions about the political abili2
ties of DPJ politicians and brought the party to the brink of destruction.
Naturally, the decay of the LDP is a major factor in explaining that party’s
2009 defeat. Former prime minister (2001–2006) Junichiro Koizumi, the major
factor in the LDP’s 2005 victory, was out of office a year after that general election, and he was followed in the succeeding three years by three prime ministers
who were notoriously unable to deliver on the party’s 2005 manifesto. As the
Twenty-first Century Rincho, a group of nine private-sector think tanks, industrial organizations, and labor unions, concluded, the LDP had largely failed at
implementing its 2005 agenda; the group noted that in the four years since the
last general election, the Japanese had become more impoverished and the government had done nothing to address widening inequalities. The government of
Prime Minister Taro Aso, who had been prime minister since 2008, was criticized in particular for its economic stimulus program, which pushed back the
day when the government might be able to achieve a balanced budget, without
providing much help for the Japanese economy.3
This criticism gets to the heart of the Liberal Democratic Party’s decline.
While corruption scandals and a string of embarrassing gaffes by prime ministers and cabinet ministers undoubtedly damaged its reputation, the Japanese
people deserted the LDP because of the sense that it had failed at addressing the
marked decline in the quality of life of the Japanese people over the past two decades, especially the past decade. One measure of this decline is Japan’s ranking
in per capita gross domestic product (GDP), which was third in the world as recently as 2000 but as of 2007 was nineteenth. Despite Japan’s having experienced
between 2000 and 2007 its longest period of growth since the end of World War
II, few Japanese benefited from the export-led boom, which constituted what
Kohei Ootsuka, a DPJ member of the upper house and vice minister of the cabinet office in the Hatoyama government who had worked at the Bank of Japan
4
before entering politics, has called an “illusory recovery.” Indeed, even as Japan’s economy grew, Japan rose to second in the world in its poverty rate, which
5
measures the number of people who earn less than half the median income.
During the same decade, the number of nonregular employees rose to more
than a third of the Japanese labor force. Japanese, long accustomed to thinking
of their society as uniformly middle class, were forced to confront serious inequalities, and they felt increasingly insecure about the future as Japanese society continued to age and shrink and as the future of the government services
grew more doubtful, especially after the 2007 pensions scandal.
But many of these trends were apparent before the 2005 general election,
meaning that the LDP’s 2005 victory was anomalous. Arguably, independents in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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particular turned to the LDP in 2005 not because of the particulars of the LDP
agenda—it is unclear that voters in 2005 cared about postal privatization, despite Koizumi’s making the election “about” postal privatization—but because
Koizumi signified a new type of politics in which the LDP’s traditionally
“immobilist” politics would give way to more dynamic, top-down leadership.
Many of the same independent, “floating” voters concluded this year that after
three years during which the LDP reverted to its pre-Koizumi ways (symbolized
by the readmission less than three months after Koizumi left the premiership of
the “rebels” he had ousted) the DPJ was a better choice than the LDP. In both the
2007 upper-house election and this year’s general election, the DPJ has, accord6
ing to exit polls, been supported by a majority of independent voters. In this
year’s general election, the trend penetrated even LDP supporters, nearly 30 percent of whom supported the DPJ. Not only had the LDP lost the ability to appeal
to independents—its support among independents fell from roughly 32 percent
in 2005 to 15 percent in 2009—but it could not even unify its own base.
Still, the LDP’s collapse is only part of the story: after all, voters did not have
to turn out and vote for the Democratic Party of Japan. They could have stayed
home entirely, as many did in the elections between 1993 and 2005, turnout falling below 60 percent in 1996 and 2003, with 1996’s 59.65 percent the lowest ever
for a general election. The other part of the story of the 2009 election is the
transformation of the DPJ into a party that the Japanese people felt could be
trusted with power “at least once.”
Much of the credit for that transformation goes to Ichiro Ozawa, who served
three years as party leader from Maehara’s resignation until Ozawa himself was
forced to resign in May 2009 due to a campaign finance scandal involving one of
his aides. During those three years Ozawa—regarded as an electoral mastermind, due to lessons he had learned as the protégé of the LDP’s Kakuei Tanaka
(prime minister 1972–74)—handpicked the party’s candidates, trained them in
the art of campaigning, and traveled the country on their behalf in both the 2007
upper-house election and the general election, during which he held the party
title of acting president responsible for elections.
The reality is that the DPJ forged a national brand, based upon the party’s
manifesto. Regardless of the district, DPJ candidates campaigned on the same
agenda. Unlike the LDP, the DPJ waged a relentlessly positive campaign, focused
on its own policy proposals instead of criticism of LDP rule. A sign at a DPJ campaign office in Okayama’s second district said precisely that, reminding staffers
that the campaign was “not to bad-mouth the LDP candidate and other candidates.” The DPJ’s campaign was based not only on its policy agenda but also on
its desire to convey an impression of youthful vitality. It helped that a considerable majority of the DPJ’s 271 candidates in single-member districts were fifty
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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or younger, the largest cohort being candidates in their late thirties, followed by
those in their late forties. The average age of DPJ candidates was 49.4, compared
to 55.5 for the LDP. The DPJ also ran more female candidates—forty-six to the
LDP’s twenty-seven—and far fewer hereditary politicians, only thirty-two versus 109 for the LDP. (Nearly 50 percent of the LDP’s winning candidates in 2009
were hereditary politicians, compared with only 10 percent for the DPJ.) At least
on the symbolic level, the DPJ’s victory signifies the introduction of new blood
into Japanese politics.
It is difficult to say, however, what role the DPJ’s policy proposals played in
voters’ decisions to vote for the DPJ. One Asahi Shimbun poll found that only 24
percent of respondents felt that “regime change”—that is, a DPJ victory
—would make Japanese politics better, while 56 percent felt it would leave
7
things unchanged. Another Asahi poll asked respondents to comment first on
whether the LDP would be able to pay for its promises, then whether the DPJ
would be able to pay for those it made. The numbers were the exact same for
both parties: 8 percent felt that each party would have the funds to cover its
8
promises, while 83 percent were skeptical.
That is to say not that policy was irrelevant but that the DPJ’s specific proposals arguably mattered less than its “narrative,” which can be captured in two slogans: seiken kotai (regime change) and seikatsu dai-ichi (lifestyle, or livelihood,
quality of life, first). The first encapsulates the party’s plans to change Japan’s
system of government, while the second stresses that its focus will be on the public’s standard of living, in contrast to the LDP’s focus on simple economic
growth (“GDP-ism”) and other, noneconomic matters (constitution revision,
for example, which was the number-one issue in the LDP’s manifesto for the
2007 upper-house election). Whatever voters thought about the DPJ’s specific
proposals in these areas, it appeared to be more dynamic than the Liberal Democrats and promised effective leadership, with the goal of easing the public’s economic insecurities. That proved to be a winning formula.
CAN THE DPJ GOVERN JAPAN?
Now that the DPJ has taken power, with Yukio Hatoyama becoming only the
fourth non-LDP prime minister since 1955, the question is whether the DPJ can
deliver on its promises regarding administrative/political reform and economic
reforms in the public interest.
Seiken Kotai
There is no doubt that the DPJ’s proposals related to administrative reform are
central to the party’s program—without administrative reform, genuine change
is impossible. As Katsuya Okada, foreign minister in the present government
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(that of Yukio Hatoyama), writes in his book Regime Change, in order to implement reforms the DPJ will first have to reform Japan’s system of government,
9
strengthening the cabinet at the expense of the bureaucracy. Accordingly, the
first major point (of five) in the DPJ’s campaign manifesto concerned “cutting
waste,” which in practice means introducing a new policy-making system characterized by top-down political leadership by the cabinet, an arrangement that
will enable the DPJ-led government to control the budgeting process and reallo10
cate Japan’s 207 trillion–yen budget as it sees fit.
Arguably, the DPJ’s proposals on administrative reform are the most developed aspect of the party’s program. Perhaps this focus reflects lessons learned
from the 1993–94 coalition government of Morihiro Hosokawa, the first
non-LDP government, in which many DPJ leaders participated. That sevenparty coalition was formed without any idea as to how to formulate policy. As
one Western scholar writes of the Hosokawa government: “One important factor contributing to the coalition’s collapse is that it came to power not only without an agreement on its goals other than passing political-reform legislation, but
without an agreement on a process for deciding what its policies should be.”11
The result was a government that governed much like the LDP, with the cabinet
weak relative to the ruling parties. The bureaucracy was able to exploit the confusion and interfere with the government’s plans.
The DPJ has also learned from the pathologies of the Liberal Democratic sys12
tem of government. LDP rule was characterized by extensive collaboration between the bureaucrats and politicians. However, contrary to the idea that LDP
rule meant bureaucratic rule, as has been argued, LDP rule was in fact characterized by close cooperation through backbenchers, via the party’s internal organi13
zations. The result was a proliferation of veto points within the government,
what has been called Japan’s “Un-Westminster” system—that is, in contrast to
Britain’s Westminster system, characterized by a strong executive and top-down
policy making: “The executive in the Japanese governing structure is bound by
this advance screening-cum-prior-approval process that makes the LDP and its
PARC [Policy Affairs Research Council] a vital veto point for all major policies
and legislation. Unlike the norm in Westminster systems, the party is not subordinate to the executive. It is a parallel structure with equivalent if not superior
14
powers because of its right of veto.”
As policy made its way up the LDP’s hierarchy, it also moved up the bureaucratic hierarchy, with differences among ministries being hammered out in
meetings of administrative vice ministers held the day before cabinet meetings,
ensuring that the cabinet’s role would be perfunctory. The cabinet and prime
minister under LDP rule were thus hemmed in by both the bureaucracy and the
ruling party structure. As another Western scholar wrote at the time, “The
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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ruling party, not the executive, is the only political institution with sufficient
power to bargain and negotiate with bureaucrats. Policy originates in the bu15
reaucracy and is then subjected to political intervention by the PARC.”
It was only the exceptional LDP prime minister who was able to circumvent
this system—and once such a presidential-style leader left office, the system reverted to the status quo ante.
Accordingly, the DPJ now intends to build a new policy-making system that
subordinates the bureaucracy, the ruling party, and the Diet to the cabinet, at the
expense of both the bureaucracy and the ruling party, in order to produce more
dynamic, top-down government. That is, the DPJ intends to build a new system,
not simply to depend on having a capable leader in the prime minister’s chair.
Most important, the DPJ wants the cabinet to be responsible for producing the
budget, without which policy change is impossible.
Appropriately, given that Japan has an “Un-Westminster” arrangement, the
DPJ has studied the British system as a model for what it hopes to build in Japan.
It does not want to copy the American system of controlling the bureaucracy
through a vast number of political appointees; instead, it wants to free political
leaders from dependence on the bureaucracy while still taking advantage of Japan’s high-quality civil service for the benefit of the country. (Ozawa makes this
16
distinction in his 2006 book.) More recently, Naoto Kan, a founder and former
leader of the DPJ (who became famous as health minister during the mid-1990s,
when he took on his ministry’s bureaucrats in response to a tainted-blood scandal), visited the United Kingdom in June 2009 and produced a report on the operations of the British executive after speaking with officials from the Labor and
Conservative parties. In this report and an article in the journal Chuo Koron,
Kan expressed his admiration for the British cabinet system. He singled out Britain’s cabinet committees as particularly worthy of emulation, as in his assessment they would enable ministers to work together in small groups to produce
17
policy—especially the budget. Cabinet committees would move Japan away
from the custom of unanimity in cabinet decisions, effectively giving each minister a veto.
How does the DPJ plan to move Japan in the direction of a true Westminster
system? Central to the party’s administrative plan is a new national strategy bureau (NSB) that will be headed by a senior cabinet minister and staffed with
roughly thirty appointees, including ten Diet members. The NSB’s primary
function will be to manage the budgeting process. At this point, however, it is
unclear precisely how the NSB will operate. Kan has already been named the
NSB’s head; he will simultaneously serve as the deputy prime minister. Little else
is known. The NSB could be a superministry or cabinet within the cabinet, directing the work of other ministries, an arrangement that could be problematic
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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for the new government. Alternatively, it could be a support group for the work
18
of cabinet committees, following their leads.
Whatever form the NSB takes, the DPJ is trying to centralize power even
within the cabinet. The DPJ took a step in that direction by announcing its appointees for the top cabinet positions within a week of the election victory. According to a transition plan drafted in 2003 by a committee responsible for
administrative preparations, within five days after an election the DPJ was to
convene a transition team and quickly appoint party members to senior cabinet
positions. It has now done so, appointing Okada as foreign minister, Hatoyama
confidante Hirofumi Hirano as chief cabinet secretary, Kan as deputy prime
minister and NSB chief, and Hirohisa Fujii as finance minister. The cabinet’s senior officials will be at the heart of an “inner cabinet” that will move decision
making away from the current system in which, as we have seen, bureaucrats can
exercise effective veto power in the council of administrative vice ministers and
19
through unanimous decision making within the cabinet. Indeed, upon taking
power the Hatoyama government abolished the administrative vice ministers’
meetings; it will likely replace them with meetings of parliamentary vice ministers. The new government also immediately established new regulations governing contact between bureaucrats and politicians not holding cabinet or
subcabinet appointments. The regulations will require bureaucrats to make the
contents of all requests from Diet members known to their ministers, and it
bans, in principle, efforts by bureaucrats to influence Diet members. The government has also mandated that bureaucrats save records related to requests
for subsidies, licenses, contracts, and the like from backbenchers or their
20
secretaries.
Another major feature of the DPJ’s administrative reform is a proposal to appoint more than a hundred politicians to government posts. Both Ozawa and
Kan have expressed their admiration for the British system’s inclusion of so
many legislators in the executive, and the DPJ clearly intends to do the same. To
enforce the idea of political teams overseeing the work of ministers, the DPJ has
already stated that cabinet ministers will be free to choose their own deputy
ministers and parliamentary secretaries—unlike LDP rule, under which the
party’s factions played dominant roles in distributing subcabinet jobs even as
their power to appoint cabinet ministers and select the prime minister de21
clined. One problem with this proposal, however, will be finding enough DPJ
members qualified to take up positions in the government.
Revealingly, when the Hatoyama government took power, the DPJ dissolved
its policy research council, making clear that the cabinet’s role in policy making
is superior to that of the party. Similarly, by giving Ozawa the position of party
secretary-general, the Hatoyama government hopes to neutralize the ruling
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party as a policy actor. Ozawa will be responsible for Diet affairs and election
strategy, meaning that he will control what under LDP rule were four different
posts, none of the occupants of which were in the cabinet. The DPJ has rolled the
LDP’s many “veto points” outside the cabinet into a single veto authority—Ozawa, as secretary-general. In Diet strategy, Ozawa will be responsible for
assigning committee positions, appointing the leaders of the two houses, and,
crucially, distributing the party’s political funds. In short, he will act as the
party’s chief whip, ensuring that backbenchers follow the cabinet’s lead; controlling the party’s campaign funds, he will have the power to reward and punish.
Ozawa will be the critical hinge between cabinet and ruling party, and between
ruling party and Diet, the indispensable actor in moving Japan to a Westminster
system, in which “the line of policy-making authority is top-down: prime ministers normally carry their cabinets, cabinets nearly always carry the parliamen22
tary party and the parliamentary party counts on carrying parliament.” Ozawa
will be responsible for carrying the parliamentary party and parliament.
Giving Ozawa such broad powers is risky. He is notoriously mercurial and secretive in his decision making. As secretary-general of his Japan Renewal Party
in 1993–94, he was instrumental, through his political maneuvering, in both
building and destroying the Hosokawa government. In 2007, as the DPJ’s president, he entered into negotiations with the LDP for a grand coalition without securing the approval of the DPJ beforehand, for which he resigned temporarily
from the party’s leadership before being coaxed back. Ozawa has said that he regrets decisions he made during the first non-LDP coalition government—especially decisions to alienate the Socialist Party, which resulted in its joining a
coalition with the LDP—suggesting that he may have learned from his mistakes.
Some have warned, however, that Ozawa, through his help for DPJ candidates,
seeks to create an Ozawa “army” that will play a role in the DPJ similar to the role
23
played by the Tanaka faction in the LDP during the 1970s and 1980s. Although
there is no evidence thus far that Ozawa seeks to build a faction that will dominate the DPJ, his past makes it difficult to rule out the possibility entirely.
Ozawa himself has said that he will respect the power of the cabinet and not use
his position to veto the plans of the government. If he abides by this pledge, he will
thereby make the cabinet stronger and the ruling party weaker. But there are few
checks on Ozawa’s power, other than the appointment to the cabinet of DPJ politicians distant from him, ensuring that the cabinet will not passively accept insubordination by him. There is no denying the risk that Ozawa could, far from
unifying the cabinet and the ruling party as DPJ plans state, create a power center
outside the cabinet and therefore resurrect the worst pathologies of LDP rule.
Even as the DPJ has entrusted Ozawa with the task of pacifying the ruling
party and the Diet, there is still the question of how the DPJ will deal with the
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bureaucracy, even with its new-model cabinet in place. It will surely face resistance from the bureaucracy. A Western scholar observes, “Japanese bureaucrats
control a great deal of information due to the absence of staff support either in
the party organizations or among politicians themselves. Information is power
and Japanese politicians are heavily dependent on bureaucrats for information,
especially given that think tanks and other alternative sources of information
24
and expertise are so weakly developed.” Leaks by bureaucrats to the media under the Hosokawa government were at least a factor, if not the primary factor, in
its demise, and bureaucrats will certainly try again to destroy a non-LDP government through leaks and sabotage, helped by a sympathetic conservative media and the opposition LDP.25
But working in the DPJ’s favor is the idea that there is no such thing as “the
bureaucrats.” The bureaucracy is by no means a monolithic entity; opposition to
the DPJ will differ by ministry. The finance ministry will likely become an ally of
the new government, simply because it shares the party’s goal of cutting waste.
The DPJ’s appointment of Fujii, a former ministry bureaucrat and finance minister under the Hosokawa government, sends a signal to the ministry that while
the DPJ government stands for political leadership, that politicians will now
take the lead on budgeting—a point that Fujii himself has made quite forcefully
in his public appearances—the new government nevertheless hopes to work
with the finance ministry. In the months leading up to the general election, senior finance ministry officials met frequently with senior DPJ figures, suggesting that the ministry is willing to find a way to work with its new political
masters. At the other extreme are ministries like those of agriculture, forestry,
and fisheries; land, infrastructure, transportation, and tourism; and health, labor, and welfare. These ministries enjoyed considerable power and sizable budgets under LDP rule and were “protected” from scrutiny by the LDP’s policy
elements (many of which were among what Koizumi referred to as the “opposition forces” during his effort to change the LDP).
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries is particularly threatened, as the DPJ has
proposed to replace the baroque system of agricultural subsidies with a more
transparent scheme of income supports that will remove much of the ministry’s
discretion. This ministry was fighting publicly with the DPJ well before the general election. In June, Ichide Michio, its administrative vice minister, publicly
called the DPJ’s proposal “unrealistic,” prompting Hatoyama to respond that in
26
Britain “he would be sacked immediately.”
Demanding resignations will be one way for the DPJ to respond to bureaucratic resistance. It has dropped a radical proposal in its transition plan that the
new government would demand the resignations of administrative vice
ministers and some bureau chiefs and reappoint them only upon receiving
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affirmations that they would accept the party’s policy agenda. The proposal also
called for ending seniority promotions. But even if the DPJ does not go that far,
it will still try to use the cabinet’s constitutionally granted right to appoint and
dismiss administrative personnel in order to fight back against bureaucrats. For
example, the DPJ plans to review the LDP’s choice for director-general of a
27
newly created consumer-affairs agency and possibly dismiss him.
The DPJ will have the public on its side when it comes to administrative reform. A recent Fuji-Sankei poll asked which policies should be implemented: 87
percent of respondents approved of “Reviewing the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats” and “Reviewing the compilation and execution of budgets.” The DPJ will have to be skillful in communicating via the media—the
bureaucrats certainly will be. But tremendous public support for administrative
reform is an important weapon in the party’s arsenal.
Seikatsu Dai-ichi
As Okada and others have argued, administrative reform is only a first step.
What the DPJ will do once it reforms the policy-making process is more uncertain. The party faces a threefold challenge: it has to develop a sustainable basis
for economic growth while building a new social safety net and reducing the
government’s debt burden.
The party manifesto, of course, includes pages upon pages of policy proposals
under the headings of “Child Raising and Education,” “Pensions and Health
Care,” “Decentralization,” and “Employment and the Economy.” Some of these
proposals are quite good, provided the DPJ can find a way to pay for them. The
DPJ’s proposal to provide 26,000 yen per month per child until middle-school
graduation should have a beneficial effect on domestic consumption and the
birthrate. The income-support plan for agriculture—which will compensate
farmers if the price of a commodity falls below the cost of producing it—should
be a politically acceptable way of supporting Japan’s aging and shrinking population of farmers. The party also has a number of apparently sound proposals for
strengthening the pension and health-care systems, the top priority for most
Japanese voters.
If the DPJ’s proposals are strong on a new safety net, they are weaker on economic growth and fiscal reform. The statements of its leaders suggest the party
recognizes that the challenge is to move Japan away from its export-dependent
model of growth, the bankruptcy of which was exposed in the latest crisis, in
which the American recession dragged Japan’s economy into a recession of its
own, thanks to a dramatic collapse of exports. Japan needs a more balanced
growth strategy that features both domestic consumption—especially of services—and the export of high-value-added goods. It needs to find a way to
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release the cash savings of Japanese households (roughly 1.5 times Japanese
GDP) and bank reserves into the economy so as to promote more growth.
Similarly, proposals to raise the minimum wage to 1,000 yen/hour and to ban
in principle the use of “dispatch” workers (temporary workers supplied to employers by private firms) in the manufacturing sector could result in more manufacturers relocating production overseas, as could the DPJ government’s
insistence on a 25 percent cut in CO2 emissions by 2020. The party’s proposal to
lower corporate tax rates for small- and medium-sized enterprises could be useful for encouraging such companies, which are largely in Japan’s inefficient services sector, to become more efficient and profitable, but that will take more
than tax cuts.
Also, the DPJ will still have to find a way to shrink Japan’s national debt without raising consumption taxes, which the party has promised not to do for at
least four years. The party will, of course, try to cut as much waste from the budget as it can; however, according to at least one party member with a finance
ministry background, the DPJ cannot be sure how much money it will be able to
find and cut. Meanwhile, although the overwhelming majority of Japanese government bonds are held domestically, a fact that buys the government some time
(and enables it to sell more debt, as necessary), the government cannot depend
on debt financing forever.28
All this may represent an impossible trinity of challenges: fixing the government’s finances while also building a safety net and shifting the economy to a
more balanced growth model may simply be out of the question, whoever is in
charge. Pursuing growth and fiscal balance could result in the safety net being
neglected, as happened under the Koizumi government. Pursuing growth and a
safety net—the latter being, perhaps, politically necessary for the former
—could delay the achievement of a balanced budget even further than it has already been. (The Koizumi government set a target of 2011, which cannot now be
achieved, thanks to the Aso government’s stimulus packages.) The DPJ’s focus
will likely lead it to prioritize a social safety net and fiscal balance, but it is difficult to see how the government will be able to finance a safety net without
growth over the medium term, as Japan’s baby boomers retire.
BECOMING A NORMAL NATION
Just as the DPJ will try to “normalize” Japan’s system of government and economy, so too will it try to normalize Japan’s foreign relations.
What exactly does a “normal” foreign policy mean for Japan? Some scholars
have argued that it means a Japan freed of Cold War–era restraints on its security
policy. Arguably, though, this interpretation misses what Ozawa sees as the essential point—that Japan’s external dependence on the United States has been
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equivalent to its politicians’ longtime internal dependence on the bureaucracy.
Just as dependence on the bureaucracy has deprived politicians of the ability to
make decisions necessary for Japanese society, so too has dependence on the
29
United States interfered with Japan’s foreign policy behavior.
Ozawa has at times been criticized for what some Americans believe are
anti-American views. But it may be a mistake to read Ozawa as anti-American.
Ozawa’s goal is a Japan able to make decisions on the basis of its leaders’ calculations of the national interest, not of pressure from the United States—or any
other international actor, for that matter. His goal, and that of the DPJ as a
whole, is to expand Japan’s freedom of international action.
What will this mean for U.S.-Japan relations and Japanese foreign policy in
the near term? In the first year, when the relevant enabling law expires in January
2010, the DPJ will likely bring its Maritime Self-Defense Force refueling ships
home from the Indian Ocean. One month into the Hatoyama government, there
has been no final decision on Afghanistan policy—and indeed, Akihisa
Nagashima, the parliamentary secretary for defense, was reprimanded by Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano
for speaking out of line when he argued in a speech that the government ought
30
to extend the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. The government appears
to be giving serious thought to the best way to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan as the Barack Obama administration debates its own approach in
light of General Stanley McChrystal’s request for an additional forty thousand
troops and of Afghanistan’s tainted election. The Hatoyama government will
likely provide greater civilian support for the governments of Afghanistan and
Pakistan in place of a mission involving Japan’s armed forces.
The new government has also decided that it will press for early negotiations
on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, especially the controversial Marine
Corps air station at Futenma. After a decade of talks, the United States and Japan
agreed in 2006 to a “Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” which stipulated the relocation of eight thousand Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam but also tied progress on relocation to the construction of a new
air station at Henoko Bay—a “Futenma Replacement Facility”—on land cur31
rently part of the Marine Corps’s Camp Schwab. The roadmap became law in
2009, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then–foreign minister
Hirofumi Nakasone signed an agreement on its implementation. Among other
things the agreement reaffirmed the importance of Futenma for the realignment
process: “The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the
Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Fa32
cility as stipulated in the Roadmap.”
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The Democratic Party of Japan—to say nothing of the Social Democratic
Party of Japan—has expressed its opposition to the roadmap. In principle, the
DPJ wants U.S. bases removed from Okinawa entirely; in its 2008 Okinawa vision paper it called for the dramatic reduction of U.S. forces, first from Okinawa,
33
then from Japan entirely. While the vision paper does not constitute an official
policy statement for the Hatoyama government, it shows that the DPJ is united
34
in its opposition to the realignment as currently planned. Even the DPJ’s conservatives—the party’s most enthusiastic supporters of the alliance—are opposed to the roadmap. Seiji Maehara, a leading hawk serving concurrently as the
minister of land, infrastructure, and transport and minister responsible for Okinawa, said after a visit to the island in early October that it would be necessary
for the Hatoyama government to launch a fundamental review of the plan to
35
build a Futenma replacement at Camp Schwab.
At the same time, however, the new government is fully aware of how difficult
it will be to revise the realignment process. The process may be delayed: as Admiral Timothy Keating, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, admitted in November 2008, “It’ll take a little bit longer to effect—we won’t be done by
36
2014, or maybe even 2015, but it’s about a decade in execution.” With the realignment roadmap enshrined in a bilateral treaty and preparations under way
on both Okinawa and Guam, the Hatoyama government will have a hard time
implementing the DPJ’s Okinawa vision. Acknowledging this reality, in its election manifesto the party softened the language on realignment, saying that it
would “look to revise” the realignment of U.S. forces and the arrangement of
37
American bases in Japan. Since taking power the Hatoyama government has
been no less willing to reconsider its approach to Okinawa and Futenma. The
government still hopes for changes to the plan; far from dropping the issue,
Okada said within days of taking office that he wants to reach a new agreement
with the United States on Futenma within the year, so that necessary expendi38
tures can be included in the 2010 budget. Nonetheless, senior officials have
clearly backed away from more radical revisions to the roadmap. After a visit to
Okinawa, Kitazawa said building a Futenma replacement elsewhere would be
“difficult.” Hatoyama himself has remarked, when asked about Futenma, that it
may be necessary to back away from proposals included in the DPJ manifesto.
The foreign ministry is currently reviewing the government’s options, with an
eye toward having a proposal ready for when President Obama visits Japan in
mid-November.
For its part the Obama administration has softened its own tone on Futenma. A
State Department spokesman shortly after the election ruled out the possibility of
renegotiating the roadmap, but since then senior administration officials have
stressed their willingness to listen to the new Japanese government’s concerns
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about the agreement. The White House may yet reject a Hatoyama government
proposal out of hand—a distinct possibility after Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates visited Japan and said in regard to Futenma that “it is time to move
39
on”—but it appears that it will at least try to minimize conflict over the issue.
There is a certain political logic to the Hatoyama government’s decision to
address these thorny bilateral issues in its first months in office. The closer the
government gets to the 2010 upper-house election—in which the DPJ will try to
win a majority to complement its majority in the lower house—the less it will
want foreign-policy issues crowding its agenda. Other things being equal, the
Japanese public is largely inattentive to foreign policy; foreign and security issues never rank as top priorities in public opinion polls. But the Hatoyama government could suffer political consequences if it is seen as incapable of
responsibly managing Japan’s foreign relations, especially the alliance with the
United States. It is unclear whether the public approves or disapproves of the
government’s policies regarding Afghanistan and Futenma, but if they result in
bilateral strife, the DPJ could suffer at the polls.
Accordingly, the Hatoyama government is trying to distance itself from the
LDP’s approach to the alliance and to devise its own way of dealing with the
United States while at the same time signaling to Washington and to the Japanese public that the relationship is safe in its hands. It is imperative that the
American administration not overreact to the DPJ’s new approach to the alliance, especially with respect to the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. That
mission began in 2001, arising as much out of Japan’s lingering guilt over its
“checkbook” diplomacy during the 1991–92 Gulf War as out of desire to support
the United States after 9/11. By 2007, when the DPJ was able to block temporarily the extension of the enabling law, there remained little importance symbolically and even less materially; if anything, it shielded Japan from having to
make a more substantive financial or political contribution to coalition activities in Afghanistan. Replacing the refueling mission with civilian assistance
would be an easy way for the new government to show that, unlike recent LDP
governments, it does not view every foreign policy challenge as an opportunity
to stretch the limits on the use of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). As Ichiro
Fujisaki, Japan’s ambassador in Washington, reminded the Obama administration after Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell “encouraged” Japan to continue
the refueling mission, “Japan’s international contribution is for Japan to decide
independently.” Ending the refueling mission may be the most painless way for
the Hatoyama government to signal a break with the past.
The same may not apply to Futenma and realignment, which entail serious
material costs for both governments. The roadmap is the result of years of painstaking negotiations by American officials, and the U.S. government is
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understandably reluctant to scrap what it views as the best possible arrangement. But Washington should understand the DPJ’s perspective, which sees the
agreement signed by the Aso government as paying inadequate attention to the
environment of Henoko Bay and the interests of local residents. Given that the
realignment process is already behind schedule and that everything hinges on
replacing Futenma, it may be appropriate for the United States to take seriously
the DPJ’s desire for renegotiation, especially since the Hatoyama government
has admitted that any revisions to the deal will not involve moving remaining
Marines off Okinawa.
Underlying both of these Hatoyama government policies is the idea that the
U.S.-Japan alliance is on the cusp of a new era. From 1996 onward officials in
both countries sought to take the Cold War alliance, once described as “a paper
alliance that could be, and was, run virtually from desktops and filing cabinets,”
and transform it into an alliance modeled on the “special relationship” between
40
the United States and Great Britain. After the trade wars of the early 1990s, officials focused once again on the security relationship, starting with a 1996 joint
security declaration and continuing with a 1997 revision of the guidelines for security cooperation.
Today it is unclear just how different the 1996 alliance was from that of the
Cold War. The Koizumi government’s decision to support the United States in
Afghanistan within weeks was a momentous decision, but as previously argued,
it had as much to do with making up for Japan’s mistakes in 1991 as with fighting
terrorism. The Koizumi government may have put “boots on the ground” in
Iraq, but its JSDF detachment depended on the troops of other countries to defend it, suggesting that the deployment was less a departure than met the eye.
Article IX of the Japanese constitution remains intact, and the efforts of the
Shinzo Abe government (2006–2007) to introduce even minor modifications to
the constitutional interpretation prohibiting Japan from exercising its right of
collective self-defense were scrapped as soon as Abe resigned. Since the early
2000s Japan has cut its defense budget, notwithstanding several “hawkish”
prime ministers.
The advent of the Hatoyama government will likely mean the end of the
security-centered 1996 alliance. The United States and Japan will continue to
cooperate in security affairs, of course, but the geographical and operational
scope will be more limited than officials in both countries had hoped earlier this
decade. The DPJ and the new government have no interest in constitution revision, an issue that vanished from the agenda after Abe made it the centerpiece of
his party’s losing campaign in 2007. Hatoyama and other DPJ leaders are instead
interested in exploring new avenues of bilateral cooperation, notably
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41

cooperation against climate change and nuclear nonproliferation. In particular economic cooperation is back on the agenda: the DPJ manifesto included a
proposal for a U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement. That may be difficult if not impossible to achieve in the foreseeable future, but its inclusion in the party manifesto is revealing. For the DPJ the key to building an “equal” relationship with
the United States means exploring cooperation in areas other than security, because ultimately an equal partnership with the United States in that realm is impossible, given the asymmetries in capabilities.
But the DPJ’s thinking on the alliance cannot be separated from its broader
thinking on foreign policy. Hatoyama sees Japan’s foreign-policy dilemma thus:
“How can Japan, caught between an America struggling to remain a hegemon
and a China wanting to be and planning to be a hegemon, maintain its political
and economic autonomy and defend its national interests? The international en42
vironment in which Japan will be placed from now on is not straightforward.”
The Hatoyama government, like the Abe, Fukuda, and Aso governments before it, faces a structural challenge in East Asia. Japan, like Australia, South Korea, and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
has close and indispensable security ties with the United States, but it also has increasingly important economic ties with China. Japan, like the other countries
of the region, is in no position to choose between the United States and China.
Both Abe and Aso, despite belonging to the conservative wing of the LDP, which
is notoriously skeptical of Chinese power, worked to build a “strategic, mutual”
relationship with China; Yasuo Fukuda, as prime minister (2007–2008), was
even more enthusiastic than the two conservatives. While Abe tried to balance a
new relationship with China with efforts to enhance security cooperation
among East Asia’s democracies, his successors focused more on China than on
cooperation among democracies that excluded China.
Fukuda offered perhaps the most articulate vision of where Japanese foreign
policy in the region ought to be going, and there are a number of similarities between Fukuda’s ideas, as expressed in a May 2008 speech on foreign policy, and
Hatoyama’s, as laid out in an essay published in September 2009. Fukuda’s answer to the dilemma described by Hatoyama was remarkably similar to
Hatoyama’s: his lengthy speech devoted but one paragraph to the U.S.-Japan alliance, in which he stressed the alliance’s value in providing stability and re43
gional “public goods.” He did not stress an alliance based on common values or
on other such ideas that have been floated. Japan’s future, Fukuda argued, is in
Asia, but he did not mean “Asia” as a code word for China—he meant Asia as a
whole, including but not limited to China. In effect, cooperation with Asia
would serve as a means of increasing Japan’s freedom of action vis-à-vis both
China and the United States.
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Much like Australia’s Kevin Rudd (prime minister since 2007), Hatoyama has
come into power pushing a vision for an East Asian community. Again as with
Rudd, it is unclear just how much acceptance Hatoyama’s ideas will win in the
region. It is one thing to accept in principle the value of a regional community,
but it would be quite another for countries to pool their sovereignty, which the
ASEAN members have struggled to do even among themselves, let alone with
the region’s larger states. Notwithstanding, if some of Hatoyama’s specific proposals for cooperation in Asia are far-fetched—Hatoyama has admitted that his
ideas are a “dream”—it is clear that a DPJ government will continue Japan’s
movement to status as an Asian middle power, in that—like Australia, South Korea, and the ASEAN countries—Japan will have to balance its relationships with
the region’s two giants. As Okada said recently, “Two-sided debates like America
44
or Asia, America or China are futile debates.” Under the Hatoyama government, Japan will continue to move in the direction of what a Japanese scholar
calls “middle-power diplomacy” and a Western author calls the “Goldilocks
45
consensus”—but might be called simply the DPJ’s “new realism.”
Japan’s new leaders, taking power in the midst of wrenching changes at home
and abroad, are in a position similar to that of the men who led Japan in the early
years following the Meiji Restoration (in the second half of the nineteenth century), and that of Shigeru Yoshida (prime minister 1946–47 and 1948–54) and
the other architects of the postwar order. They have to reconfigure Japan’s institutions at home to manage the country’s changing demographics and alter the
obsolete postwar growth model, while also modifying the country’s foreign policies (and foreign policy–making institutions) in light of China’s rise. Like
Yoshida, the Hatoyama government will undoubtedly find value in preserving
the security relationship, in part because stagnant defense spending gives Japan
few options—and because the United States still appears to be willing to allow
Japan a cheap, if not free, ride on its defense spending (although one question
for the future is whether the United States will be willing to tolerate this for
much longer, given its own financial situation). Like Yoshida, the Hatoyama government recognizes that Japan’s leadership abroad begins at home: that until Japan returns to economic normalcy, it will struggle to lead in the region. And like
Yoshida (nicknamed “One Man,” for his “dictatorial” tendencies), Hatoyama
and other DPJ leaders recognize that leadership at home and abroad requires institutions that enable politicians to lead.
Some analysts have argued that for better or worse, the DPJ’s victory will leave
46
Japan largely unchanged. This view seems mistaken. Arguably the DPJ
changed Japan simply by defeating the LDP in a general election and winning an
absolute majority in the House of Representatives, showing the LDP’s 1955 system had been finally and irrevocably destroyed. The Democratic Party of Japan
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having won on the back of support from independents and Liberal Democratic
defectors, its victory arguably suggests that Japan has entered into a period of intense partisan competition and further changes of government (once the LDP
sorts itself out), a period in which successive governments will be desperate to
introduce and implement new policies to sell themselves to voters and tie the
hands of their successors in the event of electoral defeat.
But beyond that, the DPJ’s plans for changing Japan’s policy-making process
constitute a genuine revolution in how the country is governed, and they open
the way to far-reaching reforms in domestic and foreign policy. Whether or not
its policies leave Japan better or worse off, the Hatoyama government’s plans
could result in an undeniably transformed Japan. At the very least, Japan is on
the brink of a period of policy experimentation not unlike Japan’s “openings”
after the Meiji Restoration and the American occupation.
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ENGAGING OCEANIA
Captain Sea Sovereign Thomas, U.S. Marine Corps

T

he fourteen island nations of Oceania are weak by any traditional measure of
state power. They are mostly small and poor, with zero military muscle and
little diplomatic clout. On a map of the Pacific these microstates appear almost
like tossed sand, widely dispersed and hardly noticeable in the great blue expanse between the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Australia. But the small size
and gross domestic products of these states conceal a disproportionate economic, political, and military potential. As a consequence, this region has received considerable attention from Beijing over the past decade as it moves to
expand its influence in far-flung capitals around the world. China now has more
diplomats in Oceania than does any other nation, its bilateral aid is expanding
rapidly, and its trade with the region is two to three times larger than that of the
1
United States. While growing competition for influence is not necessarily a
zero-sum game, neither is it risk free. Washington cannot afford to neglect its
long-standing links with these saltwater states and should better employ the U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM)—its principal lever of military and diplomatic
power in the Pacific—by elevating the region’s importance and making current
“theater security cooperation” more robust.
Oceania deserves Washington’s increased attention for three reasons. First, its
Captain Thomas is a Marine intelligence officer curmarine resources in fish are tremendous at a time
rently assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command. He is a
when global stocks are on the brink of collapse. Furgraduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, the Fletcher
ther, it is home to some of the world’s most vibrant
School of Law and Diplomacy, and the Naval War College. He sits on the board of directors of the Institute for
and healthy coral reefs, invaluable in both economic
Global Maritime Studies.
and ecological terms. Second, the states of Oceania
represent a sizable bloc of nations whose collective
Naval War College Review, Winter 2010, Vol. 63, No. 1
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diplomatic weight is considerable. Maintaining strong American influence in
the region, especially as Beijing moves assertively to establish itself as a new
source of influence, will help to enhance regional support for Washington’s foreign policy agenda. Third, the islands of Oceania straddle the geopolitically significant maritime routes between the United States, Australia, New Zealand,
East Asia, and Guam, where America is significantly expanding its military presence. In the event of any large-scale U.S. military action in the western Pacific
(over Taiwan, for instance), these islands could become logistically crucial.
ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL VALUE: FISH
The world is facing a crisis in global fish supply. Fish stocks have collapsed in
nearly one-third of open-sea fisheries (that is, they have declined to less than 10
percent of their original yield), 25 percent of the world’s marine fish stocks are
overexploited (depleting faster than they are recovering), and an additional 50
percent are fully exploited (depleting at the pace of recovery).2 As stocks become
further exhausted, competition for access to fish and other seafood will become
increasingly intense.
The Pacific Ocean is home to three of the four most productive fishing areas
of the world, with the northwest Pacific being the most abundant and the west3
ern central Pacific—where Oceania lies—the fourth. This maritime space is
also the planet’s most important tuna fishing area, producing about one-third of
4
the global total. These considerable resources are contained in island states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which stretch two hundred nautical miles from
the coastline and wherein nations enjoy jurisdiction over the water column and
all seabed and subsoil resources. The microstates of Oceania, many of which include sprawling chains of atolls, control vast swaths of saltwater territory out of
all proportion to their tiny landmasses. For example, the Republic of
Kiribati—half the size of Rhode Island (the smallest American state)—has an
EEZ more than five times the size of Texas and eight times the size of California.
In total, the fourteen nations of the region have rights to twenty million square
kilometers of sea, more than twice the size of the continental United States (see
5
map). Washington’s economic interests in maintaining access to these marine
resources are complemented by strong ecological ones: not only is there value in
supporting conservation regimes that protect fish and coral reefs from
overexploitation, but there are scientific and purely environmental reasons for
preserving Oceania’s exceptional saltwater ecosystems. Consider the fact that
President George W. Bush created the world’s largest marine sanctuaries—three
protected areas totaling five hundred thousand square kilometers—in the very
6
heart of the region’s saltwater expanse.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24

NWCR_Winter2010_john.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5294_NWC_Review_Winter2010\NWCR_Winter2010_john.vp
Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:28:39 AM

104

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

War College: Winter 2010 Review

THOMAS

99

POLITICAL VALUE: VOTES
Despite wide geographic distribution
and diversity in forms of government, the nations of Oceania have
broadly similar domestic concerns
and foreign-policy goals. DomestiOkinawa
cally, nearly all island states confront
Hawaii
Guam
poverty, lack of sustainable economic
development, ineffective government
institutions, corruption, and increasingly, transnational crime. Regionally, natural disasters, including
cyclones, droughts, tsunamis, and
rising sea levels associated with climate change, are significant challenges; further, poaching of marine
EEZ data obtained from “SOPAC Mapserver,” Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commisresources—illegal, unregulated, and
sion, www.sopac.org/tiki-map.phtml?mapfile=pacific.map. Map produced from Google
Earth.
unreported (IUU) fishing—is a
7
growing problem faced by all island countries.
Largely because of these shared challenges, a lack of local military competition, and a common maritime experience, there is great concert among the fourteen states of Oceania. This relative unity has spawned a considerable level of
cooperation, resulting in the conclusion of several multiparty treaties (e.g., the
South Pacific Tuna Treaty) and the development of healthy regional institutions,
principally the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). These long-standing international organizations (the SPC
was established in 1947 and the PIF in 1971) have expansive mandates in the
fields of economic growth and integration, good governance, and security, and
in turn they oversee numerous suborganizations (the PIF administers eleven)
that collaborate on concerns ranging from fishing and tourism to power utilities
management and environmental policy. The issues of common interest are numerous, and the vigorous governmental links that crisscross Oceania are illustrative of a surprising level of regional integration. In fact, the region’s economic
agenda is so closely aligned that Oceania’s states are currently entertaining the
8
adoption of a common market.
Because of their close association and shared interests, these nations represent a sort of “maritime bloc” likely to vote along similar lines in international
forums like the United Nations. Smart American diplomacy can translate this
regional diplomatic potential into broad support for U.S. positions in places like
the World Trade Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the
PACIFIC ISLAND NATION EEZS
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Asian Development Bank (ADB), where Pacific island votes are highly significant. (Consider the fact that Oceania, if viewed collectively, ranks ninth of
sixty-seven nations in total votes in the ADB, with 75 percent of the voting
9
power of China or India.) Oceania’s states also occupy a position of considerable collective weight within the various governance mechanisms of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which appears increas10
ingly likely for near-term U.S. ratification. Besides constituting nearly 10 percent of signatory members, these countries often furnish critical leadership; for
example, the first secretary general of the International Seabed Authority, one of
the three subsidiary bodies of UNCLOS, was a Fijian who held the post for
11
twelve years, from 1996 to 2008. Given the Obama administration’s renewed
emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism, the search for votes and influence
in international organizations is likely to receive greater emphasis. Because of
the close alignment of its governments, “winning” all fourteen of Oceania’s
votes is a far easier task than, say, the twelve votes of South America, a region
where amity is far less common.
MILITARY VALUE: ISLAND HOPPING REDUX?
With the impending move of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam—the emerging geographic linchpin of American strategy in the western Pacific—Oceania’s
importance grows greatly. Its sprawling island states are far closer to Guam than
Okinawa is (by more than 1,200 nautical miles, the maritime distance from San
Diego to Seattle), and bisect the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between
the United States and its allies Australia and New Zealand. In the event of a major conflagration in East Asian waters, perhaps involving Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), American SLOCs would pass through Oceania.
Given Beijing’s strategic aim of expanding its naval defensive boundaries well
beyond local waters and into the Marianas and Micronesia (the Chinese operating constructs known as the first and second “island chains”) and its focus on
developing anti–aircraft carrier capabilities through land-based missiles and
submarines, it is clear that Chinese leaders plan to contest the maritime com12
mons in the future, if push comes to shove.
If the risks to carrier operations around Taiwan became too great, American
military commanders would likely be compelled to fall back and disperse their
forces on China’s maritime periphery rather than in concentrations that could
be easily targeted. As U.S. forces “phased” into the theater, building a critical
mass along China’s southern flank, the islands of Oceania could provide a significant logistical function as forces “hopped” into the western Pacific, evoking
memories of American experiences in World War II. The region’s runways and
ports, not to mention its diplomatic support, would be of tremendous value.
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In the broader strategic context, Oceania provides the United States with geographic alternatives as Washington reorients its East Asian military posture,
moving troops from Japanese (Okinawa) to American soil (Guam) and reducing its force structure in Korea. The ability to operate from Oceania’s sea and airports could simultaneously afford strategic depth and allow the United States to
remain centrally positioned within Asian geopolitics—being operationally near
allies without aggravating Japanese or Korean domestic affairs.
CHINA’S INTERESTS IN THE REGION
Beijing’s principal interests in the region are not military but political and economic. It is primarily concerned with reversing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan; the Pacific remains one of the last critical diplomatic battlegrounds
between the two Chinas. Only twenty-three states worldwide recognize the government in Taipei, and six of them are in Oceania—Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. This grouping represents
the world’s second-largest regional cluster of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan,
and Beijing is intent upon chipping away at this support for what it considers a
13
breakaway province. Offering carrots and sticks, China has rapidly increased
its economic aid to nations that recognize Beijing exclusively, giving a regional
total of $300 million in 2007 (a ninefold increase over the preceding three
14
years). At the same time, nations that have switched their allegiance to Taipei
have seen their economic assistance drop to zero and their Chinese embassies
shuttered.
Beijing’s secondary interests in Oceania are in access to natural resources like
fish, timber, and minerals (prospective seabed mineral resources are also a
long-term consideration). China is the world’s largest producer and exporter of
fish and is eager to have greater access to the region’s gargantuan EEZs. It has
fishing fleets permanently based in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)
and Fiji, and it guarantees continued access by funding large-scale industryrelated projects. (Examples are fish-processing plants in Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, and Papua New Guinea [PNG] and the construction of the regional
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission headquarters in the FSM.)
Beijing has also invested substantially in the few nations with territorial resources, importing significant quantities of timber from the Solomon Islands
and PNG and investing heavily in the latter’s mineral sector—notably, funding
15
the $651 million Ramu nickel and cobalt mine in 2006.
Chinese trade with the region has multiplied appreciably, from $743 million
in 2006 (by comparison, U.S. trade was $393 million) to approximately $2 bil16
lion in 2007, with a stated goal of $3 billion in total trade by 2010. As aid and
trade increase, Beijing seeks to build an alternative source of influence in the
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Pacific—a region where governments are weary of being treated by donors as irresponsible, immature, and crooked. The PRC offers a new, attractive paradigm
by granting aid, preferential loans, and tariff reductions without preconditions,
all the while treating Pacific governments with respect, evinced by senior-level
official visits, which have included trips by the foreign minister and premier,
17
Wen Jiabao.
ENGAGING SALTWATER STATES
While Beijing’s economic presence in Oceania may be on the ascent, it is not
necessarily at the expense of American political influence. The United States has
strong and enduring ties with the nations of Oceania built on a long history of
economic and diplomatic engagement, and despite the PRC’s increased activity,
America-friendly Australia remains the dominant power in the region. Still,
while competition in this increasingly important maritime area is not inevitably
zero-sum, neither is it free of consequences. To hedge against rising Chinese influence, and because of the region’s growing economic, political, and military
potential, it is in Washington’s strategic interest to enhance its relationship with
Oceania. USPACOM is best poised to strengthen American ties by augmenting
current theater security cooperation.
The depth and breadth of USPACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan
(TSCP) for its entire area of responsibility—a plan that includes at least five or
six annual military exercises, frequent senior official visits and exchanges, millions of dollars’ worth of humanitarian and civic assistance activities, a myriad
of multinational security and health-related training conferences, and the subsidization of dozens of international students at various American military educational institutions—make it the “Cadillac” of the regional combatant
18
commands. With respect to Oceania, humanitarian assistance is the TSCP’s
major area of focus. The annual naval PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP Program, born out
of international cooperation following the 2004 Asian tsunami, has provided
medical, dental, veterinarian, educational, and engineering support to seven of
19
the nations of Oceania since 2007. This and other assistance programs have
been received extremely well in the region and considered highly successful.
Outside of these vigorous humanitarian efforts, however, the TSCP is rather
thin as it affects Oceania. There are certainly elements that deserve continuation. For example, island states are well represented at USPACOM’s regularly
sponsored security seminars and health workshops and in programs to support
international collaboration, like the Multinational Planning Augmentation
Team. Further, Pacific military officers and officials are regular students at the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, and a handful have attended
the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island (four of fourteen states have
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20

been represented there—Fiji, PNG, Samoa, and Tonga). What the TSCP lacks
for Oceania is a set of specific initiatives that treat the region as a distinct entity,
aim to build upon its shared maritime identity, and address systemic problems
in island government capacity.
The first order of business is to develop a regional multilateral exercise.
USPACOM sponsors at least sixteen major international military exercises with
relative frequency, including notables like COBRA GOLD and RIMPAC and bilat21
eral exercises like GARUDA SHIELD (United States–Indonesia). None of them,
22
however, incorporate any of Oceania’s nations. An annual Pacific-island security exercise focused on disaster response and involving government institutions, police, military forces, and nongovernmental organizations could assist
states in building capacity, improving intra- and intergovernmental communications, and enhancing interoperability (especially with the United States).
Branded, perhaps, “PACIFIC NAVIGATOR,” to resonate with island peoples who
are immensely proud of their maritime histories, this exercise could be organized and executed under the leadership of Pacific Command’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, an organization
23
with experience in facilitating such drills. The South Pacific tsunami of September 2009, which killed nearly two hundred, displaced thousands, and resulted in millions of dollars’ worth of damage in Samoa, American Samoa, and
Tonga, could provide a ready case study in disaster response and mitigation.
Second, in anticipation of PACIFIC NAVIGATOR, USPACOM would conduct a
focused infrastructure upgrade for one airfield or port within the prospective
host nation (which would rotate annually). The improvement would be more
than cosmetic but far less than a major overhaul (e.g., upgrading of maintenance facilities, radar, pierside storage, and the like). During the annual exercise,
this improved facility would be a focal point. The infrastructure enhancement
program would improve the host nation’s ability to conduct its own disasterresponse operations and to receive international support in the form of supplies
and relief workers delivered by aircraft and ship. The second-order benefits
would include an improved facility better able to support a range of host nation
missions—counternarcotics, rescue, monitoring of illegal fishing, etc.; positive
local publicity for American forces; improved diplomatic relations commensurate with direct monetary assistance; and an airfield or port better able to receive
U.S. military forces in the event of a contingency.
Finally, USPACOM should reshape its military exchange program for the region’s security officers. Only three of Oceania’s states have regular military
forces, and as a consequence, many traditional military and naval roles fall to po24
lice units, including maritime functions associated with homeland defense. In
order to improve island states’ ability to conduct these missions, especially those
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that are likely to become more frequent and difficult (the monitoring and prevention of IUU fishing, for instance), Oceania’s police and naval personnel need
to train with the best, the U.S. Coast Guard. While an “exchange” program as
such would be inappropriate, due to the limited opportunities and platforms
available among Pacific-island defense forces, a robust training program placing
Oceania’s security personnel on Coast Guard vessels could be highly effective.
The aim would be to expose a pair (one midgrade officer, one junior officer/senior
enlisted) to a Coast Guard ship or sector for a period of three to four months.
Ideally, two pairs from different nations could be assigned to the same command, reinforcing regional confidence building and encouraging future collaboration. These exchange personnel would be placed with ships conducting a
range of missions (perhaps focusing on the disruption of IUU fishing), all the
while being exposed to the professionalism of the men and women of the U.S.
Coast Guard.
Of course, any American initiatives in Oceania that fail to leverage the resources and influence of Washington’s Pacific allies would be badly flawed. Australia and New Zealand, two of America’s strongest partners, are also the two
most influential nations in the neighborhood—trading in the highest volumes,
contributing the most aid and government support to Oceania, and in some
cases providing for the defense of island states. (For example, Australia provides
for the defense of Nauru and New Zealand for the Cook Islands, Niue, and Sa25
moa; Kiribati is a shared responsibility.) In addition to their sheer presence in
the region, Canberra and Wellington have long histories of military engagement
with, and involvement in, island nations, most recently demonstrated by the
Australian-led multinational peacekeeping operation in the Solomon Islands,
26
which included troops from New Zealand, PNG, and Tonga. Other allies too
wield considerable influence in the Pacific as a consequence of their colonial histories (particularly France) or current economic relationships (Japan and South
Korea, for instance). American policy makers would be wise to consider an engagement strategy that incorporates the unique strengths of these partners as
well as their nuanced understandings of regional relationships, grounded in
their long involvement in the Pacific.
REBUILDING BRIDGES
Preoccupied with counterterrorism and democracy building in the Middle East,
the United States has allowed its relationship with Oceania to wither while
Beijing has expanded its strategic aims and efforts in the region. As Chinese
trade and aid have skyrocketed, the United States has disengaged, closing its U.S.
Agency for International Development regional office, halving the number of
Peace Corps missions, and eliminating its U.S. Information Agency presence in
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Oceania. It is time to renew America’s relationship with this strategically crucial maritime area. By building on current successful initiatives, U.S. Pacific
Command is well placed to strengthen links with and between island governments, enhance regional capacity to manage future security challenges, and, in
turn, restore American influence in a region with tremendous economic, political, and military value.
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MAJOR CONVOY OPERATION TO MALTA,
10–15 AUGUST 1942 (OPERATION PEDESTAL)
Milan Vego

T

he resupply convoy to Malta in August 1942 (Operation PEDESTAL) was in
operational terms a major defensive naval and joint operation. It was also
the largest of the many Allied efforts to ensure the survival of Malta against relentless Axis air attacks. Italian accounts referred to the Axis attempt to destroy
the convoy as operation “Mid-August” (Mezzo Agosto). The Allies were well
aware of the enormous risks in making a decision to mount an all-out effort to
bring badly needed supplies to the besieged island. Yet
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OPERATIONAL SITUATION
The fifteen-mile-long island of Malta played a vital
role in British strategy for the Mediterranean since its
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capture in September 1800. Its great military strategic importance was due
largely to its commanding position in the approaches to the western and eastern
Mediterranean. Malta lies near the midpoint of the Mediterranean, about 715
nautical miles from Alexandria and 860 nautical miles from Gibraltar. Only fifty
nautical miles separate Malta from Sicily. The distance between Malta and the
Libyan coast and Cape Bon (Tunisia) are 190 and 175 nautical miles, respectively. Malta’s importance was most dramatic in World War II, when it served as
an air and naval base from which the British could attack Axis convoys to Libya.
For the Allies, resupplying Malta with fuel, ammunition, and foodstuffs was a
major problem because of intensive efforts by the Axis land-based aircraft on
Sicily and in North Africa, in combination with heavy surface forces, submarines, and mines, to cut off the island from its links with the outside world.
In the late spring of 1942, the situation in the central Mediterranean was extremely unfavorable for the Allies. The British Eighth Army in North Africa was
on the defensive, and Malta was under almost constant attack by Axis aircraft
based in Sicily and North Africa. By April 1942, the chances of Malta’s survival
were low. Reserves of wheat and flour, fodder, benzyl, and kerosene fuel would
not last after mid-to-late June, while stocks of white oil and aviation fuel were
sufficient only until about mid-August. Only about 920 tons of diesel fuel and
two thousand tons of furnace oil for refueling warships were then available.
Stocks of antiaircraft (AA) ammunition were sufficient for only about six weeks
1
of fighting. For these reasons, the Allies attempted a dual resupply convoy operation in mid-June 1942, one from the west (Operation HARPOON) and another
from the east (Operation VIGOROUS). The Allies suffered significant losses in
both operations. In Operation HARPOON, of a convoy composed of six merchant ships with forty-three thousand tons, only two merchant vessels carrying
2
a total of eighteen thousand tons of supplies reached Malta. In Operation
VIGOROUS, out of eleven ships carrying 81,500 tons only two ships with a total of
fifteen thousand tons of supplies reached the island. The Germans and Italians
sank two merchant ships in the convoy while seven ships received orders to return to Alexandria or were detached to Tobruk. In addition, damage occurred to
3
three cruisers, one special service ship, one corvette, and two merchant ships.
The governor of Malta, Field Marshal Lord Gort, reported to London on 20 June
that the unloading of the ships that reached the island was almost completed
and that he was actively examining how best to husband the existing supplies
4
until late September.
The Allied situation in North Africa greatly deteriorated in late June 1942.
The Allied forces abandoned defensive positions in Gazala and Tobruk fell on 21
June. Seven days later the Axis forces were at Matruh and in possession of the airfields some 160 miles from Alexandria. Faced with the possibility of Axis air
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24
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attacks on Alexandria, the British dispersed merchant vessels and warships from
the Suez Canal area to the ports of Haifa, Port Said, and Beirut. They also prepared to block Alexandria’s harbor and port facilities. Vice Admiral (acting Admiral) Henry H. Harwood, commander in chief (CINC) of the British
Mediterranean Fleet (April 1942–February 1943), moved his headquarters to
5
Haifa on 2 July. The retreat on land and the move of the fleet from Alexandria
greatly increased the distance that the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Royal Navy
had to cover in order to conduct effective attacks against the Axis convoys in the
central Mediterranean.
By early July 1942, the German Afrika Korps was forced to stop its offensive in
the inconclusive first battle of El Alamein. However, the Germans intensified
their efforts to renew the advance in the fall of 1942 by mounting a large effort to
send additional supplies by sea to North Africa. The Allies were also preparing to
go on the offensive in the fall of 1942. Among the most important tasks was restoring Malta’s use as a base for attacks on the Axis convoys to Libya. This was
contingent on having sufficient reserves of fuel, food, and other supplies on
Malta. Otherwise, these shortages would have forced the Allied submarines and
bombers that returned to Malta in mid-July 1942 to leave the island again. In addition, the shortage of food supplies threatened the civilian populace with star6
vation. Despite the mounting losses incurred in resupplying Malta, British
7
resolve remained unbroken.
PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS: THE ALLIES
In the aftermath of the failed dual convoy operation in June 1942, the need to
mount another effort to resupply the besieged island of Malta was obvious. First
Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound (1877–1943) agreed with Prime Minister
Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) that the loss of Malta would be a disaster of
the first magnitude to the British Empire, and probably would be fatal in the
long run to the defenses of the Nile Valley.8 The Allies were willing to accept the
high risks in mounting another convoy operation to resupply Malta. This decision became easier due to the suspension of the Arctic convoys after the disaster
of convoy PQ-17 to Soviet Russia in early July 1942. At the same time, the easing
of the situation in the Indian Ocean freed enough forces to mount a convoy op9
eration to relieve the siege of Malta. The failed dual convoy operation in
mid-June 1942 demonstrated the inability of Allied naval and air forces to ensure full protection to the Malta convoys in the face of Axis air strength in the
central Mediterranean. Hence, the decision was made that the next major convoy operation to Malta would be mounted from the west only.10
One of the worst problems for the Allies was a highly fragmented command
organization in the Mediterranean. Even two years after the outbreak of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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hostilities in the Mediterranean, the Allied command organization lacked a single theater commander responsible for the planning and execution of operations by all three services. In June 1939, the British established the Middle East
Command with the responsibility for all operations there and in the Western
Desert. During the war, its responsibility extended to include Greece, East Africa, Aden, the Persian Gulf, and Libya. However, the three services were individually responsible for defense of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
CINC of the Middle East had control over only ground forces. Directly subordinate to him were the British Troops in Egypt; the British 8th, 9th, and 10th armies; Persia and Iraq Command; and forces in Sudan. The other two service
chiefs were Air Officer, CINC Royal Air Force Middle East Command and CINC,
Mediterranean. The former had under his command air units based in the Western Desert and Malta. The principal British naval commanders in the Mediterranean in the summer 1942 were Flag Officer, Force H (Vice Admiral Edward N.
Syfret), Rear Admiral 15th Cruiser Squadron (Philip L. Vian), Vice Admiral in
Charge, Malta (Ralph Leatham), and Rear Admiral, Alexandria (G. A.
11
Creswell).
What the Allies Knew
One of the key prerequisites for sound planning is accurate, timely, reliable, and
perhaps most important, relevant information on the situation. In that respect,
the Allies had fair knowledge of Italian and German naval dispositions and deployments of their land-based aircraft in the central Mediterranean prior to execution of the resupply operation to Malta. The most important sources of
intelligence were the Allied interception and decoding of most of the German
Enigma messages. They not only had solid knowledge of German naval and air
dispositions, content of the Luftwaffe’s operation orders, air reconnaissance reports, and U-boat observations but also the appreciation of the situation by
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, CINC South (Oberbefehlshaber Sued) and his
subordinate commanders. Intelligence obtained by reading German radio traffic was distributed to major Allied commanders in the form of special intelligence summaries by the Admiralty’s Operations Intelligence Centre in London.
Based on analysis of the Enigma messages, the Allies assessed that on 22 July
1942 the Italians had deployed at Tarent (Taranto) four battleships (1 Littorio, 3
Cavour); three six-inch cruisers (Abruzzi, Garibaldi, and Aosta) at Navarino
(Pylos today), Greece; two eight-inch cruisers at Messina, Sicily; five destroyers,
two torpedo boats, two submarines, and eighteen motor torpedo boats (MTBs)
at various bases in Sicily; four MTBs at Pantelleria; and two six-inch cruisers, six
submarines, and three destroyers at Cagliari, Sardinia.
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Allied intelligence also estimated that at Naples were one Italian six-inch
cruiser in dock (and not serviceable), three destroyers, and eight submarines.
They noted that the number of destroyers at Tarent varied between ten and
twenty according to convoy requirements from Italy to Greece, Crete, and North
Africa. Allied intelligence believed that if Axis leaders suspected them of launching convoys to Malta, the Italians would most likely establish a patrol line of
three or four submarines between Sardinia and the French North Africa’s coast,
and four submarines would probably be on patrol in the triangle of
Cartagena–Ibiza–Algiers. They (incorrectly) estimated that the German
U-boats did not appear “to have maintained patrols in the western Mediterranean.” In their view, the German U-boats encountered in that area “so far were
apparently on transit.” Allied intelligence also provided detailed analysis of the
deployment of the French Navy and French shipping routes across the western
Mediterranean.12
As to enemy air strength, the Allies estimated that on 23 July, the Luftwaffe
had 315 aircraft, including one hundred long-range and torpedo bombers on
Sicily and fifty on Sardinia. In their view, the increase in the number of
long-range bombers was through the movement of two air groups (each consisting of sixty-five to seventy aircraft) from Crete, due supposedly not to any oper13
ational needs but to the lack of fuel on Crete. The Allies assessed that the
Luftwaffe had on Sardinia twenty Ju-88 bombers, while the Italian Air Force
(IAF) had fifteen long-range bombers, thirty single-engined fighter aircraft,
thirty-five torpedo bombers, twenty reconnaissance aircraft, and thirty coastal
seaplanes. On Sicily, the Luftwaffe had 120 long-range bombers, twelve reconnaissance bombers, and thirty-six single- and twenty-seven twin-engined fighters. The IAF had about eighty long-range bombers, 120 single-engine fighters,
twenty torpedo bombers, fifteen dive-bombers, ten reconnaissance aircraft, and
14
fifty coastal seaplanes.
Allied intelligence revised its estimates of enemy air dispositions on 9 August
1942. It erroneously concluded that there were no German aircraft based on Sardinia, while the IAF had fifteen to twenty long-range bombers, fifteen to twenty
fighter-bombers, thirty-five to forty torpedo bombers, twenty reconnaissance
aircraft, and thirty coastal seaplanes. The Luftwaffe’s strength then consisted of
144 long-range bombers, twenty-seven reconnaissance bombers, and sixty-six
single-engined fighters. The IAF had deployed seventy long-range bombers,
thirty-five to forty torpedo bombers, fifteen to twenty dive-bombers, forty reconnaissance aircraft, fifty coastal seaplanes, fifteen to twenty fighter-bombers,
and ninety-five single-engined fighters. Serviceability of the aircraft was about
15
55 percent of the above strength figures.
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On 5 August 1942, the Allies learned from Enigma intercepts that the Germans interpreted the reduction in RAF activity over Malta and Egypt as an indication that the enemy planned to mount a large-scale operation to supply Malta.
The Germans also believed that the Allies would launch diversionary attacks on
the Panzerarmee (Panzer Army) Afrika and a combined operation against
Mersa Matruh. The Germans planned to counter the enemy’s possible moves by
redeploying Luftwaffe aircraft from Greece to Sicily and increasing combat
readiness of air units in both areas. They also planned to discuss with the commander of the Italian air forces on Sicily joint bombing and torpedo attacks and
16
training exercises.
The Allies learned from Enigma messages that on 6 August the Germans
alerted their agents at Algeciras about the possibility that a Malta-bound convoy
was preparing to sail and that all reporting stations should increase vigilance.
German agents reported the arrivals and departures of Allied warships from Gibraltar during the night of 8–9 August. Rome passed that information to
Cagliari in its daily bulletin on 9 August. The Allies also read the Enigma report
that at 0925 on 10 August Tangier informed Madrid that based on personal observation a convoy of thirty-seven ships, including two large transports, were
outside the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar sailing on an easterly course. The
17
station in Ceuta also reported the movement of various enemy ships eastward.
Plans
The Allies considered four variants of the plan to resupply Malta from the west,
designated plans A, B, C, and D, respectively. Most of these plans revolved
around the availability of the 17,580-ton (full load) U.S. aircraft carrier Ranger
(CV 4) for the operation. The Admiralty was in favor of plan A, if Ranger and its
five destroyers were available at Scapa Flow. Under plan A two battleships (Nelson and Rodney), deployed with the Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean, would
also take part in the operation. In the Admiralty’s view, training of the Eastern
Fleet would be completed earlier if the Malta convoy were run in July instead of
August and there would be no need to remove the carrier Indomitable from the
Eastern Fleet. The Admiralty received information from Malta that the island
could survive until September. Hence, there was no great urgency to run a resupply convoy in July. This, in turn, would affect the degree to which the British government would press the Americans to allow Ranger to be employed in the
18
Mediterranean as envisaged under plan A.
Plan B would also require the movement of Ranger to Scapa Flow. The Admiralty favored plan A and was concerned if both plans were presented to the
Americans they might opt for plan B. In the Admiralty’s view, if plan B were carried out in July it would not have allowed adequate time for preparations. If the
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Americans rejected plan A, then the Admiralty favored a modified plan B to be
executed in the August new moon period in order to allow more time for the carrier Victorious to become familiar with the U.S. fighter squadrons. To execute the
modified plan B, it would require that Ranger arrive at Scapa Flow and transfer
twenty-four folding-wing Martlet fighters (U.S. Wildcats) with their crews to
Victorious; Ranger would operate with the Home Fleet to relieve Victorious during its absence from the fleet. Ranger would need to retain at least twelve Martlets. The modified plan B would not interfere with the schedule for PQ convoys
bound for Russia. However, the execution of plan B depended on whether
Ranger would be available for service with the Home Fleet until the end of August. Plan C was not acceptable because protection of both the convoy and the
battleships by obsolete Fulmar fighters carried by Victorious was inadequate in
the area south of Sardinia. This assessment was based on the heavy losses suffered from enemy land-based aircraft during Operation HARPOON.19
Plan D contemplated the convoy operation be executed in August using British forces exclusively. Among advantages of this plan were that it would not require American help and more time would be available for training and for the
buildup of a heavy bomber force in the Middle East in support of the operation.
Another advantage was that there would be one more hour of darkness in August than in July. A major disadvantage of plan D was that it would also delay relief to Malta by one month. It would delay the assembly and training of the
Eastern Fleet by two and one-half months, because its sole carrier Indomitable
and two battleships (Nelson and Rodney) would be detached for the operation in
the Mediterranean. It would also entail holding up the merchant ships destined
20
for the convoy for another month.
The Admiralty was in favor of plan A if Ranger could reach Scapa by 30 July.
Failing plan A, it favored the modified plan B to be carried out in August and not
requiring the withdrawal of the carrier Indomitable from the Eastern Fleet. The
risks entailed in plan C were simply unacceptable. Hence, failing plan A or the
21
modified plan B, the Admiralty had no alternative but to adopt plan D.
The Admiralty assumed that it would be possible to run a PQ convoy toward
the end of June and another in late July. The August PQ convoy would be delayed
until the first week of September. In the Admiralty’s view it would be possible to
maintain a schedule of three PQ convoys every two months. Adopting plan D
made it unnecessary to send Ranger to the United Kingdom. However, because
of the severe shortage of cruisers and destroyers, British deputy prime minister
Clement Attlee and the chief of the British staff, General Alan Brooke
(1883–1963), suggested that the government request from the United States the
loan to the Royal Navy of two heavy cruisers (Tuscaloosa, Wichita) and four de22
stroyers until the end of August.
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The Admiralty in London conducted the planning for the new resupply convoy to Malta, dubbed Operation PEDESTAL. This allowed it to make decisions
without the extensive use of communications, enhancing operations security. In
addition, the planners could easily obtain general views on policy, and the advice
23
and help of the Naval Staff were always at hand. The plan for Operation
PEDESTAL was similar to the plan for the convoy from Gibraltar in mid-June
24
1942. The planners assumed that surprise would be difficult to achieve because
25
the Axis had excellent intelligence in the Gibraltar area.
In its broad outlines, the plan for Operation PEDESTAL visualized the assembly of sufficient forces to counter diverse threats posed by the Axis air and naval
forces based in Sardinia, Sicily, southern Italy, and Tripolitania.26 Operation
VIGOROUS failed due to the inability of Allied airpower to damage enemy battleships sufficiently to force them to withdraw from the convoy. An acute shortage
of AA ammunition and fuel was part of the reason that the convoy was dispatched to Malta after dark on 15 June. Because it was impossible to increase the
strength of the land-based aircraft, the only solution to strengthen defenses of
the next convoy for Malta was to assign much stronger naval forces to its de27
fense. Therefore, the plan required a sufficient number of fighter aircraft to
match the enemy fighters and to deal with the enemy heavy bombers and tor28
pedo bombers threatening the convoy. The Admiralty made the decision that
in the course of the operation damaged merchant vessels should be scuttled
while all efforts would be made to preserve warships. The intent was not to lose
29
both escorts and convoy.
The lessons of the Arctic convoys and those to Malta showed the need for
tankers to accompany the convoy and escorts. However, the British merchant
marine did not have fast (sixteen-knot) tankers in service. The U.S. Maritime
Administration operated two such tankers (Kentucky and Ohio). After some difficult negotiations, the British government was able to lease these two tankers.
One of them (Kentucky) was sunk during the failed dual convoy operation in
June 1942 so that only one tanker, the 14,150-deadweight-ton (DWT) Ohio (car30
rying 11,500 tons of black and white oil) was assigned to the convoy.
In planning Operation PEDESTAL, the Allies correctly assumed that the enemy
would concentrate its heavy surface forces in the area south of Sardinia and then
either attack the convoy or draw off Allied escorting forces, leaving the convoy
open to attack by its light forces. They also expected synchronized attacks by enemy high-level bombers, torpedo bombers, and dive-bombers on the third and
fourth days, and high-level bombing and torpedo bomber attacks on the second
and fifth days of the operation.31 To minimize losses from enemy aircraft, the
32
convoy would transit the Sicilian Narrows at night.
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The planners also made major changes in the strength of the convoy screen
based on the lessons learned in the aftermath of the failed dual convoy operation
in June 1942. One of the main requirements was that the convoy escorts be power33
ful enough to prevent a successful attack by Italian heavy surface forces. The Admiralty considered employment of battleships in the Sicilian Narrows, so close to
the enemy airfields in North Africa and Sicily, too risky. Hence, it deployed two
battleships for a purely defensive role. The carrier-based aircraft would play the
34
key role of inflicting damage and slowing down the Italian battle fleet.
The planners assigned all three available large aircraft carriers in support of
the operation. Sea Hurricanes and Martlets replaced all obsolete Fulmar fighters. The carriers would be positioned inside the destroyer screen and in the convoy’s rear; the carrier aircraft would be employed for attacking the Italian heavy
surface ships based at Messina, Tarent, and Naples in case they posed a threat to
35
the convoy.
Task Organization
The entire resupply operation to Malta was under the command of Acting Vice
36
Admiral Syfret (1889–1972). He was in command of Force F, composed of the
convoy and naval forces of direct screen and distant cover and support. Naval
forces assigned to the operation were a collection of ships belonging to the
Home Fleet and Eastern Fleet. Submarines deployed in the eastern Mediterranean were subordinate to CINC of the Mediterranean Fleet in Haifa. Most of the
land-based aircraft were controlled by the RAF’s Mediterranean Command.
The planners had considerable difficulty in assembling a sufficient number of
merchant ships for the new resupply effort due to the heavy losses inflicted by
the German U-boats in the northern Atlantic in the midsummer of 1942. Based
on the request by Malta’s governor to the Admiralty on 3 July, the planners envisaged a convoy composed of ten merchant ships with a loading capacity of 75,000
DWT.37 However, they made the decision in mid-July to run a convoy of thirteen
38
freighters and one tanker with tonnage of about 123,000 tons. These ships
would carry mainly flour and ammunition. They allocated each ship a proportion of the total cargo so that a percentage of every commodity was certain to get
39
through despite expected high losses. Planners based the selection of the merchant ships on the assumption that the enemy would mount heavy attacks
against the convoy. To enhance the convoy’s chances of survival, the average
speed of its advance had to be at least fifteen knots. Based on the lessons from
Operation HARPOON, the planners assigned an ocean tug to accompany the con40
voy. The intent was that the convoy would leave the United Kingdom about 2
August and arrive at Malta on 13 August. In an attempt to confuse German intelligence, the convoy’s designation, WS.5.21.S (WS for “Winston Specials”), was
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the same as for the convoys from the United Kingdom to Suez and rounding the
41
Cape of Good Hope.
Supporting naval forces were divided into four force elements designated
Forces Z, X, Y, and R. Force Z, led by Syfret himself, consisted of two battleships
(Nelson and Rodney) and three large aircraft carriers (Eagle, Indomitable, and
Victorious) with seventy-two fighters and thirty-eight torpedo-bombers, three
cruisers (Sirius, Phoebe, and Charybdis), and the 19th Destroyer Flotilla with
fifteen destroyers. Force X, under command of Rear Admiral H. M. Burrough,
was composed of three light cruisers (Nigeria, Kenya, and Manchester), one AA
ship (Cairo) of the 10th Cruiser Flotilla, eleven destroyers of the 6th Destroyer
42
Flotilla, and one ocean tug. Two of these cruisers (Nigeria and Cairo) were fit43
ted for fighter-direction duties. An additional five destroyers were assigned to
provide antisubmarine (A/S) escort for the convoy during its transit from the
44
United Kingdom to the Strait of Gibraltar. Force Y at Malta consisted of two
freighters (Troilus and Orari) and two destroyers. Force R(efueling) was com45
posed of three fleet oilers and one ocean tug plus four corvettes for escort.
Malta Escort Force (17th Minesweeping Flotilla) consisted of four minesweepers and seven motor launches. In addition, the Admiralty assigned eight destroyers as reserve escorts for the operation. They were intended to provide escort for
46
Force R and a screen for the carrier Furious.
Timing
Operation PEDESTAL depended primarily on the Allied ability to assemble a
powerful force and on the timing to outwit the Italians and the Germans. To enhance the chances of success, the Allies had to choose a time during a moonless
night. Hence, they considered the time between 10 and 16 August as optimal to
run the convoy operation to Malta from the west. They selected 10 August as the
first day of the operation, D.1 (D + 0 in U.S. terms), for the day when the convoy
with accompanying escorts would enter the Mediterranean.
Other Operations
Under the cover of the convoy operation, the Admiralty also planned two other
minor efforts. During the planning, the British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles
Portal, raised the issue of increasing the number of fighter aircraft on Malta. By
the end of July, only about eighty fighters were still in service on the island; however, that number would decline rapidly because the Allies lost about seventeen
aircraft per week. Hence, the planners decided to reinforce Malta’s air defenses
by bringing in some forty Spitfire fighters, ferried by an aircraft carrier prior to
47
the arrival of the convoy to Malta. This would also enhance the chances of success of Operation PEDESTAL. The carrier Furious was selected for the operation
(code-named BELLOWS) because the other available carrier, Argus, would require
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/24

NWCR_Winter2010_john.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5294_NWC_Review_Winter2010\NWCR_Winter2010_john.vp
Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:28:40 AM

122

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

War College: Winter 2010 Review

VEGO

117

a wind speed of at least fifteen knots, which was unlikely in August in the west48
ern Mediterranean. The carrier Furious (with four Albacores and forty Spitfires) would sail from Gibraltar and after reaching a point south of Sardinia,
approximately 550 miles from Malta, would launch its Spitfires. The Admiralty
directed Syfret that Operation BELLOWS should interfere as little as possible with
Operation PEDESTAL. Furious should not stop at Gibraltar on the way out but
should enter the Mediterranean with the convoy. It planned that five destroyers
should escort Furious back to Gibraltar and the United Kingdom immediately
after fly-off. Force F would provide fighter protection until Furious was well west
of Force F. The fly-off could take place on D.2 or D.3 at Syfret’s discretion and
could be at any time during daylight. This would allow the Spitfires to land at
dusk. Furious must be on a radius 296 nautical miles from position 37° 12' N and
49
9° 00' E at the time of fly-off. A complicating factor was that the planners for
50
Operation BELLOWS had to use signals versus radio.
Another element of the plan was to take two merchant ships (Troilus and
Orari) that had survived the June debacle with a screen of two destroyers (Force
Y) out of Malta and bring them to Gibraltar (Operation ASCENDANT). The in51
tent was to mount this effort after dark on D.1. Force Y would be suitably
painted and have Italian deck markings. The plan was to sortie from Malta to a
position some thirty nautical miles south of Lampedusa, pass Kelibia (Kélibia),
52
hug the Tunisian coast to Galita Channel, and then proceed to Gibraltar.
Support from Other Forces
In support of Operation PEDESTAL were employed Allied submarines and fighter
aircraft based on Malta, patrol aircraft based in Gibraltar, and long-range bombers of the Middle East Command. The planners prepared an elaborate scheme
for the employment of Allied submarines in support of Operation PEDESTAL.
The initial plan drafted on 20 July contemplated deployment of seven Allied
submarines in the vicinity of Sicily to prevent the Italian surface forces based in
the Tyrrhenian Sea from attacking the convoy during its last leg of transit to
Malta. Specifically, three submarines would take positions between Cape Galle
and Trapani (patrols A, B, and C), three submarines between Cavallo and
Marettimo (patrol areas D, E, F, and G), and one submarine between Volcano
and Cape Milazzo (patrol area H). All patrolling areas would be established by
53
D.1. By late July, the plan for the employment of the Allied submarines was
changed. One submarine would deploy off Milazzo (Sicily’s northwestern coast)
and one off Palermo, while six other submarines would be deployed between
54
Malta and Pantelleria. All submarines would reach their assigned positions by
55
dawn on D.4 (13 August). They would have complete freedom of action in attacking enemy ships, with Italian battleships and cruisers as their primary
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targets. After the convoy passed their patrol line, the submarines would sail on
the surface, on a parallel course with the convoy, and act as its screen. They
56
would also report on the presence of enemy aircraft in the convoy’s proximity.
The outcome of Operation PEDESTAL was also contingent on close cooperation with RAF units based on Malta and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The Allied air strength in Malta on 3 August was 155 serviceable aircraft, including
ninety to ninety-five Spitfire fighters and about fifty-five bombers. This total decreased by 10 August to 151 aircraft, including eighty Spitfires. The expected reinforcements prior to 13 August were seventy-four aircraft, including
thirty-eight Spitfires from the carrier Furious. On D.3, estimated air strength
57
would be 202 aircraft, including 113 Spitfires. On 11 August, the Allies had
about 140 aircraft organized in nine fighter squadrons, three torpedo squad58
rons, four bomber squadrons, and two reconnaissance aircraft squadrons. On
13 August, the Allied air strength on Malta comprised 230 aircraft, of which 155
were operational. This number included ninety fighters, all Spitfires, and
fifty-six long-range bombers (eighteen Beaufighters-coastal, four Beaufighters59
night, four Wellington VIIIs, twenty-four Beauforts, and six Baltimores).
The planners intended that the Allied aircraft based on Malta would conduct
reconnaissance day and night along the probable routes of enemy naval forces;
attack the Italian and German bases on Sicily, Sardinia, and Pantelleria; protect
the convoy after entering the effective range from Malta; and attack with torpe60
does Italian naval forces entering Tarent.
The Allied aircraft based in the Western Desert were tasked with the following:

• Locate, shadow, and report all enemy surface forces.
• Protect the convoy from air attack when within their effective range.
• Destroy enemy surface forces.
• Dislocate enemy air forces on the ground by means of low-flying attacks by
Beaufighters, night bombing of Sardinian bases by Liberators, and
61
large-scale night bombing by Liberators from the Middle East Command.
On 3 August, Vice Admiral, Malta requested from the Middle East Command
four Liberators for bombing enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily during the
nights of D.3–D.4 and D.4–D.5. He also suggested using an additional six
Bostons or similar aircraft suitable for carrying out high-speed daylight bomb62
ing of enemy airfields. The RAF would provide long-range escort aircraft from
Gibraltar and Malta to the limit of their effective range. He specifically requested
air reconnaissance between Sardinia and North Africa from D.2 to D.5; between
Cavallo Island Lighthouse and Marettimo (Aegadian Islands) during daylight
hours on D.3 and D.5; and reconnaissance of naval bases Tarent, Messina,
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Palermo, Naples, and Cagliari from D.1 to D.5 to keep track of the enemy surface
vessels. Allies would conduct daylight air patrols between Cavallo and
Marettimo on D.3 to D.5 and dawn patrols between Sardinia and North Africa
63
from D.2 to D.5. Beaufighters would protect Force X from 1930 to dark on D.3
and from daylight on D.4 until Spitfires could take over protection of the convoy.
The torpedo bomber striking force would maintain readiness to attack enemy
surface forces and provide cover for the westward passage of Force X to Gibraltar
64
on D.4. RAF aircraft based at Gibraltar would conduct an antisubmarine patrol
65
east of the Strait of Gibraltar.
OPERATIONAL DESIGN
The Allied commanders and planners had to fully evaluate all the aspects of the
operational situation in the Mediterranean prior to and during the planning of
Operation PEDESTAL. In modern terms, this process is called “operational design.” In generic terms, the principal elements of design for a major naval operation are ultimate/intermediate objectives, force requirements, balancing of
operational factors against the ultimate objective, identification of enemy and
friendly operational centers of gravity, initial lines of operations, direction
(axis), the operational idea (scheme), and operational sustainment.
The first and the most important step in designing a major naval operation is
to properly determine and articulate its ultimate and intermediate objectives.
The objective of Operation PEDESTAL as stated in the plan was “to pass a convoy
of 14 M.T. [motor tanker] ships through the western Mediterranean to Malta
and to cover the passage of two merchant ships and two destroyers from Malta to
66
Gibraltar.” Expressed differently, the main and ultimate objective of Operation
PEDESTAL was to deliver a sufficient amount of fuel, ammunition, and food supplies to allow Malta to operate as a major naval/air base beyond September 1942.
That objective was operational in its scale.
After the ultimate objective is determined, the next step is to derive a number
of major or minor tactical objectives that would lead collectively to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective of the operation. Major tactical objectives in
Operation PEDESTAL were defense and protection of the convoy, neutralization
of the enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily, and diversion of enemy forces from
the western to eastern Mediterranean. Under cover of the convoy operation, the
Allies also planned to accomplish a separate major tactical objective—reinforcement of Malta’s air defenses by ferrying some forty Spitfires to the island. Another separate but minor tactical objective was to bring to safety two merchant
ships that had survived the HARPOON convoy operation.
An important element of operational design is determining the overall force’s
size/mix for the entire operation. The principal factors in this process are the
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type of operation, the combat potential of friendly and enemy forces, the number and scale of intermediate objectives and their sequencing, the distances between the base of operations and the prospective operating area, and weather
and climatological conditions. In addition, intelligence and logistics play a significant role in determining the size and composition of one’s forces in a major
naval operation. The operational commander’s judgment and experience are often the decisive factors in determining the size and composition of the forces
that take part in a major naval operation. The Allies assigned the maximum
available force of aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers to Operation
PEDESTAL. They assigned three fast carriers to a force of distant cover and support. However, it would probably have been wiser not to conduct the ferrying
operation simultaneously with the resupply effort but instead to assign more destroyers for the carrier Furious to Force Z or Force X, thereby strengthening the
convoy’s air and antisubmarine warfare defenses. The Allies failed to employ a
sufficient number of serviceable long-range bombers of the Middle East Command in support of Operation PEDESTAL.
The operational commander and planners must first properly harmonize the
factors of space, time, and force against the ultimate objective of the operation.
This means that advantages in one operational factor must offset the deficiencies in other factors. Ideally, the operational commander should assess friendly
factors of space, time, and forces individually and then balance them in combination against the respective ultimate objective. A serious disconnect or mismatch between the ultimate objective and the corresponding space-time-force
factors might greatly complicate and possibly endanger the success of the entire
operation. If the imbalance cannot be satisfactorily resolved, then the objective
must be changed or scaled down and brought roughly into harmony with the
operational factors.
Operation PEDESTAL was conducted over very long distances. About 1,370
nautical miles separates Glasgow from the Strait of Gibraltar via Bishop Rock.
The distance from the Strait of Gibraltar to port La Valletta, Malta, is just over a
thousand nautical miles. A convoy from Gibraltar to Malta had to sail the distance of four hundred miles (or twenty-six hours at fifteen knots) within 150
67
miles from the enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily. The Allied naval base at
La Valletta, Malta, was favorably located to control the central part of the Mediterranean. It lies only about eighty nautical miles from Licata, Sicily, and 360
nautical miles from Benghazi. The distances in nautical miles between Malta
and the Italian naval bases at Cagliari, Sardinia; Naples; and Tarent are 330, 322,
and 337, respectively. The hundred-mile-wide Sicilian Narrows posed a particular hazard for Allied ships because of numerous mines laid by the Italians and
68
the short distances to the Axis airfields on Sicily. Lack of sea room and presence
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of the enemy mines made it next to impossible to use battleships and carriers beyond the Skerki Bank. Hence, for the last 250 miles of the voyage to Malta, the
69
convoy would have to rely on protection of cruisers and destroyers. The Sicilian Narrows were also a suitable area for the employment of the Italian and German torpedo craft and cruisers/destroyers. In the early days of the war, the Allies
had easily swept the mines, but this became more difficult and dangerous at the
later stage, when the Italians laid new and more advanced German mines.
After determining the ultimate objective of a major naval operation, the operational commander and his planners must determine corresponding enemy
and friendly operational centers of gravity—a source of massed strength, physical or moral, or a source of leverage whose serious degradation, dislocation,
neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability to accomplish a given military objective. The principal
utility of the concept of center of gravity is in significantly enhancing the chance
that one’s sources of power are used in the quickest and most effective way for
accomplishing a given military objective.
For the Allies the enemy’s operational center of gravity in the second phase of
the operation was clearly German heavy bombers and dive-bombers based on
Sicily and Sardinia. However, in the third phase, the enemy operational center of
gravity shifted to the Italian heavy surface forces in case they sortied out from
their bases. The Allied operational center of gravity was three large aircraft carriers with their fighter aircraft on board. After the passage of the Sicilian Narrows,
the Allied operational center of gravity changed to Force X. Afterward, the operational center of gravity shifted to the Allied fighter aircraft based on Malta.
OPERATIONAL IDEA
The operational idea (or scheme) is the very heart of a design for a major naval
operation. In essence, it is identical to what strategists commonly call “concept
of operations” (CONOPS) (or sometimes “scheme of maneuver”). Ideally, it
should be bold and provide for speedy execution. The simpler the operational
idea, the higher are its chances of successful execution. The operational idea
should be also sufficiently broad to accommodate changes in the situation in the
course of its execution. It should be novel and avoid stereotyped patterns. The
operational idea should ensure the decisive employment of one’s forces. It
should present the enemy with multidimensional threats that he has little or no
chance of countering successfully. It should also surprise and deceive the enemy.
The idea for Operation PEDESTAL was traditional (see map 1). The unfavorable initial geographic position was a major reason why Operation PEDESTAL
was bold but not novel. The Italians and Germans were neither surprised nor deceived; the objective of the operation was all too transparent. The Allies were
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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unable to achieve surprise, because the Axis had a large number of agents in the
70
Gibraltar area. The geography of the area restricted considerably the choice of
lines of operation for each element of Force F. It allowed for little or no flexibility
in the employment of the Allied forces. The speed of execution was limited to the
fifteen-knot speed of the convoy.
The Allied operational idea envisaged both simultaneous and successive
movements of several force elements in the western and eastern Mediterranean.
Force F would pass through the Strait of Gibraltar on the night of D.1. Upon
reaching the entrance of the Skerki Bank (an area of relatively shallow water in
71
the Sicilian Narrows) at about 1900 on D.3, Force Z would turn westward.
Upon arriving at the entrance to the Skerki Bank in the afternoon on D.3, Force
X and convoy WS.5.21.S would proceed to Malta. Force X would proceed until
the point at the approaches to Malta in the afternoon on D.4, from where the
72
Malta Escort Force would take over escort of the convoy. Force Z, after parting
company from Force X at the entrance to the Skerki Bank in the afternoon of
D.3, would remain in that vicinity until the Beaufighters from Malta took over
protection of the convoy and Force X. On D.4, Force Z would operate to the west
of Sardinia to distract attention from Force Y. After its support was no longer
necessary, Force Z would return to Gibraltar. Force X would return to Gibraltar
73
as soon as Vice Admiral, Malta could release it from protecting the convoy.
Minesweepers would clear the channels, thereby avoiding the loss of merchant
74
vessels as in the convoy operation in June. Two merchant ships that had survived the June debacle, with a screen of two destroyers, would sail out from
Malta to Gibraltar after sundown on D.1, pass through the Sicilian Narrows on
the night of D.2–D.3, and thence sail directly to Gibraltar. A submarine screen of
six British boats would deploy south of Pantelleria and north of the projected
convoy route to intercept Italian naval forces. Two additional submarines would
75
deploy off Milazzo, Palermo, and the Strait of Messina. Under the cover of the
main operation, Operation BELLOWS would be carried out to reinforce Malta’s
air defenses.
The Allied planners properly applied the principles of objective, mass, security, and economy of effort in Operation PEDESTAL. However, they violated the
principle of simplicity by adding Operations BELLOWS and ASCENDANT.
In general, planners should assign a highly capable but not overly strong force
to protecting the friendly center of gravity; otherwise, the operation would be
open to a devastating enemy attack. The Allied initial operational center of gravity—the carrier forces—were well protected by the fighter aircraft and AA defenses of each carrier’s screen. However, Force X—the second operational center
of gravity—had to rely only on its own AA defenses.
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THE ALLIED FORCES
OPERATION P EDESTAL
FORCE F
Convoy WS.5.21S
13 freighters (Empire Hope, Dorset, Wairangi, Rochester Castle, Waimarana,
Brisbane Star, Port Chalmers, Almeria Lykes, Santa Elisa, Clan Ferguson, Glenorchy, Melbourne Star, Deucalion)
1 oiler (Ohio)
Additional escorts from Britain to Gibraltar: 5 destroyers (Keppel, Malcom,
Amazon, Venomous, Wolverine)

FORCE Z
2 battleships (Nelson, Rodney)
3 aircraft carriers (Victorious, Eagle, Indomitable)
72 fighters, 38 torpedo bombers
3 light cruisers (Charybdis, Phoebe, Sirius)
15 destroyers (19th Destroyer Flotilla) (Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Quentin,
Eskimo, Tartar, Wilton, Westcott, Wrestler, Somali, Wishart, Zetland, Ithuriel,
Antelope, Vansittart)

FORCE X
4 light cruisers (10th Cruiser Flotilla) (Nigeria, Kenya, Manchester, Cairo)
11 destroyers (6th Destroyer Flotilla) (Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight, Fury,
Derwent, Bramham, Bicester, Ledbury, Pathfinder, Penn)
1 ocean tug (Jaunty)

FORCE Y
2 freighters (Troilus, Orari)
2 destroyers (Matchless, Badsworth)

FORCE R
3 fleet oil tankers (Brown, Ranger, Dingledale)
4 corvettes (Jonquil, Spirea, Geranium, Coltsfoot)
1 tug (Salvonia)
Malta Escort Force (17th Minesweeping Flotilla)
4 minesweepers (Speedy, Hythe, Hebe, Rye)
7 motor launches (121, 126, 134, 135, 168, 459, 469)
Submarine Group (10th Submarine Flotilla)
2 submarines off Milazzo and Palermo (P.211, P.42)
6 submarines between Malta and Tunisia (P.44, P.222, P.31, P.34, P.46,
Utmost)

OPERATION B ELLOWS
1 aircraft carrier (Furious)

RESERVE ESCORT GROUP
8 destroyers (Keppel, Westcott, Venomous, Malcolm, Wolverine, Amazon,
Wrestler, Vidette)

OPERATION M.G. 3
Port Said
Convoy M.W.12 (3 merchant vessels)
Escort (2 cruisers, 10 destroyers)
Haifa
1 merchant vessel
2 cruisers
3 destroyers

SERVICEABLE LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT ON MALTA
9 fighter squadrons
3 torpedo-bomber squadrons
4 bomber squadrons
2 air recce squadrons
38 Spitfire fighters from Furious
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THE AXIS FORCES
ITALIAN MAJOR SURFACE FORCES
3rd Naval Division (Messina)
3 heavy cruisers (Gorizia, Bolzano, Trieste)
7 destroyers (Aviere, Geniere, Camicia Nera, Legionario, Ascari, Corsaro,
Grecale)
7th Naval Division (Cagliari)
3 light cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Muzio
Attendolo)
4 destroyers (Maestrale, Gioberti, Oriani, Fuciliere)
1 destroyer for mining the Sicilian Narrows (Malocello)
8th Naval Division (Navarino)
3 light cruisers (Duca degli Abruzzi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Emanuele Filiberto
Duca d’Aosta)
5 destroyers

SUBMARINES
18 Italian submarines (Bronzo, Ascianghi, Alagi, Dessié, Avorio, Dandolo,
Emo, Cobalto, Otaria, Axum, Asteria, Brin, Wolframio, Granito, Dagabur,
Giada, Uarsciek, Vellela)
2 German U-boats (U-73, U-333)

LIGHT FORCES
2nd MS Squadron (MS 16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31)
15th MAS Squadron (MAS 549, 543, 548, 563)
18th MAS Squadron (MAS 556, 553, 533, 562, 560)
20th MAS Squadron (MAS 557, 554, 564, 552)
German S-boats (S30, S59, S58, S36)
Total: 9 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 20 submarines, 10 MS, 13 MAS

LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT (SICILY/SARDINIA)
Italian 287th, 146th, 170th, 144th, 197th air squadrons
328 aircraft (90 torpedo bombers, 62 bombers, 25 dive-bombers, 151
fighters)
German II Air Corps
456 aircraft (328 dive bombers, 32 bombers, 96 fighters)
Total: 784 aircraft (328 Italian, 456 German)
Sources: Fioravanzo, La Marina Italiana Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, vol. 5, pp.
410–13; Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys, pp. 129–31; “Operation Pedestal,” Supplement to the London Gazette, p. 4506.

Continued from page 122

The Allied sector of the main effort in Operation PEDESTAL was the western
Mediterranean, while the eastern Mediterranean was the sector of secondary effort. This decision was predetermined because the convoy started its voyage in
Gibraltar and headed toward Malta. The sectors of effort dictate where the principal forces and their supporting forces should be concentrated or employed in a
major naval operation. In a defensive major naval operation as was Operation
PEDESTAL, the main Allied forces were those that defended the convoy, Force X.
Force Z, submarines, and land-based aircraft were supporting forces.
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The operational idea for a major naval operation should include a plausible
plan for operational deception. In general, deception is intended to mislead the
enemy about intentions, future decisions, and friendly courses of action. It aims
to confuse and disorient the enemy about the time and place of an attack,
thereby achieving surprise. An important task for the planners of Operation
PEDESTAL was to develop a plausible deception plan. Geography alone severely
limited their options. The deception target, the Axis high commanders, would
know that any large convoy with heavy escort starting from either Gibraltar or
Alexandria was bound to the island of Malta. In other words, the ultimate objective of Operation PEDESTAL was too transparent to the enemy. The Allied planners envisaged a feint in the eastern Mediterranean (Operation M.G. 3) aimed
at preventing the Axis commanders from committing all of their available forces
against the Allied forces in the western Mediterranean. They contemplated a
convoy (M.W.12) composed of three merchant ships under cover of a task force
of two cruisers and five destroyers to sail from Port Said to a position about 100
76
miles west-southwest of Crete. They would sail out on D.2 as soon as possible
after receiving information that the WS.5.21.S convoy had passed through the
77
Strait of Gibraltar, or on D.3 if they did not receive that report. The intent was
to lure the Italian 8th (Naval) Division at Navarino, and to keep down the
Luftwaffe’s aircraft based on Crete. One Allied submarine would be deployed off
Navarino, while two other boats would be positioned further westward to intercept any Italian ship sailing from the naval base at Tarent. To divert the Italians’
attention from the events in the western Mediterranean, one Allied submarine
would debark commandos off Catania to conduct a raid against a nearby air78
field. Admiral Syfret expected the British army to help the operation by staging
79
an attack in Egypt; however, he was disappointed at the army’s refusal. The
British army never seemed to understand the importance of Malta for the ultimate Allied victory in the Mediterranean.
Naval forces attain the ultimate objective of a major operation by dividing it
into several phases related in time and space. In general, a phase is the time between the accomplishment of two successive intermediate objectives. Depending on the success of the intermediate objectives, strategists plan phases to take
place simultaneously or sequentially. The main purpose of phasing is to stagger a
major naval operation into several parts to avoid overshooting the point of culmination before achieving the next intermediate objective. The operational
commander should not arbitrarily break down a major naval operation into
phases, unnecessarily slowing down the operational tempo. Operation
PEDESTAL consisted of four related phases: assembly of the convoy at Clyde River
estuary, Scotland, and its transit to Gibraltar; transit from Gibraltar to the
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Sicilian Narrows; transit from the Sicilian Narrows to La Valletta, Malta; and return of forces of distant cover and support/direct screen to Gibraltar.
A major naval operation cannot be successful unless it is adequately, reliably,
and logistically supported and sustained. In general, sustainment is the extension of logistical support from the start of combat actions until the ultimate objective is accomplished. Operational sustainment is required to support combat
forces throughout all phases of a major operation. Because of the long distances
involved, the short-legged destroyers needed refueling during the convoy’s transit. Malta was not in a position to provide fuel. The lessons of the Arctic and
Malta convoys showed the need to have tankers to accompany the convoy and escorts. Force R would perform this critically important task. The plan envisaged
that Force R enter the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar together with the
main force, and then wait near the convoy route to refuel the destroyers as
needed.80
Preparations
The Allies envisaged conducting a three-day exercise west of the Strait of Gibraltar prior to the passage of the convoy through the strait (called Operation
BERSERK). The main purpose of the exercise was to rehearse fighter direction and
81
cooperation among the three carriers. Forces deployed to take part in the exercise were as follows: Force M from the United Kingdom (Victorious, the cruiser
Sirius, and three destroyers), Force K from Freetown (Indomitable, the cruiser
Phoebe, and three destroyers), Force J from Gibraltar (Eagle, the cruiser
Charybdis, and three destroyers), and Force W from Freetown (one fleet oiler
82
83
and two corvettes). The exercise was to start on D-5 (6 August).
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS: THE AXIS
The Axis command structure in the Mediterranean was highly centralized at the
national-strategic level and highly fragmented at the operational level. The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini concentrated all authority over Italian armed
forces in his own hands. He was simultaneously Minister of War, Minister of the
Navy, and Minister of the Air Force from late 1933 until the end of his regime in
July 1943. He appointed undersecretaries who served as chiefs of staff of the respective services. Chief of the Staff of the Supreme General Staff (Capo di Stato
Maggiore Generale) was nothing but a technical adviser without any command
responsibility. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring of the Luftwaffe was in control of
the German ground forces in the theater. Yet he did not have any control over the
German-Italian campaign in North Africa or over the organization of convoys
to Libya. Responsibility for convoying service remained in the hands of the German liaison officer to the Italian Supreme Command (Commando Supremo).
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The two German air corps (Fliegerkorps), II and X Air Corps, deployed in the
Mediterranean, were subordinate to the normal chain of command of the
Luftwaffe. Kesselring had some responsibilities for the conduct of the German
naval operations in the Mediterranean because he was nominally in control of
the new Naval Command Italy (Marinekommando Italien) created in November 1941. However, that command was at the same time subordinate to the
Kriegsmarine’s regular chain of command. The German command structure in
Italy was highly fragmented and service rivalries considerably hampered their
full cooperation in the conduct of operations. To make the situation worse, there
was little unity of effort in the employment of the German and the Italian forces
in the Mediterranean theater. Neither the Germans nor the Italians fully trusted
their nominal partners. Kesselring had the authority only to coordinate but not
to prepare plans for the joint employment of the German and Italian forces. He
had some influence on the employment of the Italian air squadrons for the protection of convoys to North Africa. The Italian Navy resisted all German attempts to influence its operations. Another problem with the Italian Navy was
that ships from different squadrons never trained together. The Italian Navy’s
high command also constantly interfered with the responsibilities of its tactical
84
commanders.
What the Axis Knew
In contrast to the Allies, the Italians and Germans lacked information about the
Allied plans and intentions. However, they had a reasonably accurate knowledge
of the enemy order of battle and movement of his forces once they entered the
Mediterranean. The main sources of information for the German and the Italian
commanders were reports by the Abwehr agents in the Gibraltar area and Ceuta,
and reports from reconnaissance aircraft and submarines. Unbeknownst to the
Germans, the Allies intercepted and read all their Enigma coded messages.
Reliable reports from the Abwehr agents concerning the activity of enemy air
and naval forces in the western Mediterranean convinced Kesselring on 5 August
that the Allies were preparing a large-scale operation to supply Malta from the
85
west. The Germans believed that in conjunction with this operation, the enemy would try to pin down the Axis forces by launching a simultaneous attack
with limited objectives against Panzerarmee Afrika. Specifically, they assumed
that the Allies would mount a combined attack from the sea, the ground, and the
air to capture Mersa Matruh. The activity of the enemy air forces in Egypt and
on Malta was remarkably light in view of their known strength. They took this as
a sign of preparations for a large-scale operation. The enemy was holding in reserve forces on Malta to support, by bombing attacks on Italian naval forces and
by fighter protection, the transit of an enemy convoy through the Sicilian
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86

Narrows. At the same time, the Germans considered the possibility of a threat
to Crete by the Allied forces in the eastern Mediterranean coinciding with the
passage of the convoy to Malta from the west. Hence, Kesselring ordered increased readiness of the Luftwaffe units in both Sicily and Crete. He also directed
87
redeployment of aircraft from Crete to Sardinia and Sicily on 5 August. The II
Air Corps increased the combat readiness of its bombers and fighters and
planned to employ its aircraft sparingly. Kesselring also ordered the II Air Corps
to prepare to accommodate reinforcements from X Air Corps that would be
transferred for short-term employment and would, in cooperation with the IAF,
strengthen the ground organization at Elmas, Sardinia. He also directed as a preparatory measure opening discussions with the IAF about joint employment of
88
the German and Italian forces in the pending operation.
The Allies learned through Enigma that the Luftwaffe had difficulty with supplies in Sardinia, which prevented the movement there of long-range bomber
forces and fighter operations to the full extent intended. They also had information that the Germans transferred from the eastern to western Mediterranean
forty to forty-five long-range bombers and six twin-engined fighters. This, in
turn, complicated the German situation in North Africa. Air Commander
(Fliegerfuehrer) Afrika was forced to shift operations on the front to provide
convoy escorts in the Tobruk area. If Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commander
of the Panzer Army Afrika (formerly Panzer Group Afrika) had been heavily engaged at the time, it seems doubtful whether even these limited reinforcements
could have been spared.89
On the morning of 8 August, a German report indicated (erroneously) that
one Argus-class carrier and four destroyers had sailed into Gibraltar. The
Abwehr reported intensive shipping traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar on the night
90
of 8–9 August.
Plans
The Germans and Italians prepared their plans separately. They decided to cooperate but to employ their forces independently in the forthcoming operation.
Specifically, the Luftwaffe’s II Air Corps in Sicily coordinated the planning of the
attacks with the sector command of the Italian Air Force in Sicily. However, they
91
conducted the attacks independently.
Supermarina (Italian naval headquarters) considered four possible courses of
action for the enemy in the pending operation. The first course of action was to
use superior naval strength for the protection of the convoy. The second course of
action open to the enemy was a sortie by the main battle force to provoke the Italians to react in force. The third course of action was to use a strong covering force
for the convoy to force a passage to the north of Pantelleria instead of turning
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westward at the entrance to Skerki Bank. The fourth course of action open to the
enemy was to carry out attacks by carrier-based aircraft on Sardinia aimed at de92
stroying the Italian airfields there and thereby facilitating the convoy passage.
Forces Available
The Germans and Italians possessed substantial and diverse forces in the theater
to inflict large losses on the Allied convoy and its covering forces. The Italians
had available for the operation 328 aircraft (ninety torpedo-bombers, sixty-two
bombers, twenty-five dive-bombers, and 151 fighters), while the Germans had
456 aircraft (328 dive-bombers, thirty-two high-level bombers, and ninety-six
93
fighters). The German II Air Corps mainly supported the Afrika Korps. The
major part of the newly trained torpedo-bombers moved from the Mediterranean to Norway in June 1942 and did not return in time for the operation. About
twenty Ju-88s from two air groups of the X Air Corps on Crete moved to Sicily
on 11 August and were ready for the action the next morning. An additional
eight Ju-88s from Crete flew to Sicily on 12 August after completing convoy es94
cort duties in the Aegean.
The Italian Navy theoretically had available for the operation four battleships, three heavy and ten light cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, twenty-eight
torpedo boats, and sixty-four submarines. However, the Italians were unable to
deploy most of their heavy ships because of the lack of fuel and adequate air
cover. The Italian Navy received only twelve thousand tons of fuel in June 1942,
enough to cover about one-fifth of that consumed by convoys (fuel reserves then
amounted to about 121,000 tons). The Italian battleships were directed to empty
their fuel for escorts. Because of this severe shortage of fuel, Mussolini suggested
to Hitler that further enemy attempts to supply Malta could be opposed only by
95
submarines and land-based aircraft. Supermarina was able to deploy for the
pending operation the 3rd (Naval) Division with three eight-inch cruisers
(Gorizia, Bolzano, and Trieste) and seven destroyers and the 7th (Naval) Division
with three six-inch cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and
Muzio Attendolo) and five destroyers plus eighteen submarines, and nineteen
torpedo boats (six MS [Motoscafo Siluranti] and thirteen MAS [Motoscafo
Armato Siluranti]). The Germans could deploy two U-boats and four S-boats
96
(torpedo boats).
The Italian and German air forces did not have a sufficient number of fighters
to escort surface ships, bombers, and torpedo bombers. Mussolini favored the use
of fighters to escort bombers instead, providing cover for surface forces to attack
97
the convoy. Kesselring did not approve the Italian request to provide air cover for
the Italian fleet. He believed that the Luftwaffe lacked a sufficient number of fight98
ers to provide escort for both his bombers and the Italian fleet. Reportedly,
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Kesselring was convinced that, based on the experience of the Second Battle of
Syrte (22 March 1942) and the encounter off Pantelleria (15 June 1942), the Ital99
ian heavy cruisers would not be successful even if they had air cover. The Germans used the pretext of the lack of fuel to refuse to provide air cover for the
100
Italian heavy surface forces. However, the German naval attaché in Rome, Admiral Eberhard Weichhold, argued that the Luftwaffe should provide air cover
for the Italian ships.101 The Italian Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ugo
Cavallero, thought that the Italian surface forces should be employed in the
forthcoming operation. However, the Supermarina did not want to take the responsibility of using its heavy surface forces without air cover.102
Operational Idea
The Axis operational idea was relatively simple compared to the one applied by
the Allies (see map 2). The Germans and Italians essentially followed almost the
same script as in their plan against the enemy major convoy in September 1941
(Operation HALBERD). Their plan envisaged a joint special air reconnaissance of
the western Mediterranean by the Italian and Luftwaffe aircraft on 11 and 12 Au103
gust. The Italian and German aircraft based on Sicily and Sardinia, the Italian
submarines and German U-boats, the Italian and German torpedo boats, and
minefields would be employed in the forms of successive barriers. These four
barriers were intended to cause the dispersal of the convoy and thereby allow
104
successful attack by a powerful cruiser-destroyer force.
The intent of the Germans and the Italians was to employ a force of
twenty-two torpedo-bombers heavily escorted by fighters, about 125
dive-bombers also with fighter escorts, and forty high-level bombers in a tightly
synchronized attack. The IAF would conduct the main attack. The Luftwaffe’s
air attacks would be conducted in two waves and be coordinated in terms of
105
time. The principal aim would be to destroy the enemy aircraft carriers first so
that they would be unable to intervene when the Italian heavy surface forces
106
closed in on the remnants of the convoy. The Italians planned to deploy seventeen submarines in the western Mediterranean while the Germans had only two
107
U-boats available. Seven Italian and two German U-boats would be deployed
108
north of Algeria between longitudes 01° 40' E and 02° 40' E. The Italians
would deploy ten submarines between Fratelli Rocks and the northern entrance
109
to the Skerki Bank. Some of these submarines would be positioned northwest
110
of Cape Bon to operate in cooperation with aircraft. In addition, an Italian
submarine would be deployed west of Malta, another off Navarino, and three
111
boats about a hundred miles west-southwest of Crete.
During the war, the Italians laid a large number of mines in the Sicilian Narrows between June 1940 and April 1942. About 2,320 mines were laid between
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Cape Granitola (at the southwestern tip of Sicily) and Pantelleria; 1,020 mines
between Pantelleria and Ras el Mustafa, Tunisia; 6,880 mines between the
Aegadian Islands (west of Trapani, Sicily) and Cape Bon; and 1,040 mines be112
tween Bizerte and Keith Rock. The Italians planned to lay down a temporary
minefield off Cape Bon by an Italian destroyer in the night of 12 August, or one
113
day before the enemy convoy was expected to transit the area. In the night of
12–13 August, the Italians planned to deploy nineteen Italian torpedo boats
(thirteen MAS, six MS) and four German S-boats south of Marettimo and off
114
Cape Bon and eventually off Pantelleria.
The Italian plan contemplated that the 3rd (Naval) Division and the 7th (Naval) Division would join about a hundred miles north of Pantelleria in the afternoon of 12 August and then sail on the intercept course south of Pantelleria
115
All’alba through the night of 12–13 August. They would attack the remnants
116
of the convoy and its direct screen (Force X) south of Pantelleria at first light.
They based this timing on the possibility that Axis aircraft could provide effective cover with fighters because of the larger number of enemy aircraft based on
Malta. Any Allied convoy from Egypt would be dealt with by the 8th (Naval) Di117
vision based at Navarino. However, the Italians changed this plan on 12 August because of its inadequate state of combat readiness. Instead, they directed
this division to move into the Ionian Sea to provide indirect support to the employment of the 3rd Naval Division. Eventually, they directed the 7th Naval Di118
vision to return to its base.
THE EXECUTION
Operation PEDESTAL began with the sortie of the Victorious group from Scapa
Flow on 31 July. On 5 August, this group started to exercise with the Indomitable
119
group and Force W from Freetown. A day later and for the next two days, all
three large aircraft carriers with their escorts less Furious took part in Operation
BERSERK between the Azores and Gibraltar as envisaged in the original plan.
The convoy, escorted by cruisers Nigeria and Kenya and destroyers, sailed
from the Clyde during the night of 2–3 August and joined the main body the
next morning. Prior to the sortie Admiral Burrough held a meeting on board his
flagship with the masters of all the merchant ships and explained the plan in detail. Shortly before Admiral Syfret left Scapa Flow, the Admiralty decided to exe120
cute Operation BELLOWS concurrently with Operation PEDESTAL. On 9
August, Force R left Gibraltar and sailed to a position south of Majorca.
The entire Force F passed through the Strait of Gibraltar on 10 August (D.1
121
Day) in a dense fog (see map 3). Transit was uneventful. Syfret mistakenly
believed that because of the poor visibility and moonless night it was unlikely
that enemy agents observed the Allied convoy. However, he subsequently
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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acknowledged that later reports showed that the enemy was “fully cognizant of
122
our passage of the strait.”
German Reports on the Convoy
The Germans had an approximately accurate picture of the movement of the enemy convoy and accompanying naval forces from their passage through the
Strait of Gibraltar during the night of 9–10 August until the end of the operation. Agents in the Gibraltar area and Ceuta made the initial sightings. Afterward the Germans and Italians received a steady stream of reports from their
reconnaissance aircraft and submarines. By intercepting and decoding Enigma
messages, the Allies for their part had almost perfect and timely information on
what the Germans knew and their planned reaction to the Allied movements
and actions.
At about 0800 on 10 August, German aircraft detected the enemy convoy sailing in three groups on an easterly course. At 1130, Tetuan was directed to pass
123
sighting reports from Alboran (Island) to Madrid. At 1245, the Germans reported that the enemy convoy was about seventy nautical miles north of Algiers.
The main group was composed of three battleships, probably Nelson class. The
convoy was accompanied by three carriers, including what the German erroneously believed was the USS Wasp, plus twenty to twenty-five cruisers and destroyers and twenty large steamers westward of the van. A southern group of six
destroyers was reported to be some seventy-five nautical miles northwest of Al124
giers. Melilla reported that by 1800 there were no enemy ships in sight. Madrid
directed both Tangier and Ceuta to increase a state of alertness. At 1700 on 10
August, a French aircraft reported two aircraft carriers, two battleships, two
cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve merchant vessels some fifty miles north
of Oran. This was the first sighting of the convoy passed by the French to the
125
Germans.
On the afternoon of 10 August, Kesselring learned, based on visual observation from Tarifa and Ceuta, that a large enemy convoy, appearing to be composed of forty to fifty units, including possibly two carriers and nineteen
freighters, had entered the Mediterranean. The Germans mistakenly assessed
that the carrier Argus was in Gibraltar. The enemy convoy was on an easterly
course at a speed of thirteen to fourteen knots. The Germans estimated that the
convoy would be south of Majorca by 0600 on 11 August and south of Sardinia
126
by the approximately same time the next day. The Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance
aircraft observed at about 1900 on 10 August some fifty-five nautical miles
north-northeast of Oran the enemy force composed of two battleships, two carriers, two cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve steamships on an easterly
course. The Germans falsely believed that the enemy ships carried about
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twenty-five thousand men. This information was based on the Abwehr’s erroneous report that thirty-seven enemy ships, including one aircraft carrier, three
cruisers, ten destroyers, three gunboats, and nineteen freighters had entered Gi127
braltar on 25 July.
Around noon on 10 August, Supermarina received information that about
128
fifty-seven British ships transited the Strait of Gibraltar on an easterly course.
One hour later the Italians comprehended that a large number of enemy warships and merchant vessels, including six large warships, had passed into the
Mediterranean during the night of 9–10 August. At 1800 the same day, the Italians believed that an enemy force comprising one battleship, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, twenty-three torpedo craft, and nineteen merchantmen were
present in the western Mediterranean.129 The Italians assumed that the British
carrier-based aircraft would attack the Italian air bases on Sardinia.
Supermarina estimated that the enemy convoy would transit longitude 10° E at
noon on 11 August and would reach Cape Bon around noon on 12 August. In
the following night, the convoy would pass through the Sicilian Narrows in the
130
area of Pantelleria.
Based on air reconnaissance reports, Kesselring directed Luftwaffe’s II Air
Corps to put its long-range bombers in the highest state of combat readiness. He
also ordered preparations for the transfer of aircraft from Sicily to Sardinia, including fighters. Kesselring transferred the Ju-88 torpedo-bomber squadron
based at Grosseto, Tuscany, to Catania, Sicily. However, because of the shortage
of fuel on Crete, it was not possible to use German transport aircraft to carry
personnel and torpedoes on 11 August. The Italian fighter aircraft would be
transferred from Sicily to Sardinia. It was also planned that the Italian fleet
would operate against the convoy as it had against the enemy convoy from the
131
west (Operation HARPOON) in mid-June 1942.
The Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean
The Germans and Italians had accurate knowledge of the operational situation in
the eastern Mediterranean. Based on British radio traffic, the Germans noted
considerable presence of British forces in the eastern Mediterranean operating in
conjunction with enemy forces in the western Mediterranean. Therefore, X Air
Corps ordered a comprehensive reconnaissance of the eastern Mediterranean east
of 25° E on the morning of 11 August. The Axis convoys in the central Mediterra132
nean would continue to run for the time being according to plan. On 10 August,
German intelligence reported intensive enemy activity in the eastern Mediterranean. The German aircraft detected a force of four enemy cruisers and ten destroyers about 150 nautical miles off Port Said on a westerly course. In Alexandria,
the Germans observed one enemy destroyer, six smaller naval vessels, and thirteen
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steamers. The German reconnaissance aircraft reported the presence at the
Suez anchorage of five enemy destroyers, one repair ship, and one Southampton134
class cruiser. The Abwehr had unconfirmed information that several loaded
freighters were at Alexandria and ready to sail for Malta on 12 August. This information, coupled with several sightings of enemy submarines off Italian and Greek
ports, led the Italians to believe that the enemy movement in the western Mediter135
ranean meant more than just a relief convoy to Malta.
Events on 11 August
By the morning of 11 August, the Allied convoy was south of the Balearics and
136
headed toward Cape Bon. At about 0620, a U-boat sighted the enemy convoy
and its screen. A German aircraft reported at 0815 the enemy convoy approxi137
mately ninety-five miles northwest of Algiers. Shadowing by the Ju-88 flying
between twenty and twenty-four thousand feet started at about 0830 and continued throughout the day. Despite the presence of the enemy submarines, Force
R refueled all three cruisers and twenty-six destroyers.138
At about noon, the convoy was about seventy-five miles south of Majorca and
sailing straight east on a zigzag course. Operation BELLOWS was executed between 1230 and 1515 from a position of approximately 585 miles from Malta.
Out of thirty-eight Spitfires that flew-off from Furious, all but one machine
139
reached Malta safely. The Allies suffered a major loss when U-73 penetrated
the screen and sank with four torpedoes the 27,230-ton (full load) carrier Eagle
140
about eighty miles north of Algiers. The carrier sank in only eight minutes;
260 men and all aircraft were lost. The Allied ships suffered attacks from six
groups of six to twelve Ju-88s at dusk on 11 August; however, they reported no
damage.
The Allies learned from Enigma that at 1155 on 11 August, the Italian
six-inch cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Raimondo Montecuccoli (7th Division)
based at Cagliari were directed by Supermarina to be at two hours’ notice from
1800 on 11 August. These cruisers, together with eight-inch cruisers Bolzano
and Gorizia at Messina, were informed at 1300 that the Italian submarines were
operating in an area sixty miles long and forty miles wide north of Bizerte. Three
enemy submarines were observed leaving Cagliari at 2045 on 11 August. At 1800
on 11 August, the six-inch cruisers Raimondo Montecuccoli and Eugenio di
141
Savoia and two destroyers sailed from Cagliari on an easterly course.
Allied intelligence learned on 11 August that the Panzerarmee Afrika believed
that the enemy convoy in the western Mediterranean posed a direct threat to
Tobruk. Hence, the Germans issued orders for the highest degree of alert for
their forces and took a series of defensive measures. Kesselring believed that the
enemy might try to land on the North African coast. The next day, he issued the
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order of the day, in which he suggested that such landings would influence operations in Africa, something the Axis must not allow to happen. On the same day,
the Luftwaffe’s air district (Luftgau) Afrika apparently believed that the landing
142
might take place at Tripoli on 13 or 14 August.
Situation and Actions on 12 August
At 0020 on 12 August, the Allies learned that Italian intelligence had sighted four
enemy cruisers and ten destroyers; part of the convoy from Gibraltar, the Italians
143
thought, might be proceeding to the eastern Mediterranean. They also intercepted and decoded operation orders issued by the II Air Corps for 12 August to
the 77th fighter wing based at Elmas, Sardinia, to expect an enemy formation approaching the Sicilian Narrows in the early morning of 12 August. The II Air
Corps would cooperate with the IAF in Sicily and Sardinia from the early morning of 12 August onward to attack and destroy enemy merchant vessels before
144
they could reach Malta. They would operate in waves with fighter escorts.
Allied intelligence concluded that the movement of a large convoy with
strong naval forces from Gibraltar, in conjunction with diversionary naval operation in the eastern Mediterranean, had a major effect on the Germans and the
Italians. It induced a sense of great uncertainty and apprehension along the entire North African coast and in Crete lest a landing take place. The Allied movements also forced the Germans to take several precautionary measures. The
Germans recognized by 11 August that if a threat to Crete existed it would materialize before 14 August. The Allies had little further indication that the Ger145
mans were much concerned at this possibility. On 12 August, the Germans
initiated defensive measures in the Benghazi-Tripoli area. One single-engine
fighter squadron and the available long-range bombers based at Derna were prepared to move to Benghazi or Tripoli as necessary. The Ju-52s essential for the
transport of ground personnel, equipment, and ammunition were put in readiness. Panzerarmee Afrika held motorized detachments ready to repel landings.
It moved some forces to the Sollum–Mersa Matruh area to defend the coast east
of Tobruk with three large motorized groups of artillery. At 0700 on 12 August,
146
all the shipping from North Africa to Italy and the Aegean was suspended. In
the late afternoon on 12 August, the Luftwaffe believed that the British might attempt a landing at Tripoli on 13 or 14 August. Hence, they sent fighters and
dive-bombers there from Sicily with supplies of ammunition and fuel. The Ger147
mans also took precautions in case the Allies threatened Benghazi.
On 12 August, the Allies intercepted a message from the CINC Luftwaffe
Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering stating that the Luftwaffe units under CINC
South (Kesselring) “will operate with no other thought in mind than the destruction of the British convoy.” He ordered the first operations directed against
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enemy aircraft carriers and transports. “The destruction of this convoy is of de148
cisive importance.”
By reading Enigma messages the Allies learned that at 1830 on 12 August the
Luftwaffe was informed that an S-boat flotilla of five (actually four) boats was
due to sail from Porto Empedocle, Sicily, at 1600 on 12 August on a westerly
course for Cape Bon. After completing their mission, the enemy torpedo boats
would leave Cape Bon at about 0430 on 13 August sailing on a northerly course
as far as 39° N and then turn south toward Marettimo and then hug the coast to
149
Augusta. The Allies also received the information that at 2145 on 12 August,
the II Air Corps assessed that the enemy forces in the western Mediterranean
consisted of fifty-one ships including two carriers, two battleships, seven cruisers, and twenty destroyers. The Germans erroneously believed in the presence of
one U.S. Yorktown-class aircraft carrier but correctly identified the presence of
the battleships Rodney and Nelson. They also estimated that the convoy consisted of thirteen freighters totaling some 105,000 tons. Defense of the enemy
150
convoy consisted of ten to sixteen fighters and strong AA fire of all calibers.
The enemy aircraft started to shadow Force F at 0500 on 12 August; throughout
the day, the Allied forces were under continuous observation by the German and
Italian bombers. The enemy bombers were progressively more strongly protected
by the fighters. Throughout the day, there were numerous attacks on the Allied
ships by the Italian high-level bombers and the German dive-bombers. In their efforts to sink as many enemy ships as possible, the German and Italian aircraft used
151
every type of attack, including laying mines ahead of the Allied ships.
On the afternoon of 12 August, the German aircraft received orders that un152
der no circumstances were they to attack damaged ships or those left behind.
The enemy aircraft were present in large numbers from 1600 to 2000. Between
1800 and 1850 there was a very heavy attack by about forty Ju-88s and Ju-87s coordinated with about twenty Italian Cant 1007 torpedo-bombers. Three bombs
struck the carrier Indomitable, with two or three near misses. Indomitable was
unable to operate aircraft but was capable of steaming at twenty-eight and a half
153
knots. An aerial torpedo hit the destroyer Foresight and friendly forces subsequently sank it. In the attacks during the day, the Germans believed that they
damaged one enemy aircraft carrier, cruiser, and destroyer each plus one
154
twenty-thousand-ton merchant ship.
Originally Syfret intended that Force Z would turn westward upon reaching
the Skerki Bank at 1915 and he informed the fleet accordingly. However, because
of the twenty-minute delay in reaching the position due to the enemy air attacks,
he made a decision to turn Force Z westward at 1855, while Force X would proceed to Malta. The enemy apparently did not notice the withdrawal of Force Z
until 2030. In view of the magnitude of enemy air attacks from 1830 to 1850,
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Syfret believed that it was unlikely that the enemy would carry out any further
major attack before dark. He also hoped, as it turned out quite mistakenly, that
reaching Skerki Bank would eliminate the danger from enemy submarines. In
his view, the greatest dangers to Force X were enemy torpedo boats during the
night and aircraft by day. However, it was exactly after Force Z reversed its course
westward that the Ju-87 attacked Force X and the convoy between 2000 and
2100. Around 2000, the Italian submarines torpedoed cruisers Nigeria and Cairo
and the tanker Ohio. Nigeria was damaged but was able to return to Gibraltar,
while Ohio was towed to Malta. Cairo was abandoned and eventually sank. At
2112, the cruiser Kenya was also torpedoed and damaged by an Italian submarine, while one freighter (Deucalion) was torpedoed and sunk at 2212 near the
155
Cani Rocks in the Sicilian Narrows.
The Allies obtained information from Enigma that the eight-inch cruiser
Trieste sailed to the southward from a northern Tyrrhenian port during the
night of 11–12 August. Between 0840 and 1000 on 12 August eight-inch cruisers
Bolzano and Gorizia with four destroyers sailed from Messina northward and at
0930, the six-inch cruiser Muzio Attendolo with two destroyers sailed from Na156
ples. The Enigma intercepts indicated that an unknown Italian naval force received orders at 1835 on 12 August to proceed south at twenty knots and join
with other forces some ninety miles north of Trapani. These were probably
cruisers from Messina and Cagliari. At 1945, Rome directed these forces to be
ten miles east of Pantelleria at 0530 the next morning. Rome also informed the
cruiser force that all Italian torpedo boats would patrol the area west of 11° 40' E
with orders to leave their patrol at dawn on 13 August and proceed toward
Pantelleria. At 2200, the cruiser force was directed to reduce speed to arrive off
San Vito, northeast of Trapani, not before midnight on 12–13 August. However,
at 2345 on 12 August they abruptly abandoned this operation. Cruisers Eugenio
di Savoia and Raimondo Montecuccoli with three destroyers received orders to
proceed to Naples, while cruisers Gorizia, Bolzano, Trieste, and Muzio Attendolo
157
and the remaining destroyers would proceed to Messina. The reason for this
decision was probably the RAF’s demonstration to convince the enemy that a
158
much larger striking force was on the way to attack the Italian surface force.
Actions on 12–13 August
At about midnight on 12–13 August the Allied convoy passed through the enemy mine fields in the Sicilian Narrows. The attenuated line of merchant ships
and the reduced number of escort ships provided many opportunities for attacks by enemy torpedo boats lying in ambushing position off Kelibia, near Cape
Bon. In the subsequent attacks by the enemy torpedo boats, they torpedoed and
sank the cruiser Manchester and three merchant ships. In the morning, another
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merchant vessel was lost from either a torpedo fired by an enemy boat or a mine.
These night attacks added to the convoy’s disorganization. At daylight the scattered ships were comparatively easy prey for enemy aircraft. By 0700 Force X and
the convoy were about 120 miles west of Malta. In the attacks by the enemy aircraft, three more merchant ships were sunk. At about 1600, the Malta Escort
159
Force took over the protection of the convoy and Force X turned westward. In
the early morning of 13 August, a British submarine (Unbroken) fired four torpedoes from its ambushing position some twelve miles south of Stromboli Island, hitting and damaging heavy cruiser Bolzano and light cruiser Muzio
160
Attendolo.
OPERATION M.G. 3 FAILS
As planned, the Allies carried out Operation M.G. 3, a feint to distract enemy attention in the eastern Mediterranean. The convoy, M.W.12, composed of three
merchant ships, sailed out of Port Said after dusk on 10 August, accompanied by
two cruisers, ten destroyers, and two escorts, while one merchant ship escorted
by two cruisers and three destroyers left Haifa at 0300 on 11 August. These two
forces were concentrated in the early morning of 11 August and sailed westward
to the longitude of Alexandria; afterward they turned back and dispersed. The
intention was to lure the Italian 8th (Naval) Division at Navarino and to keep
161
down the Luftwaffe’s aircraft on Crete. The German aircraft observed these
movements. In the early morning of 12 August, Kesselring informed X Air Corps
of the position (33° 40' N and 28° 34' E) of four enemy merchant vessels, six
cruisers, and an unknown number of destroyers sailing on a northeasterly
course at a speed of twelve knots. He believed that this convoy was possibly an
English wireless-telegraphy spoof. However, Kesselring did not exclude the possibility of a simultaneous supply operation from the eastern Mediterranean. He
ordered the X Air Corps to arrange exhaustive reconnaissance of the entire east162
ern Mediterranean area on the morning of 12 August.
In the night of 12–13 August the Allied cruisers and destroyers shelled the
port of Rhodes, while the RAF aircraft attacked airfield Maritsa (on the northern
tip of Rhodes) during the day. A British submarine debarked commandos at
Simeto, near Catania, to put explosives to the pylons. However, the Italians were
apparently not surprised by the Allied actions. Their 8th (Naval) Division remained at port. The Germans detached one of their destroyers from escort duty
and sent it to reinforce the Italian forces. The Italians held up local traffic along
the North African coast and stopped the shipping traffic between Italy and
Greece. Operation M.G. 3 failed to deceive the Axis and reduce the intensity of
163
its attacks on the main convoy in the western Mediterranean.
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FINAL MOVEMENTS
The Allies also executed Operation ASCENDANT as originally planned. Force Y left
Malta about 2030 on 10 August. It reached the area of Cape Bon the next day and
arrived at Gibraltar at about 1000 on 14 August. The carrier Furious and accompanying five destroyers arrived at Gibraltar at 1900 on 12 August. Force R cruised in
the western basin until it was certain that it would not be required; then it received
164
orders to return to Gibraltar, arriving in the morning of 16 August.
Despite the enemy’s all-out effort to destroy the remnants of the Allied convoy,
five ships eventually reached Malta. Two of these ships had sustained so much
165
damage that they almost sank. The tanker Ohio survived but never sailed
again. The Allies lost one carrier (Eagle), two cruisers (Manchester and Cairo),
and one destroyer (Foresight), while another carrier (Indomitable), two cruisers
(Nigeria and Kenya), and three destroyers were put out of commission for a considerable time. Some 350 men lost their lives. The Fleet Air Arm lost thirteen air166
craft in combat and sixteen Sea Hurricanes (sunk with Eagle). The Allies were
unable to risk such losses again soon after the completion of Operation
PEDESTAL. They would not attempt another large convoy operation to resupply
167
Malta until November 1942.
The Axis forces did not accomplish their stated operational objective, although they achieved a great tactical victory. Especially noteworthy were the
successes achieved by the Italian MS/MAS. The German U-boat sank one aircraft carrier while the Italian submarines sank one cruiser (Cairo) and two merchant ships. The Italian and German torpedo boats sank one cruiser
168
(Manchester) and three merchant ships. The Axis aircraft damaged one carrier
(Indomitable) and three merchant vessels. An Italian submarine damaged one
enemy cruiser (Nigeria), and an Italian submarine damaged another cruiser
(Kenya). Italian and German torpedo boats crippled two merchant vessels. An
169
Italian submarine and the German bombers heavily damaged the tanker Ohio.
Allied submarines damaged two Italian cruisers (Bolzano and Muzio Attendolo),
170
and neither again put to sea. The Axis lost forty-two aircraft. Allied destroyers
sank two Italian submarines (Cobalto and Dagabur), while the Allied aircraft
171
damaged one Italian submarine (Giada).
Despite heavy losses, Operation PEDESTAL was in retrospect a clear operational success for the Allies. About thirty-two thousand tons of supplies arrived
safely, allowing Malta to survive for another ten weeks. By 22 August, all cargo
was unloaded from the five surviving ships as well as fifteen thousand tons of
fuel carried by Ohio. The enemy did not attempt to interfere with the unloading
172
of cargo. While Operation PEDESTAL was in progress, three Allied submarines
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carried ammunition, torpedoes, and aviation fuel from the east to Malta. The
supply trips with Allied submarines continued in September and October
173
1942. These supplies allowed the Allied submarines and aircraft to intensify
their attacks on the Axis supplies to North Africa during the most decisive phase
of the campaign. The Allies were able to obtain air superiority over Malta and
thereby dramatically change the situation in the central Mediterranean to their
174
favor. During September 1942, the Allies sank more than 100,000 tons of enemy supplies destined for North Africa. By mid-October, the Afrika Korps had
only three days’ supply in reserve instead of the minimum fifteen days’ to start an
offensive. In November 1942, the Axis lost the Battle of El Alamein and the tide
175
of war in North Africa turned in the Allied favor.
CONCLUSION
Operation PEDESTAL took place at a time when the Allied fortunes in the Mediterranean were at their nadir. The island of Malta was close to being unable to
serve as the air and submarine base for the Allied efforts against the Axis forces
in North Africa. The Axis forces on the ground were forced to stop their advance
after the inconclusive first battle of El Alamein. However, the German and Italian forces were still within striking distance of the Nile Valley. They were preparing to resume their advance and seize Egypt as soon as they had sufficient reserve
of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. For the Allies, it was vital that Malta remained in their hands; otherwise, the Axis would be able to resume its advance
and by seizing Egypt radically improve its position in the Middle East. The operational decision to run a major resupply operation to Malta was made by the
strategic leadership in London, not by the Admiralty or the fleet commanders in
the theater.
In the summer of 1942, the Allied command organization in the Mediterranean was highly fragmented. No single commander had the authority and responsibility for the planning and employment of all three services. The basic
plan for the operation was prepared in London. Plans in support of the operation were prepared by the respective service component commanders in the
Mediterranean. These headquarters were separated by long distances. The mission’s success depended almost entirely on cooperation among the services.
However, strong parochialism among services made that task very difficult. The
British army was unwilling to support the operation by conducting a diversionary attack although the survival of Malta was vital for the Allied campaign in
North Africa.
The Allies’ single greatest advantage was their ability to timely intercept and
decode the German Enigma messages. This, in turn, allowed Allied commanders
to obtain generally accurate and detailed knowledge of the enemy’s plans,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010

NWCR_Winter2010_john.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5294_NWC_Review_Winter2010\NWCR_Winter2010_john.vp
Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:28:44 AM

149

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

144

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 1, Art. 24

actions, and pending reactions. The Allies possessed excellent knowledge of the
strength and the planned movements of the Luftwaffe’s units in the Mediterranean. They also had reliable knowledge of the strength and movement of Italian
submarines and surface forces. Their assessment of the U-boats’ strength was
faulty.
Planning for Operation PEDESTAL was soundly based and very thorough. A
major problem was to assign a sufficient number of freighters for the new resupply effort, because of the Allied commitments to supply Soviet Russia. Another
problem was to assemble a powerful force for providing distant cover and support and direct screen of the convoy, because the Allies’ naval commitments in
the British home waters and in the Indian Ocean were stretched to the limit. The
Allies learned proper lessons from the failure of the dual convoy operation in
June 1942 and applied them for the planning of Operation PEDESTAL. The geography of the western and central Mediterranean was a major and negative planning factor in Operation PEDESTAL. The long distances from Gibraltar to Malta,
combined with the proximity of the Axis airfields, dictated the type and number
of forces for support and the method of their combat employment.
Lack of adequate air strength on Malta greatly complicated the Allied problem of ensuring the success of the operation. The Allies lacked a sufficient number of heavy bombers on Malta to inflict substantial damage to the enemy air
bases on Sicily and Sardinia. They also lacked fighters to provide for the safety of
the convoy once it came within their striking range.
The Allied feint in the eastern Mediterranean was poorly conceived, because
the objectives in the pending operation were so obvious to the enemy. Also,
forces assigned to the feint were insufficient to compel the Germans and Italians
to weaken their forces in the western and central Mediterranean. Only a viable
threat of the Allied invasion of Crete or mainland Greece would have forced the
enemy to react operationally or even strategically. It was also quite possible that a
sizable diversionary attack by the British army in the Libyan Desert might have
forced the Germans and the Italians to divert some of their land-based aircraft
from attacking Force F.
The Axis command organization in the Mediterranean lacked not only unity
of command but also unity of effort. Both the Germans and the Italians had a
separate command structure. Each coalition partner prepared plans separately.
The German theater structure was also highly fragmented. Although Kesselring
was nominally in command of the entire southern theater, he was not in control
of the Axis campaign in North Africa, nor did he have de facto control over the
employment of the German naval forces. The Italian command organization
was chaotic because there were overlapping responsibilities and authority over
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various service forces. The higher naval authorities also constantly interfered
with the decisions and actions of subordinate tactical commanders.
The Axis powers had limited capability to intercept and decode the enemy radio messages. They relied mostly on air reconnaissance and submarine reports
for acquiring information on the locations, compositions, and movements of
the enemy forces. Yet they had a solid network of agents on both sides of the
Strait of Gibraltar. They also apparently had some agents in the Suez Canal zone.
Because of the lack of good intelligence prior to the movement of the enemy
forces, the Axis leaders made plans for the operation in mid-August largely as a
reaction to enemy actions. Nevertheless, the German and the Italian plans for
the employment of their forces were solidly based. They commanded an extremely favorable geographic position for the operations of their forces. A large
number of the Italian airfields and naval bases flanked the route of the enemy
convoys in the western and central Mediterranean. The Axis aircraft and surface
forces based on Sardinia and Sicily operated from exterior positions but along
the short lines of operations. The single major error on the German side was
Kesselring’s decision not to provide strong air cover for the Italian heavy surface
forces.
The Germans and Italians had a large number of land-based aircraft available
for attack on the enemy convoy and supporting forces in the western and central
Mediterranean. The Germans were also able to redeploy some of their aircraft
from Crete to Sicily. Despite the large number of aircraft, the Axis lacked a sufficient number of fighters to provide escort to bombers and cover to surface ships.
The lack of fuel essentially immobilized the Italian battleships. The Italians were
able to assemble relatively large number of submarines in the western part of the
Mediterranean, while the Germans had only two U-boats available.
The Axis commanders had a reasonably accurate picture of the situation in
the western Mediterranean once the enemy convoy transited the Strait of Gibraltar. Most of their intelligence came from reports from the reconnaissance
aircraft. The Germans and the Italians exaggerated the true capabilities of the
Allied force that entered into the Mediterranean. The probable reason for that
was the sheer size of the Allied surface forces assigned in support of the convoy.
Both the German and Italian pilots showed a great deal of determination, skill,
and courage in their repeated attacks against the convoy and its supporting
forces. The Italian submarines and the U-boats achieved great success in their
attacks against both surface ships and merchant vessels. Most surprising were
the successes of the Italian and German torpedo boats against the scattered convoy on the night of 12–13 August. Yet the Germans and the Italians made a major
mistake in their decision to focus their attacks on the enemy’s undamaged ships.
This was most likely the reason that the oiler Ohio survived and safely reached
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Malta. The Italian decision to cancel the planned attack on the remnants of the
convoy by heavy surface forces was a great mistake and probably cost the Axis
not only tactical but also operational success.
The Allies had an almost uninterrupted stream of decoded Enigma messages,
giving them unprecedented knowledge and understanding of the enemy situation, plans, and pending actions. The Allied commanders knew the German orders of the day and their intentions. Despite great odds, the Allied airmen and
sailors displayed a superb fighting spirit. This was especially true of the merchant mariners. One of the major errors on the Allied side was the decision,
based on false assumptions, to turn Force Z westward. That decision resulted in
heavy Allied losses. The Allied operation M.G. 3 failed to make any impression
on the Axis commanders. This was not a surprise, because the Allies had based
the entire effort on a faulty assumption. It represented a waste of time and sorely
needed resources.
OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
One should try to identify possible lessons for the future by in-depth study of a
major operation or campaign; otherwise, there is little value in studying a naval
history for future commanders and planners. In general, the lessons learned
should be based on one’s conclusion pertaining to a certain combat action.
These lessons can be tactical or operational in terms of their scope. They should
be derived from the study of actions by both friendly and enemy forces. The operational lessons learned are generally more important than tactical lessons.
Their value does not become obsolete with the passage of time, because they are
focused on the human element, not materiel. The study of a single major operation or campaign can provide only tentative lessons learned. However, the more
historical case studies are used, the more valuable operational lessons are. One
can derive the following operational lessons from the study of Operation
PEDESTAL of mid-August:

• A strategic leadership should not normally make decisions that rightfully
belong to the operational or tactical commanders. An exception is when
the strategic situation is so serious and the lack of decisive action might
have a major impact on the course or even outcome of war in a certain theater. Then only strategic leadership can ensure that adequate forces are
available or become available to accomplish the ultimate objective of a major operation or campaign.

• In making a decision, the operational commander should always carefully
weigh the potential risks versus the benefits of not only the pending major
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operation but also the effect on the campaign as a whole. In some situations, the potential losses in the pending operation might be prohibitively
high. Yet taking such a high but prudent risk can be justified if the outcome
of the operation would result in gaining valuable time for a campaign as a
whole.

• The closest degree of cooperation among services during planning and execution of a major operation or campaign should not be left at the discretion of individual commanders but should be based on appointing a single
commander, thereby ensuring unity of effort through unity of command.
The lines of authority and responsibilities should be simple and clear at all
levels of command, but especially at the operational and theater-strategic
levels. A single commander and staff should optimally conduct planning
for major operations. The commanders who planned the operations should
also execute it.

• The excessive parochialism of services is one of the major factors for the
lack of necessary cooperation in drafting plans for a major operation or
campaign. It is also one of the major causes of duplication of effort,
thereby resulting in the waste of sorely needed resources and time.

• The ability to obtain accurate, reliable, timely, and relevant information on
the enemy order of battle, plans, intentions, and movements is of inestimable value during the planning and execution of a major operation or campaign. However, the importance of good intelligence should not be
overestimated. Having what is today called “information dominance” is
only one, and often not even the most important, among many factors in
making a sound decision. Much more important is the commander’s experience, character traits, and sound judgment. An operational commander
might also make a sound decision but still suffer a setback or even defeat
from a weaker opponent who acts faster without waiting to have a perfect
knowledge of the situation. In some situations, the weaker side can be more
successful without having the knowledge of the stronger side’s plans and
intentions but occupying a much more favorable geographic position,
having numerical or qualitative superiority, and acting with greater speed
and determination.

• In planning a major operation, the commander should avoid adding tasks
unrelated to the accomplishment of the ultimate operational objective. Additional tasks not only unnecessarily complicate the basic plan but also reduce available forces for the accomplishment of the main objective.
Additional tasks also usually require more time for their accomplishment
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and thereby might considerably complicate or even endanger the outcome
of a major operation.

• A major operation is likely to be more successful if the planners also prepare a plausible operational deception plan. Hence, various feints, demonstrations, or ruses should not be conducted in isolation but should be
invariably integral to such a plan. A feint or operational deception is unlikely to be successful if the objective is too transparent to the enemy.
Forces assigned to operational deception should pose such a threat as to
lead the enemy to react operationally or even strategically, not tactically.

• Warfare in a typical narrow sea (enclosed or semi-enclosed sea) differs considerably from warfare on the open ocean or littorals bordering the open
ocean. The successful employment of one’s forces operating in a narrow sea
cannot be ensured without having an adequate degree of air superiority in
a given area of operations. Land-based aircraft are a formidable threat to
one’s surface ships operating in a narrow sea. This threat can be neutralized
effectively only by having one’s own superior airpower.

• Narrow seas also allow a weaker side at sea to inflict substantial losses on its
stronger opponent by skillful use of favorable geographic position, submarines, small surface combatants, and mines.
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“THE LATTER TEND ALSO TO BE THE FORMER”
Gray, Colin S. National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books, 2009. 334pp. $29.95

Colin Gray’s highly engaging book addresses a spectrum of national security
considerations that are likely to impact
the United States in the coming years.
Gray, who is a professor at the University of Reading and served for five years
in the Ronald Reagan administration,
argues that America’s sports-mindedness
has culturally prepared Americans to
think in terms of winning and losing
and of confrontations that have a beginning, middle, and end. In this light,
the former expression of art “Global
War on Terrorism,” one that President
Obama has dispensed with, leads us to
overlook the eternal nature of the struggle against individual and small-group
violence. Gray convincingly observes
that the conflict the United States has
embarked upon after September 11
“bears more resemblance to a protracted hunt than it does to what most
people understandably call a war.”
Gray warns that although we cannot
control surprise, we can control our reaction to it—a particularly important
observation for the current geostrategic
environment. His call for the United
States to develop a “detailed, culturally

empathetic understanding of its new
adversaries” is particularly apt. One is
left with the task of struggling to choose
which arguments should be highlighted.
Even the chapter on understanding revolutionary changes in warfare, a topic
that received too much attention after
the 1991 Persian Gulf war, is rewarding.
Gray points out that though the term is
of use, one cannot assess the true nature
of a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) outside the wider political,
strategic, and social context. For example, Germany’s successes in May 1940
were due as much to French mistakes as
to Nazi military innovation.
In addition, at a number of points
throughout the book Gray makes the
cogent point that the United States
could easily spend too much time looking for, or attempting to create, the
next RMA and put too little effort into
understanding social and cultural
changes in how it views war. I believe
Gray coined the term “Revolution in
Attitudes toward the Military” to argue
that variations in acceptable military
practices and the need to understand
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the cultural implications of violence
will be increasingly important.
I would offer two minor critiques. Gray
may have set the bar too high when he
argues at length that the United States
suffers “a persistent strategy deficit.”
Doesn’t history offer more than a handful of examples of powerful states that
demonstrated superb long-range strategic planning, in particular during
peacetime? I wonder if one can agree
with the great majority of Gray’s individual critiques on American strategic
practices and yet be skeptical that a
broad-gauge indictment is warranted.
Also, when I read the brief section in
which he argues that al-Qa‘ida could
potentially be deterred, I remained unconvinced. The facts that al-Qa‘ida protects its key members and that some of
the organization’s support system may
be deterrable are far from demonstrating that “the organization itself . . .
should be eminently deterrable.” However, these are two minor points regarding a commendable work that engages a
wide array of security considerations
and offers much engaging and original
thinking.
As Gray notes regarding his subtitle,
“the latter tend also to be the former.”
Colin Gray’s work offers many important arguments and observations that
will help identify both.
ANDREW L. STIGLER

Naval War College

Stuart, Douglas T. Creating the National Security
State: A History of the Law That Transformed
America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
2008. 342pp. $38.50

Douglas Stuart holds the J. William
Stuart and Helen D. Stuart Chair in International Studies, Business and
Management at Dickinson College and
is an adjunct professor at the U.S. Army
War College. He provides an insightful
history of the struggle to reform completely the U.S. national security establishment from 1937 to 1960, an effort
that resulted in the creation of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and three
separate armed service departments under a secretary of defense.
This extensively researched study of the
political and bureaucratic battles to establish control over the national security establishment holds invaluable
lessons for those interested in the current efforts to reform the joint, interagency system to better develop,
resource, and execute a coherent national security policy and strategy.
Prior to World War II, Edward
Pendleton Herring of Harvard identified problems with the existing foreign
and defense policy-making system. The
United States was wedded to isolationism and antimilitarism, with narrow
domestic political interests that shaped
its foreign and defense policies.
Pendleton Herring introduced the
“concept of national security” and was
visionary in proposing an alternative
national security system. Pearl Harbor
quickly changed the way Americans
thought about security. The fact that
the United States was attacked from
such distance firmly “established the
concept of national security as an unchallengeable standard against which all
future foreign policy decisions were to
be made.”
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Stuart describes the significant roles
played by presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower; secretaries of state George
Marshall and Dean Acheson; Secretary
of Defense James Forrestal; Congressman Carl Vinson; policy adviser
Ferdinand Eberstadt; and Pendleton
Herring. He explains how national security was managed during the war,
how the Joint Chiefs’ power grew, the
marginalization of the State Department, and the lessons learned. There is
also a discussion of the unsuccessful efforts made by Truman, Marshall, and
the Army leadership to unify the services. Forrestal and the Navy opposed
unification, proposing an alternative
national security system developed by
the Unification Study Group, chaired
by Eberstadt, with Pendleton Herring’s
participation. The bureaucratic battles
lasted over three years and resulted in
the 1947 National Security Act, which
created a National Military Establishment, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, secretary of
defense, Air Force, and three other institutions that soon disappeared. Stuart
identifies this system’s severe flaws, especially the limited powers granted to
the secretary of defense and the statutory membership of the three services
in the NSC with the secretary of defense. In 1949, 1958, and with Eisenhower’s reorganization plan of 1953,
these flaws were rectified. There follows
a discussion of the reasons for this final
transition from a National Military Establishment to a Department of Defense
and the creation of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, with the three services removed from the NSC, becoming
now departments under the defense
secretary. Stuart’s lucid analysis of
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lessons learned is a must-read for future
reform efforts.
RICHMOND M. LLOYD

Naval War College

Tangredi, Sam J. Futures of War: Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment,
2010–2035. Newport, R.I.: Alidade, 2008. 273pp.
$20

What Sam Tangredi offers here is not a
standard attempt at predicting the near
future of warfare but rather a synthesis
of various competing predictions and
analyses.
The book is a follow-up to his earlier
book All Possible Wars (2004), the object of which was to inform political decision making in the realm of defense
planning. One hopes that this latest effort does not follow the fate of its predecessor, which Tangredi freely admits
remained largely ignored by its target
audience.
A “reinvestigation and rewrite rather
than a revision,” the work has as its explicitly stated purpose “to provide—not
an independent forecast—but a comparative analysis of current studies of
the future security environment in order to support upcoming reviews of
America’s defense posture.”
Methodologically speaking, the work is
comprehensive, drawing from forty different studies. Each study is rigorously
surveyed, analyzed, and compared with
others for points of agreement and
dissention. Points of consensus and divergence are tested against the sources
to distinguish dissenting positions from
points of consensus and to validate
consensus as a majority view.
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This methodology, “Representative
Source Comparative Analysis” (RSCA),
identifies threats, conflicts, and drivers, the latter incorporating ideologies,
economic factors, and technology.
The sources are, like this study,
authoritative.
Chapter 5 contains the bulk of the work
by identifying “common assessments
and consensus.” Dividing the analysis
into categories of threats, military technology, and opposing strategies, which
are then subdivided into eighteen
subscenarios, Tangredi makes an effective comprehensive and succinct examination of the literature to provide a
review of the various studies in each
case, explaining what arises in consensus and in opposition.
The intention of chapter 6, “Divergence
and Contradictions,” is to capture the
essence of basic divergent views and examines ten “either-or” propositions. In
this instance, these are broken into various category headings, such as nature of
conflict (which replaces military technology), threats, and opposing strategies. The chapter is simple, clear, to the
point, and—although the substance is
more complicated than the author represents it to be—credible.
In chapter 7, “Wild Cards and Hedging
Scenarios,” touching on the bane of defense planners everywhere, the book inevitably loses some of its certainty—a
point not lost on Tangredi. Yet he cleverly utilizes the “wild card” and the
“hedging scenario” to provide a conceptual overlay that, he argues, enables
the assessment of an adopted defense
policy’s flexibility and baseline
assumptions.
One caveat is, naturally, that in dealing
with this subject, what was once the

future quickly becomes the past. This is
the case, for example, regarding wildcard scenarios, where a global economic
collapse is discussed. This has arguably
happened since publication.
Futures of War is certainly worthy of the
attention of U.S. defense policy makers,
but it is impossible to know if this work
will follow its predecessor and be ignored as well.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN

Deputy Director, Centre for Security Studies
University of Hull

Graham, Gordon. Ethics and International Relations. 2nd ed. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell,
2008. 223pp. $21.95

In today’s world, citizens, statesmen,
and men and women in uniform are
faced almost daily with real questions
about terrorism, torture, humanitarian
intervention, and foreign assistance.
They must return again and again to
the problem of determining when the
use of military force might be an appropriate response to the horrors of the
day. For these individuals Gordon Graham’s Ethics and International Relations
is an invaluable work. It is stimulating,
challenging, insightful, and, perhaps
most unusually, helpful. Not by any
stretch of the imagination is this a
“how-to” book, with explicit guidance
or facile answers. Rather, it represents
an understanding of the contending
logics that lead to competing conclusions about right or wrong action, or
nonaction, on the global stage.
Graham, a distinguished philosopher
now holding the Henry Luce III Chair
at the Princeton Theological Seminary,
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updates and expands here his original
1997 publication, tackling issues that
have emerged in the last decade. This
revised work retains the extraordinary
merits of the earlier. The author brings
wonderful clarity of logic and presentation to what, in other hands, is often a
confused mess of unconnected arguments, claims, counterarguments, and
counterclaims. Graham offers his presentation without disparaging or giving
short shrift to anyone, exploring realist,
various moralist, and what he terms
“Legalist” traditions of international
ethics, the assumptions and reasoning
built into them, the criticisms that have
been leveled against them, and possible
responses to these criticisms.
Graham himself is neither, on the one
hand, utopian nor, on the other hand,
dismissive of ethical concerns. In the
“Legalist” tradition, Graham stresses
the moral disanalogies between states
and individuals (a difference that “Moralist” approaches often regard as unimportant), argues the need to consider
both natural law and the law of nations
in wrestling with international ethics,
and uses the just-war theory as a logical
starting place for consideration of other
interventions. Graham is candid and
thoughtful about the problems of such
an approach, as well as about the
strengths of alternatives.
While this volume is a tightly integrated
whole, it is organized into what are essentially eight separate, carefully organized, and self-contained twenty-fivepage lectures. Beginning with the rise of
the state system and of the nation-state,
Graham investigates the ethical assumptions built into this political
framework and the challenges inherent
in such an organization of political life.
He explores just-war theory and
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considers the ethical problems associated with weapons of mass destruction
before turning to the issues that have
increasingly dominated the international agenda of the post–Cold War
period.
Among the joys of this wonderfully erudite but never overwhelming or condescending volume is Graham’s capacity
to explain, without going off on tangents, many of the concepts and distinctions—from the differences
between power and authority and between force and violence to the logic of
the principle of double effect—that, left
unexplained, befuddle so many analyses
and discussions.
Readers are likely to realize many
“aha!” moments as all sorts of nonsensical arguments suddenly make sense.
Surprisingly, given the weightiness of
the topic, this is a book that is difficult
to put down and an important book to
pick up.
EDWARD RHODES

Rutgers University

Kets de Vries, Manfred F. R. Reflections on Character and Leadership: On the Couch with Manfred
Kets de Vries. New York: Wiley, 2009. 332pp.
$29.95

Reflections on Character and Leadership
is not your typical book on leadership.
It delves into aspects that are often neglected in both the classroom and professional press. How often do we focus
on the leader who is dysfunctional and
on what drives the destructiveness?
This is what Manfred Kets de Vries has
set out to do. An engaging writer and
scholar with a penchant for practical
workplace applications, Kets de Vries
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has taught at Harvard and is currently
the Clinical Professor of Leadership at
INSEAD in Paris, one of the world’s
leading and largest business schools.
His background in economics, psychoanalysis, and organization research
gives a holistic perspective to the material, including his recommendations for
intervention.
The author opens by describing troubled entrepreneurs and analyzing the
psychology of dysfunctional leaders.
The examples are vivid and instructive.
As individuals gain recognition, authority, and power, eventually they arrive at
a fork in the road. One path commits
them to serve for the greater good,
while the other leads down the dark
lane of hubris and malevolence. Kets de
Vries then discusses how this choice can
affect organizations and proposes
possible remedial actions.
One reason the “dark side” of leadership is underrepresented in literature is
that the genesis of a pathology is not
readily assessable. Research cannot directly validate the developmental or
emotional voids that lead to paradoxical behavior in the executive ranks. Unfortunately, organizations often reward
personality defects and encourage the
wrong role models. For example, while
charismatic aggressiveness is often
viewed as a positive leadership trait, it
can also be compensatory cover for insecurity or paranoia, for which the
organization will pay a price.
Kets de Vries draws on his clinical and
psychoanalytic research to identify
these pathologies and their consequences, which are frequently substantial. Arrogance, power, and a tendency
to distort reality can result in oppressive micromanagement, a toxic

workplace, and insidiously faulty decisions. In this day and age, we do not
have to look far to find examples.
When confronted with pathological
leadership, followers have three options: flight, fight, or dependency. The
author discusses the strong symbiotic
dynamics between a corrosive leader
and dependent followers. Subconscious
identification with such a leader gives
followers the illusion of control, protection, and purpose. It is a regressive way
for followers to cope with anxiety and
fear, and it is fertile ground for
ideological manipulation.
The book concludes with a discussion
of transformational leadership and the
challenges confronting global organizations. Here Kets de Vries brings to bear
his international leadership-forum experience, stressing the necessity of interpersonal and cultural acumen and of
appropriate organizational structures.
This section contains an intriguing
analysis of how Russian leadership
behavior and thinking has been influenced by that nation’s unique culture.
Reflections on Character and Leadership
is the first of a planned three-volume
series. It suffers from a few irritants that
haunt collected works, such as dated
material, repetition, and unevenness.
However, the convenience and enjoyment of reading a range of material
from this influential and gifted writer
more than compensate for any
transgressions.
HANK KNISKERN

Naval War College
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Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm: My
Years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.
549pp. $30

George Tenet’s tenure as Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) was marked
throughout by controversy, so it is no
surprise that his memoirs face more of
the same. Partisans will never be satisfied; policy and national security insiders, regardless of their depth on the
inside, will find areas with which to disagree; historians will decry the lack of
citations; and individuals who helped to
create some of that history will be glad
for that lack.
Yet for readers not looking for confirmation of their prejudices, At the Center
of the Storm will provide an engrossing
narrative of a critical time in U.S. history. This much cannot be contested:
George Tenet was a key player during a
period that reshaped this nation. Was
he the best possible choice? Some will
argue that he was not, while others who
look back at the history of the CIA during the 1980s and 1990s will be grateful
for his tenure.
At the Center of the Storm is above all a
story of love and passion, for Tenet is
not a cold chronicler who hides his
emotions behind a detached, simple
narrative of events. As Virgil writes, “I
sing of arms and the man,” so does
Tenet. Just as his love for his country
and for his family shines throughout
this work, so does his love for the CIA
and its officers. This book reads as a
first-person history should. It is engrossing and fascinating, with the personal view of “this is what we were
trying to do.”
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Tenet’s strengths were as a leader and
visionary, strengths that civilian agencies, unlike the military, rarely have the
pleasure to experience. Tenet took over
the agency during a time of demoralization and became its greatest champion,
cheerleader, and advocate. If he was not
as successful within the larger intelligence community, it was not for lack of
effort.
Tenet’s appointment showed both the
advantages and disadvantages of having
an intelligence outsider at the helm of
the CIA. As an outsider, he was willing
to challenge the old ways of doing
things that any bureaucracy develops
over time. Changing from a Cold War
world to a multipolar world required a
new perspective to meet new threats
and challenges. But outsiders cannot always recognize the nuances of the intelligence craft (whether operational or
analytic) and risk losing the balance
necessary for producing good intelligence. The reader can decide where
events like the now-infamous
“slam-dunk” incident belong.
Decades from now, historians likely
with no better knowledge than we have
will write an objective account of DCI
George Tenet. If there is a degree of justice in the world, Tenet will be rightfully acknowledged as one of the
greatest DCIs in history. If these historians are faithful to their craft, however,
they will also point out that George
Tenet, like all great men, had an element of hubris that in the end tarnished
his record.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia
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Huchthausen, Peter A., and Alexandre SheldonDuplaix. Hide and Seek: The Untold Story of Cold
War Naval Espionage. New York: Wiley, 2009.
414pp. $30

Contrary to the popular notions of spying as conveyed in novels and films, espionage is a difficult and frequently
dangerous business. Although everyone
does it, some nations are just better at
it. In this work, Peter A. Huchthausen
and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix offer a
series of accounts of naval espionage
after World War II.
While this reviewer cannot attest to the
bona fides of Sheldon-Duplaix, I do
know that Huchthausen was the consummate insider in naval intelligence,
having had a diverse career during
which he always seemed to be in the
middle of the action. His specialty was
in human-source intelligence, with a
primary focus on the Soviet Union and
its navy. Sadly, Peter died in July 2008,
before the formal release of this book,
so it seems somewhat unfair to critique
his work.
To be of value to other than casual
readers, a book on Cold War naval espionage should first describe the national
security context to explain why these
intelligence activities were undertaken
in the first place and what bits of
knowledge were so important that they
required such great risk. Second, it
should ask, what did naval espionage do
to obtain the information, and what
contributions did naval intelligence offer to the problem? What did naval
intelligence add to the body of knowledge? Against this paradigm, Hide and
Seek falls short of the mark.

The early chapters provide an interesting account of the competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union
to obtain German technology immediately after World War II. The authors
go on to discuss the early stages of the
Cold War, culminating with the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962. Although there
are numerous references to archival historical material, books, and personal
correspondence, Huchthausen and
Sheldon-Duplaix largely rely on anecdotes (we call them “sea stories” in the
Navy), loosely strung together, and offer few conclusions. For example, one is
left wondering why the Royal Navy
would risk the life of the World War II
hero, frogman, and MI6 diver Lionel
Crabb in a seemingly failed effort to
conduct underhull reconnaissance of an
aging Soviet warship.
While some insights are provided into
naval intelligence activities during the
Cold War, especially the Cuban missile
crisis, no description is offered of the
enormous contributions of naval intelligence and its operations to the redefinition of the U.S. Navy’s maritime
strategy in the 1980s, which focused on
holding at risk the Soviet ballisticmissile submarine force.
Extensively covered is Project JENNIFER,
the joint CIA-Navy venture to recover
the lost Soviet Golf II ballistic-missile
submarine from the depths of the
northern Pacific Ocean in 1974. The
authors’ unique contribution is a
lengthy description of the efforts taken
by the United States to provide the lost
Soviet submariners dignified burials at
sea when the submarine was recovered—an event that was videotaped and
years later handed over to the Russians.
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Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix also
examine a number of counterintelligence issues, such as the 1961 Christine
Keeler affair in Britain and, more important, the treason of John Walker,
who spied for the Soviets from 1967 to
the mid-1980s and whom the authors
describe as “one of the greatest espionage successes in history.”
Two concluding chapters introduce orthogonal themes, such as the 1980s Soviet operations that culminated in the
“Whiskey on the Rocks” (a euphemism
for the grounding of a Soviet submarine
in Swedish territorial waters) and a bizarre account of how UFOs might have
altered the strategic balance during the
Cold War.
Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix offer an interesting and entertaining read,
one that shows that U.S. naval attachés
at times work in difficult and dangerous
circumstances. However, because of its
excessive use of anecdotes, this book
does not add much to the body of
knowledge about naval espionage—neither that of the United States, of the Soviets, or of anyone else.
JEROME J. BURKE

Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Washington, D.C.

Rhys-Jones, Graham. Churchill and the Norway
Campaign. South Yorkshire, U.K.: Pen and
Sword, 2008. 223pp. $33

“The principle of aiming everything at
the enemy’s center of gravity admits of
only one exception—that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally
rewarding.” This classic dictum, given
to us by the great military theorist Carl
von Clausewitz, provides the impetus
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behind this book. Originally conceived
as a case study for inclusion in the
Strategy and Policy curriculum at the
U.S. Naval War College, this historical
work covers the operations in Norway
during the spring of 1940, one of the
most overlooked campaigns of the Second World War. The reader is presented with a complete account, in a
fast-moving and easy format, of the
strategic decision making that eventually led both Great Britain and France,
on the one side, and Germany, on the
other, to conclude that opening a new
theater in Norway could in fact be
“exceptionally rewarding.”
While Churchill figures prominently in
the book’s title, the reader will find examined not only his policy decisions
and strategic ideas discussed at length
but also the actions and decisions of
numerous other participants in the governments of the major belligerents.
Most studies concerning the war in the
West in 1940 focus on the French military’s epic defeat, but Rhys-Jones offers
an account of French participation in
the war as Great Britain’s strategic partner. The strategic partnership between
the Neville Chamberlain and Édouard
Daladier governments in the spring of
1940 is a subject that usually does not
get much attention, but an interesting
account of that short-lived alliance can
be found in this book.
Rhys-Jones, a former member of the
Naval War College faculty, presents his
analysis in a manner that both students
and faculty at the college will find familiar. He begins at the policy level, focusing on the benefits and drawbacks
that each major participant concludes
are relevant to undertaking operations
in what was considered a secondary theater. He then outlines each belligerent’s
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strategy before presenting a thorough
examination of operations and tactical
considerations for both land and maritime forces involved in the campaign.
The outcome in Norway was never a
foregone conclusion. Germany’s tactical
prowess and brilliant leadership at the
small-unit level are conveyed nicely,
leaving the reader to actually wonder
throughout the narrative whether the
Germans can pull off such a bold and
daring feat of arms.
It is a tribute to Rhys-Jones’s authoritative approach to the subject matter and
his fine writing style that he has created
such a useful study of the elements—
the matching of strategy and policy, the
conduct of joint operations, and the
wisdom of opening a new theater—
while at the same time telling a riveting
story.
Any student of grand strategy, as well as
the casual reader, will find plenty of
value in this well written historical narrative. If there is a waiting list of books
to be included into the curriculum at
the Naval War College, this book
should top the list.
JEFF SHAW

Naval War College

Kuehn, John T. Agents of Innovation: The General
Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the
Japanese Navy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2008. 296pp. $32.95

Skeptics of disarmament treaties, such
as Richard Pearl, have long argued that
these treaties make a nation weaker by
depriving it of the means of self-defense.
John Kuehn, former naval aviator and
presently professor of military history
at the U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is far more subtle in this
excellent book. He shows how the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 froze
battleship construction and yet made
the U.S. Navy stronger by 1941. While
it is never easy to prove something so
counterintuitive, Kuehn does it hands
down.
How did this happen? First, by freezing
the building of battleships the treaty
drove the Navy to invest more time,
money, and imagination into other
projects, particularly submarines and
aircraft carriers. These ships had greater
potential than the battleship, which had
just about reached its maximum technology by the end of World War I. In
addition, by preventing the United
States from enhancing its base fortifications west of Hawaii, the treaty drove
the Navy to design new vessels of much
greater operational radius, build floating dry docks, and enhance its total
transport capabilities. By World War II,
the U.S. Navy could do the seemingly
impossible: beat a peer competitor in
the western Pacific without permanent
bases in the area of operations.
One wonders why the Japanese did not
take advantage of the constraints imposed by U.S. arms limitations. Kuehn
offers a convincing explanation, by focusing on the General Board of the U.S.
Navy. Whereas the Royal Navy and the
Imperial Japanese Navy were hierarchal
and faction ridden, the U.S. General
Board was collegial, collaborative, and
remarkably open to new ideas from all
branches of the service, virtually irrespective of rank. Both the British and
the Japanese fell far behind in antisubmarine warfare. The Japanese stuck to
their Mahanian dogma of decisive naval
battle conducted by large battleships.
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The Americans, meanwhile, built a
more balanced fleet, able to starve Japan of supplies as well as defeat its
forces on land, in the air, and beneath
the sea.
When Kuehn writes of being collegial
and collaborative, this reviewer thought
of a perpetuation of the status quo,
since I was of the opinion that military
innovation is only the by-product of
egotistic individuals who are unable get
along with their fellow officers. Billy
Mitchell, J. F. C. Fuller, George Patton,
and Pete Ellis readily come to mind.
Kuehn points out yet another irony as
well—that the U.S. Navy of the 1920s
thrived because of financial constraints.
All naval officers with pulses and open
eyes could see that they could no longer
rely on their navy’s simply being bigger
than its prospective opponents. Hence
the institution entertained all serious
ideas of reform, so that the rebels, so to
speak, became the norm.
Although this is an excellent book, it is
not perfect. The discussion of flyingdeck cruisers (a model never put into
production) is too long. Chapter 8,
however, which compares innovation
or lack of it in the navies of Britain, Japan, and Germany, is about the best
writing I have seen on military development in the interwar years.
MICHAEL PEARLMAN

Lawrence, Kansas
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(Retired)

Kozak, Warren. LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay. Washington, D.C.: Regnery,
2009. 434pp. $27.95
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Warren Kozak captures the true essence
of General Curtis LeMay. Like many
great leaders, LeMay was a paradox, a
vivid contrast of unique strengths and
debilitating weaknesses. He was insecure, afraid of failure, always questioning his own decisions. LeMay hid his
insecurities beneath a stern and gruff
demeanor that gave the impression of
confidence and strength. The antithesis
of the stereotypical dashing American
flyboy, “LeMay was dark, brooding, and
forbidding. He rarely smiled, he spoke
even less, and when he did, his words
came out in a snarl.”
Always seeking to learn as much as he
could, LeMay not only flew airplanes
but took time to service and repair
them alongside his maintenance crew.
He made himself the best navigator in
the U.S. Army Air Corps. For example,
he successfully located the USS Utah in
a 120,000-square-mile area of the Pacific, and he found the Italian ocean
liner SS Rex in a large Atlantic storm.
As the United States entered World
War II LeMay commanded the 305th
Bomber Group, which began with only
three aircraft to train thirty-five crews.
He was a stern disciplinarian who
demanded excellence.
LeMay was always able to cut to the
heart of the matter. He devised radically
new tactics that improved bombing accuracy and reduced aircraft losses. To
build trust and confidence within his
crew, he led the missions himself. His
success was noticed, and as Generals
Hap Arnold’s and Ira Eaker’s “fireman”
he was given the toughest challenges to
overcome.
Kozak goes on to describe LeMay’s development of Strategic Air Command
(SAC), which supported his long-held
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vision that the best way to avoid war
was through strength and readiness, as
reflected in SAC’s motto: “Peace Is Our
Profession.” LeMay felt he was one of
the few people who understood that the
United States was at war with the Soviet
Union and that the only way SAC could
provide the security that the nation
needed was to be prepared to go to nuclear war at a moment’s notice. Everything he did was focused on that
objective.
After relinquishing command at SAC,
LeMay served as the U.S. Air Force’s
vice chief of staff and then chief of staff
during the Dwight D. Eisenhower, John
F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations. In the later years, LeMay
worked for Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, who, ironically, had once
worked for LeMay as a targeting analyst. The relationship between these two
men was often confrontational, but despite their differences McNamara called
LeMay “the finest military strategist this
nation ever produced.”
The last major chapter in LeMay’s life is
the one probably best remembered and
yet least reflective of LeMay’s internal
values. LeMay’s decision to run for vice
president on the Independent ticket
with Alabama’s Governor George
Wallace confounded everyone, including his own wife, daughter, and closest
associates. Kozak maintains there is no
evidence of LeMay being a racist and
maintains that the only reason he chose
to run was to split the vote, ensuring
that Democratic presidential candidate,
Hubert Humphrey, would not win the
election and so continue the policies of
the Johnson administration. By running, LeMay believed, he was taking
“one last chance to rise up and do battle” against the “defense intellectuals,”

whom he believed would cut the U.S.
deterrent until the Soviets could win a
general war.
This book’s greatest value might be that
it offers an opportunity to consider objectively the impact that Curtis E.
LeMay (the youngest general in modern
American history and its longest serving) had on the events that shaped this
nation for many years to come.
ROGER DUCEY

Naval War College

Willmott, H. P. The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books, 2008. 520pp. $17.60

The Great Crusade is a comprehensive
military history of World War II. With a
focus on strategic-level military operations and a global perspective, this work
provides a particularly complete and nationally balanced account of the war. H.
P. Willmott achieves his ambitious goal
of providing “a basic reference and guide
to the war” that offers balance among
the major fronts of the conflict and illuminates “why events unfolded in the
manner in which they did.”
The Great Crusade discusses conflict
between countries and systems, not
between leaders or equipment. It is
about “how states make war and the basis on which services planned, executed
and either won or lost campaigns.”
Willmott distinguishes between the use
of available forces by military commanders to win campaigns and the use
of national power to win wars. National
and international political factors, beginning in 1931, get the attention they
deserve. How and why countries joined
and left the conflict (including the
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lesser Axis members) is presented in
context but without excess sympathy.
The ideology and associated atrocities
of Germany and Japan strengthened
morale at home and intimidated some,
but brutality prevented any prospect of
willing economic or military support
from conquered areas, particularly
China and the non-Russian parts of the
Soviet Union. The failure of the German and Japanese governments to mobilize their economies effectively when
at war contrasts with efforts by the key
Allied powers.
Willmott argues convincingly against numerous popular ideas concerning the war.
He attacks the “myth of German military
excellence,” offering numerous examples
of error and failure in military efforts and
in related economic and political activities. He highlights the paramount importance of the Russian front, covering the
enormous scale of combat and the tremendous improvement in Soviet military
strategic and operational skill.
This work is rich with comparisons between campaigns, strategies, and countries, and it covers land, sea, and air
operations with good balance. Numerous statistics illustrate key ideas and
strengthen the historical narrative. Dozens of maps help illustrate key campaigns. Also, the general index is useful.
Corrections to page numbers in the
“Campaign Index” planned for the second printing will make this book invaluable. The bibliography organizes
suggestions into fourteen categories
that reflect regions or themes in a way
that may compensate for the absence of
citations.
Willmott’s impressive credentials include faculty experience at several universities and at the Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst. He has written
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nineteen books and coauthored several
others. He is a fellow of the Royal
Historical Society.
Because this work is “a general overview
of military events” with some emphasis
on correcting popular misunderstandings, it offers a great deal to readers at
every level of expertise. This sweeping
history provides the reader with great
insights into World War II in particular
but also into enduring issues, including
relationships between military,
political, and economic power.
BRENT BOSTON

Commander, U.S. Navy

Barritt, M. K. Eyes of the Admiralty: J. T. Serres—
an Artist in the Channel Fleet, 1799–1800. London: Hydrographic Office and National Maritime Museum, 2008. 144pp. $39.95

For centuries, the port of Brest in
northwestern France has been the chief
naval base and dockyard for French naval operations in the North Atlantic and
the Channel. For Britain, during the
Napoleonic Wars—as well as in all the
maritime wars between Britain and
France in 1689 and 1815—the French
Brest squadron was a central threat to
the Royal Navy. British naval strategy to
counter this threat had a number of elements. The Royal Navy’s Channel
Squadron had, as a primary duty, the
blockade of Brest. These operations
served the strategic function of deterring the Brest squadron from leaving
port and, thereby, of preventing it from
launching an invasion force against
Britain or its overseas possessions, attacking the British fleet, or interfering
with British warships and merchant
convoys that were using the nearby
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sea-lanes en route to various other parts
of the world. Given the central importance of dealing with the French naval
threat, British naval activities off Brest
are important in naval history and, not
surprisingly, they feature too in the
widely read historical naval novels that
are set in the period of the naval wars of
the French Revolution and Napoleon.
This volume is about a British naval intelligence operation off Brest in 1799–
1800. The story begins at a critical moment. The Second Coalition against
France had just been formed in June
1799, and in December Napoleon was
making his way back from Egypt to
overthrow the Directory and to make
himself First Consul. In London, halfway
between those events in September 1799,
the First Secretary of the Admiralty,
Evan Nepean, found that nothing available in any government office in London
provided a detailed visual image of Brest
that the First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord St.
Vincent, could use to understand the operational challenges or opportunities
that the port presented. To fill this gap in
British naval intelligence, Nepean ordered John Thomas Serres to report immediately to a frigate with the inshore
squadron on blockading duty to paint a
series of views of Brest and the nearby
coast of Brittany.
John Thomas Serres (1759–1825) was
the son of Dominic Serres (1719–93), a
French merchant seaman, who had
been captured in 1748 and brought to
England. Making his hobby of drawing
and painting into a lucrative new career, the elder Serres had become one of
the founders of the Royal Society of Art.
His evocative and highly accurate depictions of naval battles during the War
of the American Revolution had
brought him wide praise and, at the

very end of his life, in 1791, the title of
Marine Painter to King George III. On
his death two years later, his son, John
Thomas Serres, who was already Master
Draughtsman to the Admiralty,
inherited his father’s position.
Serres’s beautiful and informative
sketches and paintings from this important mission have lain long unnoticed
by naval historians at the archives of
Britain’s Hydrographic Office in Taunton, Devon. Captain Michael K. Barritt,
Royal Navy (retired), has now brought
them to light in a beautifully produced
volume that is accompanied by Barritt’s
well researched, skillfully written, and
informative history of Serres’s mission.
Barritt first came to learn of this material when in 2003 he retired after
thirty-three years of naval service, having risen to become Hydrographer of
the Royal Navy. Fascinated by a framed
image from this series that he received
as a retirement gift, he set out on a research quest to understand more about
it. This book is the result of that research, which is informed by his naval
career and professional hydrographic
expertise as well as by his undergraduate education in history under Piers
Mackesy at Pembroke College, Oxford.
The story that Barritt tells in this volume is a valuable contribution to naval
history, one that directly complements
the documents in the Navy Records Society’s volume edited by Roger Morriss,
The Channel Fleet and the Blockade of
Brest, 1793–1801 (vol. 141, 2001). At the
same time, Barritt describes in this
beautifully illustrated volume a naval
mission that is full of action and interest for both the general reader and the
naval professional.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Naval War College
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IN MY VIEW

“THE HEART OF AN OFFICER”

Sir:
Every successful officer considers his career path as that most appropriate and
useful. So it is—for him or her. Certainly the successes of Admiral Stavridis and
Captain Hagerott testify to the worth of their credentials to make the arguments
in their article [see James Stavridis and Mark Hagerott, “The Heart of an Officer:
Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development,” in the Spring 2009 issue, pp. 27–41]. But the thrust of their argument,
based upon their own histories and experiences, is not congruent with the mission of the Navy. Officer selection, training, education, and experience are not,
and should not be, intended to prepare officers to serve as joint combatant commanders. The Navy needs to produce only a handful of senior officers each year
for these tasks. But several hundred officers are required as commanding officers
of battle groups, amphibious ready groups, ships, aircraft squadrons, and the
shore stations supporting them.
These commanding officers are those who execute the actual function of the
Navy—to serve at sea or in direct support of those who do. The Navy’s job is at
sea, there to perform effectively and efficiently over long periods. The individual
components that perform the functions are highly technical in form and substance. While a grasp of history, political science, and sociology is useful and
mastery of language is extremely beneficial, these are not areas that help officers
to operate and maintain complex machinery. The nod to nuclear power in their
essay is an acknowledgment of this fact, but their relegating such expertise to
that specialty damages the capability of the rest of the fleet.
The decision to require line officers to master the technology of ship’s propulsion—made over a hundred years ago—set the stage for a grasp of technical details in commanders. The proposal to relegate these details back to engineering
duty specialists carries the second-order effect of removing technical competence from line officers just when the technologies of warfare have become more
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complex than those of ship’s propulsion. The expertise demanded of submarine
officers in the understanding of the physics of their propulsion plant also generates understanding of the physics of sound in the ocean—a comprehension vital
to that warfare specialty.
Every officer needs an honest appreciation of the laws of physics, theories of
thermodynamics, the fundamentals of preventive and corrective maintenance,
and some comprehension of computer technology. Previous episodes in which
concerns with the machinery of the ships were relegated to the sidelines resulted
in such a poor state of material conditions and upper-level supervision that Admiral Holloway, then Chief of Naval Operations, had to require special engineering training for all officers going to command at sea; the establishment of
the Propulsion Plant Examining Boards and years of attention were needed to
restore surface ships to reasonable standards of readiness. Today and for the future the bottom line remains: if officers cannot get their ships under way and operate them effectively, their ships are liabilities, not assets.
Legislative demands have eroded the goals of technical excellence over the
past thirty years, at the price of achieving jointness. But “jointness” has little
meaning at sea—other services have few functions there and even less interest.
The proposal of Admiral Stavridis and Captain Hagerott to generalize the majority of naval officers serves to further this erosion.
Admiral Stavridis’s career demonstrates that there are especially talented individuals who respond to the educational opportunities and who can excel at
joint commands. There will always be such individuals. Constructing career
paths to make every officer a potential combatant commander shortchanges the
true epitome of the naval profession—Command at Sea.

W. J. HOLLAND, JR.

Rear Admiral, USN (Retired)
Vice President, Naval Historical Foundation
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REFLECTIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program.

O

ne of the primary goals of the Navy Professional Reading Program
(NPRP) is to provide sailors with opportunities for professional development that will enable them to do better jobs as twenty-first-century warriors.
Each book is a window into a world readers may have never encountered, and
each conveys concepts relevant to their professional and personal lives. A topic
may best be learned about by reading a number of books within the NPRP library. For example, American forces are increasingly focusing on military operations in Afghanistan. Three books in the primary library and one in the
“supplemental reading” list are particularly relevant to an understanding of this
ancient part of the world.
From the Junior Enlisted Collection. The Kite Runner, by Afghan novelist Khaled
Hosseini, paints a sometimes painful and sometimes poetic picture of life in Afghanistan from the fall of the monarchy in the 1970s through the Soviet invasion
and into the era of the rise of the Taliban. The story includes the protagonist’s
escape to Pakistan, immigration to the United States, and return to a land permanently changed by war and tribal struggles. This book will help readers understand many of the factors that continue to influence conflict in a part of the
world that has seen little peace in the past three hundred years.

From the Department/Command Leaders Collection. Imperial Grunts, by Robert D. Kaplan, focuses on the day-to-day life and military missions of America’s
fighting men and women who serve on the ground in some of the world’s hot
spots. Kaplan spent time with the troops on battlefields around the globe, and he
paints a vivid picture of life on the “tip of the spear.” His book is divided into
chapters covering operations in various military areas of responsibility, and his
chapter on Central Command and Special Operations Command provides an
in-depth look at the work done by the “grunts” in Afghanistan in the autumn of
2003. He describes the frustration of troops over how the war was being waged
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by “rear echelon” forces at Bagram Air Force Base and how the headquarters organization was consuming resources (like helicopters) badly needed elsewhere
in-country. He quotes one observer’s description of Afghanistan as “a road-less,
broken and under-developed country; an absence of any strategic points; a
well-armed enemy with great mobility and modern rifles, who adopts guerrilla
tactics. The results . . . are that the troops can march anywhere, and do anything,
except catch the enemy.” What makes this quote particularly interesting is that it
was written by a young Winston Churchill about conditions in 1897!
From the Junior Enlisted Collection. Lone Survivor, by Marcus Luttrell, tells the
story of the sole survivor of Operation REDWING, an ill-fated Navy SEAL mission to capture or kill a notorious al-Qa‘ida leader in the Afghan mountains
along the Pakistani border. Readers will learn about the mission itself, how a decision to adhere to the law of armed conflict led to the deaths of three of the four
team members, and how another eight SEALs and eight Army Rangers were
killed in a rescue mission to reach their fallen comrades. They will also meet the
Afghan villagers who took in the badly wounded sailor and hid him from the
Taliban killers who were looking to finish the bloody work they had started on
the mountaintop.
From the Supplemental Reading List. Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to
Promote Peace, One School at a Time, by Greg Mortensen and David Oliver Relin,
portrays a much more peaceful and more hopeful vision of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This book is a favorite of the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, who personally visited the school built
by Mortensen in the remote Afghan village of Pushgahar, one of nearly two hundred built in Central Asia exclusively with donated funds. It is also required
reading for special operations forces who deal at the most personal level with local inhabitants in the region.
NPRP books, including three of the four titles mentioned above, have been provided to every major command and activity in the Navy, and they are available
for sale at the Navy Exchange and from commercial booksellers. There is no
better way to learn about the world around you than through the eyes of such
authors.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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